From 9d77db3c730780c8ef5ccd4b66403ff5675cfe4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Mon, 13 May 2024 10:30:14 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] modify sin led gpio
---
kernel/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
1 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c b/kernel/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
index 35e1fb7..64e0f48 100644
--- a/kernel/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
+++ b/kernel/net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/* SCTP kernel implementation
* (C) Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2004
* Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Cisco, Inc.
@@ -9,22 +10,6 @@
* These functions work with the state functions in sctp_sm_statefuns.c
* to implement the state operations. These functions implement the
* steps which require modifying existing data structures.
- *
- * This SCTP implementation is free software;
- * you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
- * the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
- * any later version.
- *
- * This SCTP implementation is distributed in the hope that it
- * will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
- * ************************
- * warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
- * See the GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, see
- * <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the
* email address(es):
@@ -222,7 +207,6 @@
const struct sctp_bind_addr *bp,
gfp_t gfp, int vparam_len)
{
- struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
struct sctp_supported_ext_param ext_param;
struct sctp_adaptation_ind_param aiparam;
struct sctp_paramhdr *auth_chunks = NULL;
@@ -260,9 +244,11 @@
chunksize = sizeof(init) + addrs_len;
chunksize += SCTP_PAD4(SCTP_SAT_LEN(num_types));
- chunksize += sizeof(ecap_param);
- if (asoc->prsctp_enable)
+ if (asoc->ep->ecn_enable)
+ chunksize += sizeof(ecap_param);
+
+ if (asoc->ep->prsctp_enable)
chunksize += sizeof(prsctp_param);
/* ADDIP: Section 4.2.7:
@@ -270,13 +256,13 @@
* the ASCONF,the ASCONF-ACK, and the AUTH chunks in its INIT and
* INIT-ACK parameters.
*/
- if (net->sctp.addip_enable) {
+ if (asoc->ep->asconf_enable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF;
extensions[num_ext+1] = SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK;
num_ext += 2;
}
- if (asoc->reconf_enable) {
+ if (asoc->ep->reconf_enable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_RECONF;
num_ext += 1;
}
@@ -284,7 +270,7 @@
if (sp->adaptation_ind)
chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
- if (sp->strm_interleave) {
+ if (asoc->ep->intl_enable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_I_DATA;
num_ext += 1;
}
@@ -351,7 +337,8 @@
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(sat), &sat);
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, num_types * sizeof(__u16), &types);
- sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ecap_param), &ecap_param);
+ if (asoc->ep->ecn_enable)
+ sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(ecap_param), &ecap_param);
/* Add the supported extensions parameter. Be nice and add this
* fist before addiding the parameters for the extensions themselves
@@ -363,7 +350,7 @@
sctp_addto_param(retval, num_ext, extensions);
}
- if (asoc->prsctp_enable)
+ if (asoc->ep->prsctp_enable)
sctp_addto_chunk(retval, sizeof(prsctp_param), &prsctp_param);
if (sp->adaptation_ind) {
@@ -453,7 +440,7 @@
if (sp->adaptation_ind)
chunksize += sizeof(aiparam);
- if (asoc->intl_enable) {
+ if (asoc->peer.intl_capable) {
extensions[num_ext] = SCTP_CID_I_DATA;
num_ext += 1;
}
@@ -1248,7 +1235,7 @@
/* Create an Operation Error chunk of a fixed size, specifically,
* min(asoc->pathmtu, SCTP_DEFAULT_MAXSEGMENT) - overheads.
- * This is a helper function to allocate an error chunk for for those
+ * This is a helper function to allocate an error chunk for those
* invalid parameter codes in which we may not want to report all the
* errors, if the incoming chunk is large. If it can't fit in a single
* packet, we ignore it.
@@ -1683,18 +1670,14 @@
ntohs(init_chunk->chunk_hdr->length), raw_addrs, addrs_len);
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac) {
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
int err;
/* Sign the message. */
- desc->tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
- desc->flags = 0;
-
- err = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, ep->secret_key,
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, ep->secret_key,
sizeof(ep->secret_key)) ?:
- crypto_shash_digest(desc, (u8 *)&cookie->c, bodysize,
- cookie->signature);
- shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, (u8 *)&cookie->c, bodysize,
+ cookie->signature);
if (err)
goto free_cookie;
}
@@ -1755,18 +1738,13 @@
/* Check the signature. */
{
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
int err;
- desc->tfm = sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac;
- desc->flags = 0;
-
- err = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, ep->secret_key,
+ err = crypto_shash_setkey(tfm, ep->secret_key,
sizeof(ep->secret_key)) ?:
- crypto_shash_digest(desc, (u8 *)bear_cookie, bodysize,
- digest);
- shash_desc_zero(desc);
-
+ crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, (u8 *)bear_cookie, bodysize,
+ digest);
if (err) {
*error = -SCTP_IERROR_NOMEM;
goto fail;
@@ -1802,7 +1780,7 @@
* for init collision case of lost COOKIE ACK.
* If skb has been timestamped, then use the stamp, otherwise
* use current time. This introduces a small possibility that
- * that a cookie may be considered expired, but his would only slow
+ * a cookie may be considered expired, but this would only slow
* down the new association establishment instead of every packet.
*/
if (sock_flag(ep->base.sk, SOCK_TIMESTAMP))
@@ -1985,7 +1963,9 @@
return 0;
}
-static int sctp_verify_ext_param(struct net *net, union sctp_params param)
+static int sctp_verify_ext_param(struct net *net,
+ const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+ union sctp_params param)
{
__u16 num_ext = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
int have_asconf = 0;
@@ -2012,7 +1992,7 @@
if (net->sctp.addip_noauth)
return 1;
- if (net->sctp.addip_enable && !have_auth && have_asconf)
+ if (ep->asconf_enable && !have_auth && have_asconf)
return 0;
return 1;
@@ -2022,18 +2002,16 @@
union sctp_params param)
{
__u16 num_ext = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
- struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_ext; i++) {
switch (param.ext->chunks[i]) {
case SCTP_CID_RECONF:
- if (asoc->reconf_enable &&
- !asoc->peer.reconf_capable)
+ if (asoc->ep->reconf_enable)
asoc->peer.reconf_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_CID_FWD_TSN:
- if (asoc->prsctp_enable && !asoc->peer.prsctp_capable)
+ if (asoc->ep->prsctp_enable)
asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_CID_AUTH:
@@ -2045,12 +2023,12 @@
break;
case SCTP_CID_ASCONF:
case SCTP_CID_ASCONF_ACK:
- if (net->sctp.addip_enable)
+ if (asoc->ep->asconf_enable)
asoc->peer.asconf_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_CID_I_DATA:
- if (sctp_sk(asoc->base.sk)->strm_interleave)
- asoc->intl_enable = 1;
+ if (asoc->ep->intl_enable)
+ asoc->peer.intl_capable = 1;
break;
default:
break;
@@ -2099,7 +2077,7 @@
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_DISCARD_ERR:
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ERROR;
- /* Fall through */
+ fallthrough;
case SCTP_PARAM_ACTION_SKIP_ERR:
/* Make an ERROR chunk, preparing enough room for
* returning multiple unknown parameters.
@@ -2167,13 +2145,13 @@
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT:
- if (!sctp_verify_ext_param(net, param))
+ if (!sctp_verify_ext_param(net, ep, param))
return SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
- if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
- goto fallthrough;
+ if (!ep->asconf_enable)
+ goto unhandled;
if (ntohs(param.p->length) < sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param) +
sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr)) {
@@ -2192,11 +2170,11 @@
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
if (ep->prsctp_enable)
break;
- goto fallthrough;
+ goto unhandled;
case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
- goto fallthrough;
+ goto unhandled;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Secion 6.1
* If the random number is not 32 byte long the association
@@ -2213,7 +2191,7 @@
case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
- goto fallthrough;
+ goto unhandled;
/* SCTP-AUTH: Section 3.2
* The CHUNKS parameter MUST be included once in the INIT or
@@ -2229,7 +2207,7 @@
case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
- goto fallthrough;
+ goto unhandled;
hmacs = (struct sctp_hmac_algo_param *)param.p;
n_elt = (ntohs(param.p->length) -
@@ -2252,7 +2230,7 @@
retval = SCTP_IERROR_ABORT;
}
break;
-fallthrough:
+unhandled:
default:
pr_debug("%s: unrecognized param:%d for chunk:%d\n",
__func__, ntohs(param.p->type), cid);
@@ -2333,7 +2311,6 @@
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
struct sctp_init_chunk *peer_init, gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
struct sctp_transport *transport;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
union sctp_params param;
@@ -2349,7 +2326,7 @@
/* This implementation defaults to making the first transport
* added as the primary transport. The source address seems to
- * be a a better choice than any of the embedded addresses.
+ * be a better choice than any of the embedded addresses.
*/
if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, peer_addr, gfp, SCTP_ACTIVE))
goto nomem;
@@ -2391,8 +2368,8 @@
* also give us an option to silently ignore the packet, which
* is what we'll do here.
*/
- if (!net->sctp.addip_noauth &&
- (asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable)) {
+ if (!asoc->base.net->sctp.addip_noauth &&
+ (asoc->peer.asconf_capable && !asoc->peer.auth_capable)) {
asoc->peer.addip_disabled_mask |= (SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP |
SCTP_PARAM_DEL_IP |
SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY);
@@ -2519,9 +2496,9 @@
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
+ struct net *net = asoc->base.net;
struct sctp_transport *t;
enum sctp_scope scope;
union sctp_addr addr;
@@ -2614,8 +2591,7 @@
case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
asoc->peer.cookie_len =
ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(struct sctp_paramhdr);
- if (asoc->peer.cookie)
- kfree(asoc->peer.cookie);
+ kfree(asoc->peer.cookie);
asoc->peer.cookie = kmemdup(param.cookie->body, asoc->peer.cookie_len, gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.cookie)
retval = 0;
@@ -2630,15 +2606,20 @@
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
- asoc->peer.ecn_capable = 1;
- break;
+ if (asoc->ep->ecn_enable) {
+ asoc->peer.ecn_capable = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Fall Through */
+ goto fall_through;
+
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
asoc->peer.adaptation_ind = ntohl(param.aind->adaptation_ind);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
- if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
+ if (!ep->asconf_enable)
goto fall_through;
addr_param = param.v + sizeof(struct sctp_addip_param);
@@ -2666,7 +2647,7 @@
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
- if (asoc->prsctp_enable) {
+ if (asoc->ep->prsctp_enable) {
asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1;
break;
}
@@ -2678,8 +2659,7 @@
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's random parameter */
- if (asoc->peer.peer_random)
- kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
+ kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
@@ -2693,8 +2673,7 @@
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's HMAC list */
- if (asoc->peer.peer_hmacs)
- kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
+ kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
@@ -2710,8 +2689,7 @@
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
- if (asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
- kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
+ kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
--
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