From 8ac6c7a54ed1b98d142dce24b11c6de6a1e239a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 10:36:11 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] 修改4g拨号为QMI,需要在系统里后台执行quectel-CM
---
kernel/net/bluetooth/smp.c | 343 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------------------
1 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 215 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/kernel/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 719ae1d..b7374db 100644
--- a/kernel/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/kernel/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/b128ops.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
@@ -88,7 +89,6 @@
u8 local_rand[16];
bool debug_key;
- struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
};
@@ -127,7 +127,6 @@
u8 dhkey[32];
u8 mackey[16];
- struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
};
@@ -171,7 +170,6 @@
size_t len, u8 mac[16])
{
uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
int err;
if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
@@ -181,9 +179,6 @@
BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
return -EINVAL;
}
-
- desc->tfm = tfm;
- desc->flags = 0;
/* Swap key and message from LSB to MSB */
swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
@@ -198,8 +193,7 @@
return err;
}
- err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
- shash_desc_zero(desc);
+ err = crypto_shash_tfm_digest(tfm, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("Hash computation error %d", err);
return err;
@@ -378,22 +372,18 @@
* s1 and ah.
*/
-static int smp_e(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 *k, u8 *r)
+static int smp_e(const u8 *k, u8 *r)
{
+ struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx;
uint8_t tmp[16], data[16];
int err;
SMP_DBG("k %16phN r %16phN", k, r);
- if (!tfm) {
- BT_ERR("tfm %p", tfm);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
/* The most significant octet of key corresponds to k[0] */
swap_buf(k, tmp, 16);
- err = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, tmp, 16);
+ err = aes_expandkey(&ctx, tmp, 16);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("cipher setkey failed: %d", err);
return err;
@@ -402,17 +392,18 @@
/* Most significant octet of plaintextData corresponds to data[0] */
swap_buf(r, data, 16);
- crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data, data);
+ aes_encrypt(&ctx, data, data);
/* Most significant octet of encryptedData corresponds to data[0] */
swap_buf(data, r, 16);
SMP_DBG("r %16phN", r);
+ memzero_explicit(&ctx, sizeof (ctx));
return err;
}
-static int smp_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+static int smp_c1(const u8 k[16],
const u8 r[16], const u8 preq[7], const u8 pres[7], u8 _iat,
const bdaddr_t *ia, u8 _rat, const bdaddr_t *ra, u8 res[16])
{
@@ -437,7 +428,7 @@
u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) r, (u128 *) p1);
/* res = e(k, res) */
- err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
+ err = smp_e(k, res);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
return err;
@@ -454,14 +445,14 @@
u128_xor((u128 *) res, (u128 *) res, (u128 *) p2);
/* res = e(k, res) */
- err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, res);
+ err = smp_e(k, res);
if (err)
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
return err;
}
-static int smp_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes, const u8 k[16],
+static int smp_s1(const u8 k[16],
const u8 r1[16], const u8 r2[16], u8 _r[16])
{
int err;
@@ -470,15 +461,14 @@
memcpy(_r, r2, 8);
memcpy(_r + 8, r1, 8);
- err = smp_e(tfm_aes, k, _r);
+ err = smp_e(k, _r);
if (err)
BT_ERR("Encrypt data error");
return err;
}
-static int smp_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, const u8 irk[16],
- const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
+static int smp_ah(const u8 irk[16], const u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
{
u8 _res[16];
int err;
@@ -487,7 +477,7 @@
memcpy(_res, r, 3);
memset(_res + 3, 0, 13);
- err = smp_e(tfm, irk, _res);
+ err = smp_e(irk, _res);
if (err) {
BT_ERR("Encrypt error");
return err;
@@ -508,18 +498,15 @@
const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
- struct smp_dev *smp;
u8 hash[3];
int err;
if (!chan || !chan->data)
return false;
- smp = chan->data;
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
- BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
-
- err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+ err = smp_ah(irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
if (err)
return false;
@@ -529,24 +516,21 @@
int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
- struct smp_dev *smp;
int err;
if (!chan || !chan->data)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
- smp = chan->data;
get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f; /* Clear two most significant bits */
rpa->b[5] |= 0x40; /* Set second most significant bit */
- err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
+ err = smp_ah(irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- BT_DBG("RPA %pMR", rpa);
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "RPA %pMR", rpa);
return 0;
}
@@ -563,7 +547,7 @@
smp = chan->data;
if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
- BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "Using debug keys");
err = set_ecdh_privkey(smp->tfm_ecdh, debug_sk);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -622,7 +606,7 @@
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
- iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE | ITER_KVEC, iv, 2, 1 + len);
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, iv, 2, 1 + len);
l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
@@ -742,6 +726,10 @@
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+ if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
+ max_key_size != SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
+ return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
+
if (max_key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
@@ -765,11 +753,10 @@
complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
- kzfree(smp->csrk);
- kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
- kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->csrk);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->slave_csrk);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
- crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
@@ -802,7 +789,7 @@
}
chan->data = NULL;
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
hci_conn_drop(hcon);
}
@@ -867,7 +854,7 @@
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
u32 passkey = 0;
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret;
/* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
@@ -896,9 +883,16 @@
hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
smp->method = JUST_WORKS;
- /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
+ /* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK and ask user-space for
+ * confirmation */
if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS) {
- set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
+ ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst,
+ hcon->type,
+ hcon->dst_type,
+ passkey, 1);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ set_bit(SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER, &smp->flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -915,8 +909,8 @@
hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
}
- /* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
- * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
+ /* If both devices have Keyboard-Display I/O, the initiator
+ * Confirms and the responder Enters the passkey.
*/
if (smp->method == OVERLAP) {
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
@@ -958,7 +952,7 @@
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
- ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
conn->hcon->init_addr_type, &conn->hcon->init_addr,
conn->hcon->resp_addr_type, &conn->hcon->resp_addr,
cp.confirm_val);
@@ -984,12 +978,9 @@
u8 confirm[16];
int ret;
- if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(smp->tfm_aes))
- return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-
BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
- ret = smp_c1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
+ ret = smp_c1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->preq, smp->prsp,
hcon->init_addr_type, &hcon->init_addr,
hcon->resp_addr_type, &hcon->resp_addr, confirm);
if (ret)
@@ -1006,7 +997,7 @@
__le64 rand = 0;
__le16 ediv = 0;
- smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
+ smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, stk);
if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -1022,7 +1013,7 @@
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
smp->prnd);
- smp_s1(smp->tfm_aes, smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
+ smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
auth = 1;
@@ -1161,11 +1152,11 @@
return;
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
- /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
+ /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7031 */
const u8 salt[16] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, salt, smp->link_key)) {
- kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
smp->link_key = NULL;
return;
}
@@ -1174,14 +1165,14 @@
const u8 tmp1[4] = { 0x31, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
- kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
smp->link_key = NULL;
return;
}
}
if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
- kzfree(smp->link_key);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp->link_key);
smp->link_key = NULL;
return;
}
@@ -1219,7 +1210,7 @@
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CT2, &smp->flags)) {
- /* SALT = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
+ /* SALT = 0x000000000000000000000000746D7032 */
const u8 salt[16] = { 0x32, 0x70, 0x6d, 0x74 };
if (smp_h7(smp->tfm_cmac, key->val, salt, smp->tk))
@@ -1390,19 +1381,13 @@
if (!smp)
return NULL;
- smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
- BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
- goto zfree_smp;
- }
-
smp->tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
- goto free_cipher;
+ goto zfree_smp;
}
- smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ smp->tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_ecdh)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
goto free_shash;
@@ -1421,10 +1406,8 @@
free_shash:
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
-free_cipher:
- crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
zfree_smp:
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
return NULL;
}
@@ -1671,7 +1654,7 @@
memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
put_unaligned_le32(value, smp->tk);
- /* Fall Through */
+ fallthrough;
case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags);
break;
@@ -1884,7 +1867,7 @@
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = smp->conn->hcon->hdev;
- BT_DBG("");
+ bt_dev_dbg(hdev, "");
if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
@@ -2139,7 +2122,7 @@
struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb;
+ u8 *pkax, *pkbx, *na, *nb, confirm_hint;
u32 passkey;
int err;
@@ -2192,6 +2175,24 @@
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
smp->prnd);
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
+
+ /* Only Just-Works pairing requires extra checks */
+ if (smp->method != JUST_WORKS)
+ goto mackey_and_ltk;
+
+ /* If there already exists long term key in local host, leave
+ * the decision to user space since the remote device could
+ * be legitimate or malicious.
+ */
+ if (hci_find_ltk(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+ hcon->role)) {
+ /* Set passkey to 0. The value can be any number since
+ * it'll be ignored anyway.
+ */
+ passkey = 0;
+ confirm_hint = 1;
+ goto confirm;
+ }
}
mackey_and_ltk:
@@ -2200,7 +2201,7 @@
if (err)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
- if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS || smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
+ if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
if (hcon->out) {
sc_dhkey_check(smp);
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_DHKEY_CHECK);
@@ -2212,8 +2213,14 @@
if (err)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+ confirm_hint = 0;
+
+confirm:
+ if (smp->method == JUST_WORKS)
+ confirm_hint = 1;
+
err = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type,
- hcon->dst_type, passkey, 0);
+ hcon->dst_type, passkey, confirm_hint);
if (err)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -2388,12 +2395,17 @@
authreq |= SMP_AUTH_CT2;
}
- /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
- * requires it.
+ /* Don't attempt to set MITM if setting is overridden by debugfs
+ * Needed to pass certification test SM/MAS/PKE/BV-01-C
*/
- if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
- hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
- authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+ if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_FORCE_NO_MITM)) {
+ /* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
+ * requires it.
+ */
+ if (hcon->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT ||
+ hcon->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+ authreq |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+ }
if (hcon->role == HCI_ROLE_MASTER) {
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
@@ -2477,6 +2489,15 @@
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+ /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
+ if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_LTK,
+ rp->ltk)) {
+ bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
+ "LTK blocked for %pMR",
+ &conn->hcon->dst);
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+ }
+
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
@@ -2532,6 +2553,15 @@
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+
+ /* Pairing is aborted if any blocked keys are distributed */
+ if (hci_is_blocked_key(conn->hcon->hdev, HCI_BLOCKED_KEY_TYPE_IRK,
+ info->irk)) {
+ bt_dev_warn_ratelimited(conn->hcon->hdev,
+ "Identity key blocked for %pMR",
+ &conn->hcon->dst);
+ return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+ }
SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
@@ -3046,7 +3076,7 @@
if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
return;
- /* Only master may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
+ /* Only initiator may initiate SMP over BR/EDR */
if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
return;
@@ -3242,7 +3272,6 @@
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
struct smp_dev *smp;
- struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
@@ -3255,32 +3284,22 @@
if (!smp)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
- BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
- kzfree(smp);
- return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
- }
-
tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
- crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
}
- tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
- crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
return ERR_CAST(tfm_ecdh);
}
smp->local_oob = false;
- smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
smp->tfm_ecdh = tfm_ecdh;
@@ -3288,10 +3307,9 @@
chan = l2cap_chan_create();
if (!chan) {
if (smp) {
- crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
}
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
@@ -3336,10 +3354,9 @@
smp = chan->data;
if (smp) {
chan->data = NULL;
- crypto_free_cipher(smp->tfm_aes);
crypto_free_shash(smp->tfm_cmac);
crypto_free_kpp(smp->tfm_ecdh);
- kzfree(smp);
+ kfree_sensitive(smp);
}
l2cap_chan_put(chan);
@@ -3401,94 +3418,6 @@
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
-static ssize_t le_min_key_size_read(struct file *file,
- char __user *user_buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
- char buf[4];
-
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", hdev->le_min_key_size);
-
- return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
-}
-
-static ssize_t le_min_key_size_write(struct file *file,
- const char __user *user_buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
- char buf[32];
- size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
- u8 key_size;
-
- if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- buf[buf_size] = '\0';
-
- sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
-
- if (key_size > hdev->le_max_key_size ||
- key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- hdev->le_min_key_size = key_size;
-
- return count;
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations le_min_key_size_fops = {
- .open = simple_open,
- .read = le_min_key_size_read,
- .write = le_min_key_size_write,
- .llseek = default_llseek,
-};
-
-static ssize_t le_max_key_size_read(struct file *file,
- char __user *user_buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
- char buf[4];
-
- snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%2u\n", hdev->le_max_key_size);
-
- return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, strlen(buf));
-}
-
-static ssize_t le_max_key_size_write(struct file *file,
- const char __user *user_buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
- char buf[32];
- size_t buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
- u8 key_size;
-
- if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- buf[buf_size] = '\0';
-
- sscanf(buf, "%hhu", &key_size);
-
- if (key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE ||
- key_size < hdev->le_min_key_size)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- hdev->le_max_key_size = key_size;
-
- return count;
-}
-
-static const struct file_operations le_max_key_size_fops = {
- .open = simple_open,
- .read = le_max_key_size_read,
- .write = le_max_key_size_write,
- .llseek = default_llseek,
-};
-
int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
{
struct l2cap_chan *chan;
@@ -3512,11 +3441,6 @@
return PTR_ERR(chan);
hdev->smp_data = chan;
-
- debugfs_create_file("le_min_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
- &le_min_key_size_fops);
- debugfs_create_file("le_max_key_size", 0644, hdev->debugfs, hdev,
- &le_max_key_size_fops);
/* If the controller does not support BR/EDR Secure Connections
* feature, then the BR/EDR SMP channel shall not be present.
@@ -3592,7 +3516,7 @@
return 0;
}
-static int __init test_ah(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
+static int __init test_ah(void)
{
const u8 irk[16] = {
0x9b, 0x7d, 0x39, 0x0a, 0xa6, 0x10, 0x10, 0x34,
@@ -3602,7 +3526,7 @@
u8 res[3];
int err;
- err = smp_ah(tfm_aes, irk, r, res);
+ err = smp_ah(irk, r, res);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3612,7 +3536,7 @@
return 0;
}
-static int __init test_c1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
+static int __init test_c1(void)
{
const u8 k[16] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
@@ -3632,7 +3556,7 @@
u8 res[16];
int err;
- err = smp_c1(tfm_aes, k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
+ err = smp_c1(k, r, preq, pres, _iat, &ia, _rat, &ra, res);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3642,7 +3566,7 @@
return 0;
}
-static int __init test_s1(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes)
+static int __init test_s1(void)
{
const u8 k[16] = {
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
@@ -3657,7 +3581,7 @@
u8 res[16];
int err;
- err = smp_s1(tfm_aes, k, r1, r2, res);
+ err = smp_s1(k, r1, r2, res);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -3838,8 +3762,7 @@
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
-static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes,
- struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
+static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac,
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh)
{
ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime;
@@ -3854,19 +3777,19 @@
goto done;
}
- err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
+ err = test_ah();
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
goto done;
}
- err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
+ err = test_c1();
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
goto done;
}
- err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
+ err = test_s1();
if (err) {
BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
goto done;
@@ -3923,36 +3846,26 @@
int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)
{
- struct crypto_cipher *tfm_aes;
struct crypto_shash *tfm_cmac;
struct crypto_kpp *tfm_ecdh;
int err;
- tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
- BT_ERR("Unable to create AES crypto context");
- return PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
- }
-
- tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_shash("cmac(aes)", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
- crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
return PTR_ERR(tfm_cmac);
}
- tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL, 0);
+ tfm_ecdh = crypto_alloc_kpp("ecdh", 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm_ecdh)) {
BT_ERR("Unable to create ECDH crypto context");
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
- crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
return PTR_ERR(tfm_ecdh);
}
- err = run_selftests(tfm_aes, tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
+ err = run_selftests(tfm_cmac, tfm_ecdh);
crypto_free_shash(tfm_cmac);
- crypto_free_cipher(tfm_aes);
crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ecdh);
return err;
--
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