From 6778948f9de86c3cfaf36725a7c87dcff9ba247f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2023 08:20:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] kernel_5.10 no rt
---
kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 8 +-------
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
index 3df0a95..7fb482f 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/include/asm/stackprotector.h
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
*/
static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
{
- u64 canary = 0;
+ u64 canary;
u64 tsc;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
@@ -76,14 +76,8 @@
* of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init,
* there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later
* on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too.
- * For preempt-rt we need to weaken the randomness a bit, as
- * we can't call into the random generator from atomic context
- * due to locking constraints. We just leave canary
- * uninitialized and use the TSC based randomness on top of it.
*/
-#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
-#endif
tsc = rdtsc();
canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL);
canary &= CANARY_MASK;
--
Gitblit v1.6.2