From 61598093bbdd283a7edc367d900f223070ead8d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Fri, 10 May 2024 07:43:03 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] add ax88772C AX88772C_eeprom_tools

---
 kernel/kernel/sys.c |  324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
 1 files changed, 197 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/kernel/sys.c
index 4b949f7..4b02327 100644
--- a/kernel/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/kernel/sys.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/time_namespace.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
 
 #include <linux/sched.h>
@@ -74,6 +75,8 @@
 #include <asm/unistd.h>
 
 #include "uid16.h"
+
+#include <trace/hooks/sys.h>
 
 #ifndef SET_UNALIGN_CTL
 # define SET_UNALIGN_CTL(a, b)	(-EINVAL)
@@ -105,12 +108,6 @@
 #ifndef SET_TSC_CTL
 # define SET_TSC_CTL(a)		(-EINVAL)
 #endif
-#ifndef MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
-# define MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT()	(-EINVAL)
-#endif
-#ifndef MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT
-# define MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT()	(-EINVAL)
-#endif
 #ifndef GET_FP_MODE
 # define GET_FP_MODE(a)		(-EINVAL)
 #endif
@@ -122,6 +119,15 @@
 #endif
 #ifndef SVE_GET_VL
 # define SVE_GET_VL()		(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef PAC_RESET_KEYS
+# define PAC_RESET_KEYS(a, b)	(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS
+# define PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(a, b, c)	(-EINVAL)
+#endif
+#ifndef PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS
+# define PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(a)	(-EINVAL)
 #endif
 #ifndef SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
 # define SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL(a)	(-EINVAL)
@@ -377,7 +383,7 @@
 	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1) {
 		if (gid_eq(old->gid, krgid) ||
 		    gid_eq(old->egid, krgid) ||
-		    ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
+		    ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
 			new->gid = krgid;
 		else
 			goto error;
@@ -386,7 +392,7 @@
 		if (gid_eq(old->gid, kegid) ||
 		    gid_eq(old->egid, kegid) ||
 		    gid_eq(old->sgid, kegid) ||
-		    ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
+		    ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
 			new->egid = kegid;
 		else
 			goto error;
@@ -396,6 +402,10 @@
 	    (egid != (gid_t) -1 && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid)))
 		new->sgid = new->egid;
 	new->fsgid = new->egid;
+
+	retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RE);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto error;
 
 	return commit_creds(new);
 
@@ -432,11 +442,15 @@
 	old = current_cred();
 
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
+	if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
 		new->gid = new->egid = new->sgid = new->fsgid = kgid;
 	else if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid))
 		new->egid = new->fsgid = kgid;
 	else
+		goto error;
+
+	retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_ID);
+	if (retval < 0)
 		goto error;
 
 	return commit_creds(new);
@@ -521,7 +535,7 @@
 		new->uid = kruid;
 		if (!uid_eq(old->uid, kruid) &&
 		    !uid_eq(old->euid, kruid) &&
-		    !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
+		    !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
 			goto error;
 	}
 
@@ -530,7 +544,7 @@
 		if (!uid_eq(old->uid, keuid) &&
 		    !uid_eq(old->euid, keuid) &&
 		    !uid_eq(old->suid, keuid) &&
-		    !ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
+		    !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
 			goto error;
 	}
 
@@ -589,7 +603,7 @@
 	old = current_cred();
 
 	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
+	if (ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
 		new->suid = new->uid = kuid;
 		if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)) {
 			retval = set_user(new);
@@ -630,6 +644,7 @@
 	struct cred *new;
 	int retval;
 	kuid_t kruid, keuid, ksuid;
+	bool ruid_new, euid_new, suid_new;
 
 	kruid = make_kuid(ns, ruid);
 	keuid = make_kuid(ns, euid);
@@ -644,24 +659,28 @@
 	if ((suid != (uid_t) -1) && !uid_valid(ksuid))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	old = current_cred();
+
+	/* check for no-op */
+	if ((ruid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(kruid, old->uid)) &&
+	    (euid == (uid_t) -1 || (uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) &&
+				    uid_eq(keuid, old->fsuid))) &&
+	    (suid == (uid_t) -1 || uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid)))
+		return 0;
+
+	ruid_new = ruid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
+		   !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid);
+	euid_new = euid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) &&
+		   !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid);
+	suid_new = suid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) &&
+		   !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid);
+	if ((ruid_new || euid_new || suid_new) &&
+	    !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	old = current_cred();
-
-	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
-		if (ruid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(kruid, old->uid) &&
-		    !uid_eq(kruid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(kruid, old->suid))
-			goto error;
-		if (euid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(keuid, old->uid) &&
-		    !uid_eq(keuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(keuid, old->suid))
-			goto error;
-		if (suid != (uid_t) -1        && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->uid) &&
-		    !uid_eq(ksuid, old->euid) && !uid_eq(ksuid, old->suid))
-			goto error;
-	}
 
 	if (ruid != (uid_t) -1) {
 		new->uid = kruid;
@@ -722,6 +741,7 @@
 	struct cred *new;
 	int retval;
 	kgid_t krgid, kegid, ksgid;
+	bool rgid_new, egid_new, sgid_new;
 
 	krgid = make_kgid(ns, rgid);
 	kegid = make_kgid(ns, egid);
@@ -734,23 +754,28 @@
 	if ((sgid != (gid_t) -1) && !gid_valid(ksgid))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	old = current_cred();
+
+	/* check for no-op */
+	if ((rgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(krgid, old->gid)) &&
+	    (egid == (gid_t) -1 || (gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) &&
+				    gid_eq(kegid, old->fsgid))) &&
+	    (sgid == (gid_t) -1 || gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid)))
+		return 0;
+
+	rgid_new = rgid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
+		   !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid);
+	egid_new = egid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
+		   !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid);
+	sgid_new = sgid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
+		   !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid);
+	if ((rgid_new || egid_new || sgid_new) &&
+	    !ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	new = prepare_creds();
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
-	old = current_cred();
-
-	retval = -EPERM;
-	if (!ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
-		if (rgid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(krgid, old->gid) &&
-		    !gid_eq(krgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(krgid, old->sgid))
-			goto error;
-		if (egid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(kegid, old->gid) &&
-		    !gid_eq(kegid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(kegid, old->sgid))
-			goto error;
-		if (sgid != (gid_t) -1        && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->gid) &&
-		    !gid_eq(ksgid, old->egid) && !gid_eq(ksgid, old->sgid))
-			goto error;
-	}
 
 	if (rgid != (gid_t) -1)
 		new->gid = krgid;
@@ -759,6 +784,10 @@
 	if (sgid != (gid_t) -1)
 		new->sgid = ksgid;
 	new->fsgid = new->egid;
+
+	retval = security_task_fix_setgid(new, old, LSM_SETID_RES);
+	if (retval < 0)
+		goto error;
 
 	return commit_creds(new);
 
@@ -819,7 +848,7 @@
 
 	if (uid_eq(kuid, old->uid)  || uid_eq(kuid, old->euid)  ||
 	    uid_eq(kuid, old->suid) || uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid) ||
-	    ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
+	    ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) {
 		if (!uid_eq(kuid, old->fsuid)) {
 			new->fsuid = kuid;
 			if (security_task_fix_setuid(new, old, LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
@@ -863,10 +892,11 @@
 
 	if (gid_eq(kgid, old->gid)  || gid_eq(kgid, old->egid)  ||
 	    gid_eq(kgid, old->sgid) || gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid) ||
-	    ns_capable(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
+	    ns_capable_setid(old->user_ns, CAP_SETGID)) {
 		if (!gid_eq(kgid, old->fsgid)) {
 			new->fsgid = kgid;
-			goto change_okay;
+			if (security_task_fix_setgid(new,old,LSM_SETID_FS) == 0)
+				goto change_okay;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -1212,7 +1242,8 @@
 /*
  * Work around broken programs that cannot handle "Linux 3.0".
  * Instead we map 3.x to 2.6.40+x, so e.g. 3.0 would be 2.6.40
- * And we map 4.x to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0 would be 2.6.60.
+ * And we map 4.x and later versions to 2.6.60+x, so 4.0/5.0/6.0/... would be
+ * 2.6.60.
  */
 static int override_release(char __user *release, size_t len)
 {
@@ -1538,6 +1569,8 @@
 
 	if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
+
 	if (new_rlim) {
 		if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -1563,15 +1596,6 @@
 			retval = -EPERM;
 		if (!retval)
 			retval = security_task_setrlimit(tsk, resource, new_rlim);
-		if (resource == RLIMIT_CPU && new_rlim->rlim_cur == 0) {
-			/*
-			 * The caller is asking for an immediate RLIMIT_CPU
-			 * expiry.  But we use the zero value to mean "it was
-			 * never set".  So let's cheat and make it one second
-			 * instead
-			 */
-			new_rlim->rlim_cur = 1;
-		}
 	}
 	if (!retval) {
 		if (old_rlim)
@@ -1582,10 +1606,9 @@
 	task_unlock(tsk->group_leader);
 
 	/*
-	 * RLIMIT_CPU handling.   Note that the kernel fails to return an error
-	 * code if it rejected the user's attempt to set RLIMIT_CPU.  This is a
-	 * very long-standing error, and fixing it now risks breakage of
-	 * applications, so we live with it
+	 * RLIMIT_CPU handling. Arm the posix CPU timer if the limit is not
+	 * infite. In case of RLIM_INFINITY the posix CPU timer code
+	 * ignores the rlimit.
 	 */
 	 if (!retval && new_rlim && resource == RLIMIT_CPU &&
 	     new_rlim->rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY &&
@@ -1753,6 +1776,7 @@
 
 		if (who == RUSAGE_CHILDREN)
 			break;
+		fallthrough;
 
 	case RUSAGE_SELF:
 		thread_group_cputime_adjusted(p, &tgutime, &tgstime);
@@ -1778,8 +1802,8 @@
 	unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
 
 out:
-	r->ru_utime = ns_to_timeval(utime);
-	r->ru_stime = ns_to_timeval(stime);
+	r->ru_utime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(utime);
+	r->ru_stime = ns_to_kernel_old_timeval(stime);
 
 	if (who != RUSAGE_CHILDREN) {
 		struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(p);
@@ -1858,7 +1882,7 @@
 	if (exe_file) {
 		struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 
-		down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		mmap_read_lock(mm);
 		for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
 			if (!vma->vm_file)
 				continue;
@@ -1867,7 +1891,7 @@
 				goto exit_err;
 		}
 
-		up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+		mmap_read_unlock(mm);
 		fput(exe_file);
 	}
 
@@ -1881,19 +1905,20 @@
 	fdput(exe);
 	return err;
 exit_err:
-	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	mmap_read_unlock(mm);
 	fput(exe_file);
 	goto exit;
 }
 
 /*
+ * Check arithmetic relations of passed addresses.
+ *
  * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful
  * in what is allowed for modification from userspace.
  */
-static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
+static int validate_prctl_map_addr(struct prctl_mm_map *prctl_map)
 {
 	unsigned long mmap_max_addr = TASK_SIZE;
-	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
 	int error = -EINVAL, i;
 
 	static const unsigned char offsets[] = {
@@ -1947,24 +1972,6 @@
 			      prctl_map->start_data))
 			goto out;
 
-	/*
-	 * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
-	 */
-	if (prctl_map->auxv_size) {
-		if (!prctl_map->auxv || prctl_map->auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
-			goto out;
-	}
-
-	/*
-	 * Finally, make sure the caller has the rights to
-	 * change /proc/pid/exe link: only local sys admin should
-	 * be allowed to.
-	 */
-	if (prctl_map->exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
-		if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-			goto out;
-	}
-
 	error = 0;
 out:
 	return error;
@@ -1991,11 +1998,18 @@
 	if (copy_from_user(&prctl_map, addr, sizeof(prctl_map)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map);
+	error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
 	if (prctl_map.auxv_size) {
+		/*
+		 * Someone is trying to cheat the auxv vector.
+		 */
+		if (!prctl_map.auxv ||
+				prctl_map.auxv_size > sizeof(mm->saved_auxv))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
 		memset(user_auxv, 0, sizeof(user_auxv));
 		if (copy_from_user(user_auxv,
 				   (const void __user *)prctl_map.auxv,
@@ -2008,16 +2022,27 @@
 	}
 
 	if (prctl_map.exe_fd != (u32)-1) {
+		/*
+		 * Check if the current user is checkpoint/restore capable.
+		 * At the time of this writing, it checks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
+		 * or CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.
+		 * Note that a user with access to ptrace can masquerade an
+		 * arbitrary program as any executable, even setuid ones.
+		 * This may have implications in the tomoyo subsystem.
+		 */
+		if (!checkpoint_restore_ns_capable(current_user_ns()))
+			return -EPERM;
+
 		error = prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, prctl_map.exe_fd);
 		if (error)
 			return error;
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * arg_lock protects concurent updates but we still need mmap_sem for
+	 * arg_lock protects concurent updates but we still need mmap_lock for
 	 * read to exclude races with sys_brk.
 	 */
-	down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	mmap_read_lock(mm);
 
 	/*
 	 * We don't validate if these members are pointing to
@@ -2025,7 +2050,7 @@
 	 * VMAs already unmapped and kernel uses these members for statistics
 	 * output in procfs mostly, except
 	 *
-	 *  - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk but kernel lookups
+	 *  - @start_brk/@brk which are used in do_brk_flags but kernel lookups
 	 *    for VMAs when updating these memvers so anything wrong written
 	 *    here cause kernel to swear at userspace program but won't lead
 	 *    to any problem in kernel itself
@@ -2056,7 +2081,7 @@
 	if (prctl_map.auxv_size)
 		memcpy(mm->saved_auxv, user_auxv, sizeof(user_auxv));
 
-	up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	mmap_read_unlock(mm);
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */
@@ -2095,7 +2120,11 @@
 			unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 {
 	struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
-	struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map;
+	struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = {
+		.auxv = NULL,
+		.auxv_size = 0,
+		.exe_fd = -1,
+	};
 	struct vm_area_struct *vma;
 	int error;
 
@@ -2123,9 +2152,15 @@
 
 	error = -EINVAL;
 
-	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	/*
+	 * arg_lock protects concurent updates of arg boundaries, we need
+	 * mmap_lock for a) concurrent sys_brk, b) finding VMA for addr
+	 * validation.
+	 */
+	mmap_read_lock(mm);
 	vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
 
+	spin_lock(&mm->arg_lock);
 	prctl_map.start_code	= mm->start_code;
 	prctl_map.end_code	= mm->end_code;
 	prctl_map.start_data	= mm->start_data;
@@ -2137,9 +2172,6 @@
 	prctl_map.arg_end	= mm->arg_end;
 	prctl_map.env_start	= mm->env_start;
 	prctl_map.env_end	= mm->env_end;
-	prctl_map.auxv		= NULL;
-	prctl_map.auxv_size	= 0;
-	prctl_map.exe_fd	= -1;
 
 	switch (opt) {
 	case PR_SET_MM_START_CODE:
@@ -2179,7 +2211,7 @@
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	error = validate_prctl_map(&prctl_map);
+	error = validate_prctl_map_addr(&prctl_map);
 	if (error)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -2216,17 +2248,18 @@
 
 	error = 0;
 out:
-	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	spin_unlock(&mm->arg_lock);
+	mmap_read_unlock(mm);
 	return error;
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
-static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr)
+static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr)
 {
 	return put_user(me->clear_child_tid, tid_addr);
 }
 #else
-static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user **tid_addr)
+static int prctl_get_tid_address(struct task_struct *me, int __user * __user *tid_addr)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
@@ -2358,7 +2391,7 @@
 			return error;
 		if (prev)
 			vma = prev->vm_next;
-		else	/* madvise_remove dropped mmap_sem */
+		else	/* madvise_remove dropped mmap_lock */
 			vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
 	}
 }
@@ -2386,7 +2419,7 @@
 	if (end == start)
 		return 0;
 
-	down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	mmap_write_lock(mm);
 
 	switch (opt) {
 	case PR_SET_VMA_ANON_NAME:
@@ -2396,7 +2429,7 @@
 		error = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+	mmap_write_unlock(mm);
 
 	return error;
 }
@@ -2407,6 +2440,8 @@
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 #endif
+
+#define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE)
 
 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
 		unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
@@ -2555,7 +2590,7 @@
 		error = prctl_set_mm(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
 		break;
 	case PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS:
-		error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user **)arg2);
+		error = prctl_get_tid_address(me, (int __user * __user *)arg2);
 		break;
 	case PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER:
 		me->signal->is_child_subreaper = !!arg2;
@@ -2586,24 +2621,18 @@
 	case PR_SET_THP_DISABLE:
 		if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
 			return -EINVAL;
-		if (down_write_killable(&me->mm->mmap_sem))
+		if (mmap_write_lock_killable(me->mm))
 			return -EINTR;
 		if (arg2)
 			set_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
 		else
 			clear_bit(MMF_DISABLE_THP, &me->mm->flags);
-		up_write(&me->mm->mmap_sem);
+		mmap_write_unlock(me->mm);
 		break;
 	case PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT:
-		if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		error = MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT();
-		break;
 	case PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT:
-		if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
-			return -EINVAL;
-		error = MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT();
-		break;
+		/* No longer implemented: */
+		return -EINVAL;
 	case PR_SET_FP_MODE:
 		error = SET_FP_MODE(me, arg2);
 		break;
@@ -2629,6 +2658,21 @@
 	case PR_SET_VMA:
 		error = prctl_set_vma(arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
 		break;
+	case PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS:
+		if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		error = PAC_RESET_KEYS(me, arg2);
+		break;
+	case PR_PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS:
+		if (arg4 || arg5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		error = PAC_SET_ENABLED_KEYS(me, arg2, arg3);
+		break;
+	case PR_PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS:
+		if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		error = PAC_GET_ENABLED_KEYS(me);
+		break;
 	case PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL:
 		if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
 			return -EINVAL;
@@ -2639,10 +2683,34 @@
 			return -EINVAL;
 		error = GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL();
 		break;
+	case PR_SET_IO_FLUSHER:
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (arg2 == 1)
+			current->flags |= PR_IO_FLUSHER;
+		else if (!arg2)
+			current->flags &= ~PR_IO_FLUSHER;
+		else
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	case PR_GET_IO_FLUSHER:
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		if (arg2 || arg3 || arg4 || arg5)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		error = (current->flags & PR_IO_FLUSHER) == PR_IO_FLUSHER;
+		break;
 	default:
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		break;
 	}
+	trace_android_vh_syscall_prctl_finished(option, me);
 	return error;
 }
 
@@ -2672,6 +2740,7 @@
 	memset(info, 0, sizeof(struct sysinfo));
 
 	ktime_get_boottime_ts64(&tp);
+	timens_add_boottime(&tp);
 	info->uptime = tp.tv_sec + (tp.tv_nsec ? 1 : 0);
 
 	get_avenrun(info->loads, 0, SI_LOAD_SHIFT - FSHIFT);
@@ -2758,6 +2827,7 @@
 COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
 {
 	struct sysinfo s;
+	struct compat_sysinfo s_32;
 
 	do_sysinfo(&s);
 
@@ -2782,23 +2852,23 @@
 		s.freehigh >>= bitcount;
 	}
 
-	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) ||
-	    __put_user(s.uptime, &info->uptime) ||
-	    __put_user(s.loads[0], &info->loads[0]) ||
-	    __put_user(s.loads[1], &info->loads[1]) ||
-	    __put_user(s.loads[2], &info->loads[2]) ||
-	    __put_user(s.totalram, &info->totalram) ||
-	    __put_user(s.freeram, &info->freeram) ||
-	    __put_user(s.sharedram, &info->sharedram) ||
-	    __put_user(s.bufferram, &info->bufferram) ||
-	    __put_user(s.totalswap, &info->totalswap) ||
-	    __put_user(s.freeswap, &info->freeswap) ||
-	    __put_user(s.procs, &info->procs) ||
-	    __put_user(s.totalhigh, &info->totalhigh) ||
-	    __put_user(s.freehigh, &info->freehigh) ||
-	    __put_user(s.mem_unit, &info->mem_unit))
+	memset(&s_32, 0, sizeof(s_32));
+	s_32.uptime = s.uptime;
+	s_32.loads[0] = s.loads[0];
+	s_32.loads[1] = s.loads[1];
+	s_32.loads[2] = s.loads[2];
+	s_32.totalram = s.totalram;
+	s_32.freeram = s.freeram;
+	s_32.sharedram = s.sharedram;
+	s_32.bufferram = s.bufferram;
+	s_32.totalswap = s.totalswap;
+	s_32.freeswap = s.freeswap;
+	s_32.procs = s.procs;
+	s_32.totalhigh = s.totalhigh;
+	s_32.freehigh = s.freehigh;
+	s_32.mem_unit = s.mem_unit;
+	if (copy_to_user(info, &s_32, sizeof(s_32)))
 		return -EFAULT;
-
 	return 0;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */

--
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