From 50a212ec906f7524620675f0c57357691c26c81f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2024 01:20:19 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] 修改GPIO导出默认初始值
---
kernel/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst | 11 ++++++-----
1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst b/kernel/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
index 13468ea..d9cd937 100644
--- a/kernel/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
+++ b/kernel/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
@@ -19,9 +19,10 @@
etc) to extract additional credentials and continue to expand the scope
of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing.
-This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking
-(http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection
-(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already
+This is not a theoretical problem. `SSH session hijacking
+<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf>`_
+and `arbitrary code injection
+<https://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html>`_ attacks already
exist and remain possible if ptrace is allowed to operate as before.
Since ptrace is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, system
builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system.
@@ -64,8 +65,8 @@
Using ``PTRACE_TRACEME`` is unchanged.
2 - admin-only attach:
- only processes with ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` may use ptrace
- with ``PTRACE_ATTACH``, or through children calling ``PTRACE_TRACEME``.
+ only processes with ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` may use ptrace, either with
+ ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` or through children calling ``PTRACE_TRACEME``.
3 - no attach:
no processes may use ptrace with ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` nor via
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