From 37f49e37ab4cb5d0bc4c60eb5c6d4dd57db767bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Fri, 10 May 2024 07:44:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] gmac get mac form eeprom
---
kernel/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 498fed0..c165ddb 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -2998,7 +2998,7 @@
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
enum vm_entry_failure_code *entry_failure_code)
{
- bool ia32e;
+ bool ia32e = !!(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
*entry_failure_code = ENTRY_FAIL_DEFAULT;
@@ -3024,6 +3024,13 @@
vmcs12->guest_ia32_perf_global_ctrl)))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (CC((vmcs12->guest_cr0 & (X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE)) == X86_CR0_PG))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (CC(ia32e && !(vmcs12->guest_cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) ||
+ CC(ia32e && !(vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/*
* If the load IA32_EFER VM-entry control is 1, the following checks
* are performed on the field for the IA32_EFER MSR:
@@ -3035,7 +3042,6 @@
*/
if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending &&
(vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)) {
- ia32e = (vmcs12->vm_entry_controls & VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE) != 0;
if (CC(!kvm_valid_efer(vcpu, vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer)) ||
CC(ia32e != !!(vmcs12->guest_ia32_efer & EFER_LMA)) ||
CC(((vmcs12->guest_cr0 & X86_CR0_PG) &&
@@ -4556,6 +4562,17 @@
vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
+ /*
+ * If IBRS is advertised to the vCPU, KVM must flush the indirect
+ * branch predictors when transitioning from L2 to L1, as L1 expects
+ * hardware (KVM in this case) to provide separate predictor modes.
+ * Bare metal isolates VMX root (host) from VMX non-root (guest), but
+ * doesn't isolate different VMCSs, i.e. in this case, doesn't provide
+ * separate modes for L2 vs L1.
+ */
+ if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+
/* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */
vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
@@ -4901,24 +4918,35 @@
| FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
/*
- * Note, KVM cannot rely on hardware to perform the CR0/CR4 #UD checks
- * that have higher priority than VM-Exit (see Intel SDM's pseudocode
- * for VMXON), as KVM must load valid CR0/CR4 values into hardware while
- * running the guest, i.e. KVM needs to check the _guest_ values.
+ * Manually check CR4.VMXE checks, KVM must force CR4.VMXE=1 to enter
+ * the guest and so cannot rely on hardware to perform the check,
+ * which has higher priority than VM-Exit (see Intel SDM's pseudocode
+ * for VMXON).
*
- * Rely on hardware for the other two pre-VM-Exit checks, !VM86 and
- * !COMPATIBILITY modes. KVM may run the guest in VM86 to emulate Real
- * Mode, but KVM will never take the guest out of those modes.
+ * Rely on hardware for the other pre-VM-Exit checks, CR0.PE=1, !VM86
+ * and !COMPATIBILITY modes. For an unrestricted guest, KVM doesn't
+ * force any of the relevant guest state. For a restricted guest, KVM
+ * does force CR0.PE=1, but only to also force VM86 in order to emulate
+ * Real Mode, and so there's no need to check CR0.PE manually.
*/
- if (!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)) ||
- !nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu))) {
+ if (!kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_VMXE)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
/*
- * CPL=0 and all other checks that are lower priority than VM-Exit must
- * be checked manually.
+ * The CPL is checked for "not in VMX operation" and for "in VMX root",
+ * and has higher priority than the VM-Fail due to being post-VMXON,
+ * i.e. VMXON #GPs outside of VMX non-root if CPL!=0. In VMX non-root,
+ * VMXON causes VM-Exit and KVM unconditionally forwards VMXON VM-Exits
+ * from L2 to L1, i.e. there's no need to check for the vCPU being in
+ * VMX non-root.
+ *
+ * Forwarding the VM-Exit unconditionally, i.e. without performing the
+ * #UD checks (see above), is functionally ok because KVM doesn't allow
+ * L1 to run L2 without CR4.VMXE=0, and because KVM never modifies L2's
+ * CR0 or CR4, i.e. it's L2's responsibility to emulate #UDs that are
+ * missed by hardware due to shadowing CR0 and/or CR4.
*/
if (vmx_get_cpl(vcpu)) {
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
@@ -4928,6 +4956,17 @@
if (vmx->nested.vmxon)
return nested_vmx_fail(vcpu, VMXERR_VMXON_IN_VMX_ROOT_OPERATION);
+ /*
+ * Invalid CR0/CR4 generates #GP. These checks are performed if and
+ * only if the vCPU isn't already in VMX operation, i.e. effectively
+ * have lower priority than the VM-Fail above.
+ */
+ if (!nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)) ||
+ !nested_host_cr4_valid(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu))) {
+ kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
if ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES)
!= VMXON_NEEDED_FEATURES) {
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
--
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