From 2f7c68cb55ecb7331f2381deb497c27155f32faf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Wed, 03 Jan 2024 09:43:39 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] update kernel to 5.10.198

---
 kernel/arch/x86/Kconfig |   42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/arch/x86/Kconfig b/kernel/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 32536ff..35ace6d 100644
--- a/kernel/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 	select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T			if X86_32
 	select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_INIT
 	select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE	if ACPI
+	select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE	if !X86_PAE
 	select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
@@ -1336,17 +1337,16 @@
 	  If you select this option, microcode patch loading support for AMD
 	  processors will be enabled.
 
-config MICROCODE_OLD_INTERFACE
-	bool "Ancient loading interface (DEPRECATED)"
+config MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
+	bool "Late microcode loading (DANGEROUS)"
 	default n
 	depends on MICROCODE
 	help
-	  DO NOT USE THIS! This is the ancient /dev/cpu/microcode interface
-	  which was used by userspace tools like iucode_tool and microcode.ctl.
-	  It is inadequate because it runs too late to be able to properly
-	  load microcode on a machine and it needs special tools. Instead, you
-	  should've switched to the early loading method with the initrd or
-	  builtin microcode by now: Documentation/x86/microcode.rst
+	  Loading microcode late, when the system is up and executing instructions
+	  is a tricky business and should be avoided if possible. Just the sequence
+	  of synchronizing all cores and SMT threads is one fragile dance which does
+	  not guarantee that cores might not softlock after the loading. Therefore,
+	  use this at your own risk. Late loading taints the kernel too.
 
 config X86_MSR
 	tristate "/dev/cpu/*/msr - Model-specific register support"
@@ -2483,6 +2483,13 @@
 	  This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
 	  performance.
 
+config CPU_SRSO
+	bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
+
 config SLS
 	bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
 	depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
@@ -2492,6 +2499,25 @@
 	  against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
 	  larger.
 
+config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
+	bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default n
+	help
+	  Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+	  unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
+	  vector registers.
+
+	  This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
+	  command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
+	  AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
+	  the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will
+	  break with this option set.
+
+	  Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect.
+
+	  If in doubt, say N.
+
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES

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