From 102a0743326a03cd1a1202ceda21e175b7d3575c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 01:20:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] add new system file
---
kernel/net/tls/tls_sw.c | 2567 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 files changed, 1,883 insertions(+), 684 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/kernel/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 7d76124..50eae66 100644
--- a/kernel/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/kernel/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <lancerchao@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <fridolin.pokorny@gmail.com>. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2018, Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
*
* This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
* licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
@@ -34,244 +35,1327 @@
* SOFTWARE.
*/
+#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/splice.h>
#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <net/strparser.h>
#include <net/tls.h>
-#define MAX_IV_SIZE TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE
+noinline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err)
+{
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0);
+ /* sk->sk_err should contain a positive error code. */
+ sk->sk_err = -err;
+ sk->sk_error_report(sk);
+}
+
+static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len,
+ unsigned int recursion_level)
+{
+ int start = skb_headlen(skb);
+ int i, chunk = start - offset;
+ struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
+ int elt = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+ if (chunk > 0) {
+ if (chunk > len)
+ chunk = len;
+ elt++;
+ len -= chunk;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return elt;
+ offset += chunk;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
+ int end;
+
+ WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
+
+ end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
+ chunk = end - offset;
+ if (chunk > 0) {
+ if (chunk > len)
+ chunk = len;
+ elt++;
+ len -= chunk;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return elt;
+ offset += chunk;
+ }
+ start = end;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(skb_has_frag_list(skb))) {
+ skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
+ int end, ret;
+
+ WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
+
+ end = start + frag_iter->len;
+ chunk = end - offset;
+ if (chunk > 0) {
+ if (chunk > len)
+ chunk = len;
+ ret = __skb_nsg(frag_iter, offset - start, chunk,
+ recursion_level + 1);
+ if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+ return ret;
+ elt += ret;
+ len -= chunk;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return elt;
+ offset += chunk;
+ }
+ start = end;
+ }
+ }
+ BUG_ON(len);
+ return elt;
+}
+
+/* Return the number of scatterlist elements required to completely map the
+ * skb, or -EMSGSIZE if the recursion depth is exceeded.
+ */
+static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
+{
+ return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0);
+}
+
+static int padding_length(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ int sub = 0;
+
+ /* Determine zero-padding length */
+ if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
+ char content_type = 0;
+ int err;
+ int back = 17;
+
+ while (content_type == 0) {
+ if (back > rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ err = skb_copy_bits(skb,
+ rxm->offset + rxm->full_len - back,
+ &content_type, 1);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (content_type)
+ break;
+ sub++;
+ back++;
+ }
+ ctx->control = content_type;
+ }
+ return sub;
+}
+
+static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
+ struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst;
+ struct scatterlist *sgin = aead_req->src;
+ struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx;
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot;
+ struct scatterlist *sg;
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+ unsigned int pages;
+ int pending;
+
+ skb = (struct sk_buff *)req->data;
+ tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(skb->sk);
+ ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+ prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
+
+ /* Propagate if there was an err */
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == -EBADMSG)
+ TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(skb->sk),
+ LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
+ ctx->async_wait.err = err;
+ tls_err_abort(skb->sk, err);
+ } else {
+ struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ int pad;
+
+ pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
+ if (pad < 0) {
+ ctx->async_wait.err = pad;
+ tls_err_abort(skb->sk, pad);
+ } else {
+ rxm->full_len -= pad;
+ rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
+ rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* After using skb->sk to propagate sk through crypto async callback
+ * we need to NULL it again.
+ */
+ skb->sk = NULL;
+
+
+ /* Free the destination pages if skb was not decrypted inplace */
+ if (sgout != sgin) {
+ /* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */
+ for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) {
+ if (!sg)
+ break;
+ put_page(sg_page(sg));
+ }
+ }
+
+ kfree(aead_req);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
+ pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
+
+ if (!pending && ctx->async_notify)
+ complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
+}
static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
struct scatterlist *sgin,
struct scatterlist *sgout,
char *iv_recv,
size_t data_len,
- struct aead_request *aead_req)
+ struct aead_request *aead_req,
+ bool async)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
int ret;
aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv);
- aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
+ aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout,
- data_len + tls_ctx->rx.tag_size,
+ data_len + prot->tag_size,
(u8 *)iv_recv);
- aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req), &ctx->async_wait);
+ if (async) {
+ /* Using skb->sk to push sk through to crypto async callback
+ * handler. This allows propagating errors up to the socket
+ * if needed. It _must_ be cleared in the async handler
+ * before consume_skb is called. We _know_ skb->sk is NULL
+ * because it is a clone from strparser.
+ */
+ skb->sk = sk;
+ aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ tls_decrypt_done, skb);
+ atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
+ } else {
+ aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+ crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
+ }
+
+ ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
+ if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ if (async)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &ctx->async_wait);
+ }
+
+ if (async)
+ atomic_dec(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
+
return ret;
}
-static void trim_sg(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sg,
- int *sg_num_elem, unsigned int *sg_size, int target_size)
-{
- int i = *sg_num_elem - 1;
- int trim = *sg_size - target_size;
-
- if (trim <= 0) {
- WARN_ON(trim < 0);
- return;
- }
-
- *sg_size = target_size;
- while (trim >= sg[i].length) {
- trim -= sg[i].length;
- sk_mem_uncharge(sk, sg[i].length);
- put_page(sg_page(&sg[i]));
- i--;
-
- if (i < 0)
- goto out;
- }
-
- sg[i].length -= trim;
- sk_mem_uncharge(sk, trim);
-
-out:
- *sg_num_elem = i + 1;
-}
-
-static void trim_both_sgl(struct sock *sk, int target_size)
+static void tls_trim_both_msgs(struct sock *sk, int target_size)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
- trim_sg(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_data,
- &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
- target_size);
-
+ sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext, target_size);
if (target_size > 0)
- target_size += tls_ctx->tx.overhead_size;
-
- trim_sg(sk, ctx->sg_encrypted_data,
- &ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_encrypted_size,
- target_size);
+ target_size += prot->overhead_size;
+ sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted, target_size);
}
-static int alloc_encrypted_sg(struct sock *sk, int len)
+static int tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(struct sock *sk, int len)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
- int rc = 0;
+ struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
- rc = sk_alloc_sg(sk, len,
- ctx->sg_encrypted_data, 0,
- &ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_encrypted_size, 0);
-
- if (rc == -ENOSPC)
- ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem = ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sg_encrypted_data);
-
- return rc;
+ return sk_msg_alloc(sk, msg_en, len, 0);
}
-static int alloc_plaintext_sg(struct sock *sk, int len)
+static int tls_clone_plaintext_msg(struct sock *sk, int required)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
+ int skip, len;
+
+ /* We add page references worth len bytes from encrypted sg
+ * at the end of plaintext sg. It is guaranteed that msg_en
+ * has enough required room (ensured by caller).
+ */
+ len = required - msg_pl->sg.size;
+
+ /* Skip initial bytes in msg_en's data to be able to use
+ * same offset of both plain and encrypted data.
+ */
+ skip = prot->prepend_size + msg_pl->sg.size;
+
+ return sk_msg_clone(sk, msg_pl, msg_en, skip, len);
+}
+
+static struct tls_rec *tls_get_rec(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
+ struct tls_rec *rec;
+ int mem_size;
+
+ mem_size = sizeof(struct tls_rec) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send);
+
+ rec = kzalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
+ if (!rec)
+ return NULL;
+
+ msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+ msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
+
+ sk_msg_init(msg_pl);
+ sk_msg_init(msg_en);
+
+ sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_in, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_in[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
+ sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_in[1]);
+
+ sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_out, 2);
+ sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_out[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
+ sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_out[1]);
+
+ return rec;
+}
+
+static void tls_free_rec(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *rec)
+{
+ sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
+ sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
+ kfree(rec);
+}
+
+static void tls_free_open_rec(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
- int rc = 0;
+ struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
- rc = sk_alloc_sg(sk, len, ctx->sg_plaintext_data, 0,
- &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem, &ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
- tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags);
-
- if (rc == -ENOSPC)
- ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem = ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sg_plaintext_data);
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-static void free_sg(struct sock *sk, struct scatterlist *sg,
- int *sg_num_elem, unsigned int *sg_size)
-{
- int i, n = *sg_num_elem;
-
- for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
- sk_mem_uncharge(sk, sg[i].length);
- put_page(sg_page(&sg[i]));
+ if (rec) {
+ tls_free_rec(sk, rec);
+ ctx->open_rec = NULL;
}
- *sg_num_elem = 0;
- *sg_size = 0;
}
-static void tls_free_both_sg(struct sock *sk)
+int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_en;
+ int tx_flags, rc = 0;
- free_sg(sk, ctx->sg_encrypted_data, &ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_encrypted_size);
+ if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) {
+ rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
+ struct tls_rec, list);
- free_sg(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_data, &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_plaintext_size);
+ if (flags == -1)
+ tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
+ else
+ tx_flags = flags;
+
+ rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, tx_flags);
+ if (rc)
+ goto tx_err;
+
+ /* Full record has been transmitted.
+ * Remove the head of tx_list
+ */
+ list_del(&rec->list);
+ sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
+ kfree(rec);
+ }
+
+ /* Tx all ready records */
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
+ if (READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready)) {
+ if (flags == -1)
+ tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
+ else
+ tx_flags = flags;
+
+ msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
+ rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx,
+ &msg_en->sg.data[msg_en->sg.curr],
+ 0, tx_flags);
+ if (rc)
+ goto tx_err;
+
+ list_del(&rec->list);
+ sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
+ kfree(rec);
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+tx_err:
+ if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
+
+ return rc;
}
-static int tls_do_encryption(struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
+static void tls_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
+ struct sock *sk = req->data;
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct scatterlist *sge;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_en;
+ struct tls_rec *rec;
+ bool ready = false;
+ int pending;
+
+ rec = container_of(aead_req, struct tls_rec, aead_req);
+ msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
+
+ sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, msg_en->sg.curr);
+ sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
+ sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
+
+ /* Check if error is previously set on socket */
+ if (err || sk->sk_err) {
+ rec = NULL;
+
+ /* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
+ if (sk->sk_err) {
+ ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err;
+ } else {
+ ctx->async_wait.err = err;
+ tls_err_abort(sk, err);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rec) {
+ struct tls_rec *first_rec;
+
+ /* Mark the record as ready for transmission */
+ smp_store_mb(rec->tx_ready, true);
+
+ /* If received record is at head of tx_list, schedule tx */
+ first_rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
+ struct tls_rec, list);
+ if (rec == first_rec)
+ ready = true;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
+ pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
+
+ if (!pending && ctx->async_notify)
+ complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
+
+ if (!ready)
+ return;
+
+ /* Schedule the transmission */
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
+ schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, 1);
+}
+
+static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk,
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx,
struct aead_request *aead_req,
- size_t data_len)
+ size_t data_len, u32 start)
{
- int rc;
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
+ struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
+ struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, start);
+ int rc, iv_offset = 0;
- ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].offset += tls_ctx->tx.prepend_size;
- ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].length -= tls_ctx->tx.prepend_size;
+ /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of IV is a constant */
+ if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
+ rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
+ iv_offset = 1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&rec->iv_data[iv_offset], tls_ctx->tx.iv,
+ prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
+
+ xor_iv_with_seq(prot->version, rec->iv_data + iv_offset, tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq);
+
+ sge->offset += prot->prepend_size;
+ sge->length -= prot->prepend_size;
+
+ msg_en->sg.curr = start;
aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send);
- aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
- aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, ctx->sg_aead_in, ctx->sg_aead_out,
- data_len, tls_ctx->tx.iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, rec->sg_aead_in,
+ rec->sg_aead_out,
+ data_len, rec->iv_data);
aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
+ tls_encrypt_done, sk);
- rc = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req), &ctx->async_wait);
+ /* Add the record in tx_list */
+ list_add_tail((struct list_head *)&rec->list, &ctx->tx_list);
+ atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
- ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].offset -= tls_ctx->tx.prepend_size;
- ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].length += tls_ctx->tx.prepend_size;
+ rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
+ if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ atomic_dec(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
+ sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
+ sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
+ }
+ if (!rc) {
+ WRITE_ONCE(rec->tx_ready, true);
+ } else if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ list_del(&rec->list);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* Unhook the record from context if encryption is not failure */
+ ctx->open_rec = NULL;
+ tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->tx);
return rc;
+}
+
+static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from,
+ struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl,
+ struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point,
+ u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end)
+{
+ u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes;
+ struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
+ u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
+ struct scatterlist tmp = { };
+ struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
+ struct tls_rec *new;
+ int ret;
+
+ new = tls_get_rec(sk);
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size +
+ tx_overhead_size, 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ tls_free_rec(sk, new);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end;
+ i = msg_opl->sg.start;
+ sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
+ while (apply && sge->length) {
+ if (sge->length > apply) {
+ u32 len = sge->length - apply;
+
+ get_page(sg_page(sge));
+ sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
+ sge->offset + apply);
+ sge->length = apply;
+ bytes += apply;
+ apply = 0;
+ } else {
+ apply -= sge->length;
+ bytes += sge->length;
+ }
+
+ sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
+ if (i == msg_opl->sg.end)
+ break;
+ sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
+ }
+
+ msg_opl->sg.end = i;
+ msg_opl->sg.curr = i;
+ msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
+ msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0;
+ msg_opl->sg.size = bytes;
+
+ msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext;
+ msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply;
+ msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes;
+
+ j = msg_npl->sg.start;
+ nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
+ if (tmp.length) {
+ memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
+ sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
+ nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
+ }
+
+ osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
+ while (osge->length) {
+ memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
+ sg_unmark_end(nsge);
+ sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
+ sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
+ if (i == *orig_end)
+ break;
+ osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
+ nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
+ }
+
+ msg_npl->sg.end = j;
+ msg_npl->sg.curr = j;
+ msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0;
+
+ *to = new;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to,
+ struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end)
+{
+ struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext;
+ struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge;
+ u32 i, j;
+
+ i = msg_opl->sg.end;
+ sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
+ j = msg_npl->sg.start;
+
+ osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
+ nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
+
+ if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) &&
+ osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) {
+ osge->length += nsge->length;
+ put_page(sg_page(nsge));
+ }
+
+ msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end;
+ msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end;
+ msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
+ msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size;
+ msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size;
+
+ sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted);
+ sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted);
+
+ kfree(from);
}
static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
unsigned char record_type)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL;
+ u32 i, split_point, orig_end;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
struct aead_request *req;
+ bool split;
int rc;
- req = aead_request_alloc(ctx->aead_send, sk->sk_allocation);
- if (!req)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!rec)
+ return 0;
- sg_mark_end(ctx->sg_plaintext_data + ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem - 1);
- sg_mark_end(ctx->sg_encrypted_data + ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem - 1);
+ msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+ msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
- tls_make_aad(ctx->aad_space, ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
- tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq_size,
- record_type);
-
- tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx,
- page_address(sg_page(&ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0])) +
- ctx->sg_encrypted_data[0].offset,
- ctx->sg_plaintext_size, record_type);
-
- tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = 0;
- set_bit(TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD, &tls_ctx->flags);
-
- rc = tls_do_encryption(tls_ctx, ctx, req, ctx->sg_plaintext_size);
- if (rc < 0) {
- /* If we are called from write_space and
- * we fail, we need to set this SOCK_NOSPACE
- * to trigger another write_space in the future.
+ split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes;
+ split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size;
+ if (unlikely((!split &&
+ msg_pl->sg.size +
+ prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size) ||
+ (split &&
+ split_point +
+ prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size))) {
+ split = true;
+ split_point = msg_en->sg.size;
+ }
+ if (split) {
+ rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en,
+ split_point, prot->overhead_size,
+ &orig_end);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ /* This can happen if above tls_split_open_record allocates
+ * a single large encryption buffer instead of two smaller
+ * ones. In this case adjust pointers and continue without
+ * split.
*/
- set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
- goto out_req;
+ if (!msg_pl->sg.size) {
+ tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
+ msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+ msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
+ split = false;
+ }
+ sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size +
+ prot->overhead_size);
}
- free_sg(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_data, &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_plaintext_size);
+ rec->tx_flags = flags;
+ req = &rec->aead_req;
- ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem = 0;
- ctx->sg_encrypted_size = 0;
+ i = msg_pl->sg.end;
+ sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
- /* Only pass through MSG_DONTWAIT and MSG_NOSIGNAL flags */
- rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx, ctx->sg_encrypted_data, 0, flags);
- if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
+ rec->content_type = record_type;
+ if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
+ /* Add content type to end of message. No padding added */
+ sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_content_type, &rec->content_type, 1);
+ sg_mark_end(&rec->sg_content_type);
+ sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, msg_pl->sg.end + 1,
+ &rec->sg_content_type);
+ } else {
+ sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_pl, i));
+ }
- tls_advance_record_sn(sk, &tls_ctx->tx);
-out_req:
- aead_request_free(req);
- return rc;
+ if (msg_pl->sg.end < msg_pl->sg.start) {
+ sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start],
+ MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1,
+ msg_pl->sg.data);
+ }
+
+ i = msg_pl->sg.start;
+ sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, &msg_pl->sg.data[i]);
+
+ i = msg_en->sg.end;
+ sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
+ sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_en, i));
+
+ i = msg_en->sg.start;
+ sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_out, 2, &msg_en->sg.data[i]);
+
+ tls_make_aad(rec->aad_space, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
+ tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size,
+ record_type, prot->version);
+
+ tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx,
+ page_address(sg_page(&msg_en->sg.data[i])) +
+ msg_en->sg.data[i].offset,
+ msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
+ record_type, prot->version);
+
+ tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = false;
+
+ rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req,
+ msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
+ if (split) {
+ tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
+ tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
+ }
+ }
+ ctx->async_capable = 1;
+ return rc;
+ } else if (split) {
+ msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext;
+ msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted;
+ sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
+ tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
+ ctx->open_rec = tmp;
+ }
+
+ return tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
+}
+
+static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
+ bool full_record, u8 record_type,
+ ssize_t *copied, int flags)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct sk_msg msg_redir = { };
+ struct sk_psock *psock;
+ struct sock *sk_redir;
+ struct tls_rec *rec;
+ bool enospc, policy;
+ int err = 0, send;
+ u32 delta = 0;
+
+ policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY);
+ psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
+ if (!psock || !policy) {
+ err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
+ *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ err = -sk->sk_err;
+ }
+ if (psock)
+ sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
+ return err;
+ }
+more_data:
+ enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
+ if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) {
+ delta = msg->sg.size;
+ psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg);
+ delta -= msg->sg.size;
+ }
+ if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size &&
+ !enospc && !full_record) {
+ err = -ENOSPC;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ msg->cork_bytes = 0;
+ send = msg->sg.size;
+ if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send)
+ send = msg->apply_bytes;
+
+ switch (psock->eval) {
+ case __SK_PASS:
+ err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
+ *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ err = -sk->sk_err;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ break;
+ case __SK_REDIRECT:
+ sk_redir = psock->sk_redir;
+ memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg));
+ if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
+ msg->apply_bytes = 0;
+ else
+ msg->apply_bytes -= send;
+ sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send);
+ msg->sg.size -= send;
+ release_sock(sk);
+ err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, &msg_redir, send, flags);
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir);
+ msg->sg.size = 0;
+ }
+ if (msg->sg.size == 0)
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ break;
+ case __SK_DROP:
+ default:
+ sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send);
+ if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
+ msg->apply_bytes = 0;
+ else
+ msg->apply_bytes -= send;
+ if (msg->sg.size == 0)
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ *copied -= (send + delta);
+ err = -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (likely(!err)) {
+ bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec;
+
+ rec = ctx->open_rec;
+ if (rec) {
+ msg = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+ if (!msg->apply_bytes)
+ reset_eval = true;
+ }
+ if (reset_eval) {
+ psock->eval = __SK_NONE;
+ if (psock->sk_redir) {
+ sock_put(psock->sk_redir);
+ psock->sk_redir = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (rec)
+ goto more_data;
+ }
+ out_err:
+ sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
+ return err;
}
static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
{
- return tls_push_record(sk, flags, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
+ size_t copied;
+
+ if (!rec)
+ return 0;
+
+ msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+ copied = msg_pl->sg.size;
+ if (!copied)
+ return 0;
+
+ return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
+ &copied, flags);
}
-static int zerocopy_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
- int length, int *pages_used,
- unsigned int *size_used,
- struct scatterlist *to, int to_max_pages,
- bool charge)
+int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
- struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
+ long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ bool async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
+ unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
+ bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
+ bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
+ size_t try_to_copy;
+ ssize_t copied = 0;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
+ struct tls_rec *rec;
+ int required_size;
+ int num_async = 0;
+ bool full_record;
+ int record_room;
+ int num_zc = 0;
+ int orig_size;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int pending;
- size_t offset;
- ssize_t copied, use;
- int i = 0;
+ if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
+ MSG_CMSG_COMPAT))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ lock_sock(sk);
+
+ if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
+ ret = tls_proccess_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
+ num_async++;
+ else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
+ if (sk->sk_err) {
+ ret = -sk->sk_err;
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->open_rec)
+ rec = ctx->open_rec;
+ else
+ rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
+ if (!rec) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+
+ msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+ msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
+
+ orig_size = msg_pl->sg.size;
+ full_record = false;
+ try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg);
+ record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
+ if (try_to_copy >= record_room) {
+ try_to_copy = record_room;
+ full_record = true;
+ }
+
+ required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy +
+ prot->overhead_size;
+
+ if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
+ goto wait_for_sndbuf;
+
+alloc_encrypted:
+ ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret != -ENOSPC)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+
+ /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
+ * actually allocated. The difference is due
+ * to max sg elements limit
+ */
+ try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_en->sg.size;
+ full_record = true;
+ }
+
+ if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor) && !async_capable) {
+ u32 first = msg_pl->sg.end;
+
+ ret = sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
+ msg_pl, try_to_copy);
+ if (ret)
+ goto fallback_to_reg_send;
+
+ num_zc++;
+ copied += try_to_copy;
+
+ sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first);
+ ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
+ record_type, &copied,
+ msg->msg_flags);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
+ num_async++;
+ else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+ else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC)
+ goto rollback_iter;
+ else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+ continue;
+rollback_iter:
+ copied -= try_to_copy;
+ sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first);
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter,
+ msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
+fallback_to_reg_send:
+ sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size);
+ }
+
+ required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy;
+
+ ret = tls_clone_plaintext_msg(sk, required_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret != -ENOSPC)
+ goto send_end;
+
+ /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
+ * actually allocated. The difference is due
+ * to max sg elements limit
+ */
+ try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
+ full_record = true;
+ sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en,
+ msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
+ }
+
+ if (try_to_copy) {
+ ret = sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
+ msg_pl, try_to_copy);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto trim_sgl;
+ }
+
+ /* Open records defined only if successfully copied, otherwise
+ * we would trim the sg but not reset the open record frags.
+ */
+ tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
+ copied += try_to_copy;
+ if (full_record || eor) {
+ ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
+ record_type, &copied,
+ msg->msg_flags);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
+ num_async++;
+ else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+ else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
+ if (ret == -ENOSPC)
+ ret = 0;
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ continue;
+
+wait_for_sndbuf:
+ set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
+wait_for_memory:
+ ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
+ if (ret) {
+trim_sgl:
+ if (ctx->open_rec)
+ tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size);
+ goto send_end;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size)
+ goto alloc_encrypted;
+ }
+
+ if (!num_async) {
+ goto send_end;
+ } else if (num_zc) {
+ /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
+ ctx->async_notify = true;
+
+ pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
+ if (pending)
+ crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
+ else
+ reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
+
+ /* There can be no concurrent accesses, since we have no
+ * pending encrypt operations
+ */
+ WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
+
+ if (ctx->async_wait.err) {
+ ret = ctx->async_wait.err;
+ copied = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
+ cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
+ tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags);
+ }
+
+send_end:
+ ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret);
+
+ release_sock(sk);
+ mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
+ return copied > 0 ? copied : ret;
+}
+
+static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
+ int offset, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
+ unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
+ struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
+ struct tls_rec *rec;
+ int num_async = 0;
+ ssize_t copied = 0;
+ bool full_record;
+ int record_room;
+ int ret = 0;
+ bool eor;
+
+ eor = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST);
+ sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
+
+ /* Call the sk_stream functions to manage the sndbuf mem. */
+ while (size > 0) {
+ size_t copy, required_size;
+
+ if (sk->sk_err) {
+ ret = -sk->sk_err;
+ goto sendpage_end;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->open_rec)
+ rec = ctx->open_rec;
+ else
+ rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
+ if (!rec) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto sendpage_end;
+ }
+
+ msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
+
+ full_record = false;
+ record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
+ copy = size;
+ if (copy >= record_room) {
+ copy = record_room;
+ full_record = true;
+ }
+
+ required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + copy + prot->overhead_size;
+
+ if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
+ goto wait_for_sndbuf;
+alloc_payload:
+ ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret != -ENOSPC)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+
+ /* Adjust copy according to the amount that was
+ * actually allocated. The difference is due
+ * to max sg elements limit
+ */
+ copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
+ full_record = true;
+ }
+
+ sk_msg_page_add(msg_pl, page, copy, offset);
+ sk_mem_charge(sk, copy);
+
+ offset += copy;
+ size -= copy;
+ copied += copy;
+
+ tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
+ if (full_record || eor || sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) {
+ ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
+ record_type, &copied, flags);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
+ num_async++;
+ else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
+ goto wait_for_memory;
+ else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
+ if (ret == -ENOSPC)
+ ret = 0;
+ goto sendpage_end;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+wait_for_sndbuf:
+ set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
+wait_for_memory:
+ ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ctx->open_rec)
+ tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, msg_pl->sg.size);
+ goto sendpage_end;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx->open_rec)
+ goto alloc_payload;
+ }
+
+ if (num_async) {
+ /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
+ cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
+ tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
+ }
+ }
+sendpage_end:
+ ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret);
+ return copied > 0 ? copied : ret;
+}
+
+int tls_sw_sendpage_locked(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
+ int offset, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
+ MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY |
+ MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ return tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
+}
+
+int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
+ int offset, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
+ MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ ret = tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
+ release_sock(sk);
+ mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sk_buff *tls_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
+ bool nonblock, long timeo, int *err)
+{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+ DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
+
+ while (!(skb = ctx->recv_pkt) && sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) {
+ if (sk->sk_err) {
+ *err = sock_error(sk);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
+ __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
+ if (ctx->recv_pkt)
+ return ctx->recv_pkt;
+ }
+
+ if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (nonblock || !timeo) {
+ *err = -EAGAIN;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
+ sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
+ sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo,
+ ctx->recv_pkt != skb ||
+ !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock),
+ &wait);
+ sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
+ remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
+
+ /* Handle signals */
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ *err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return skb;
+}
+
+static int tls_setup_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
+ int length, int *pages_used,
+ unsigned int *size_used,
+ struct scatterlist *to,
+ int to_max_pages)
+{
+ int rc = 0, i = 0, num_elem = *pages_used, maxpages;
+ struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
unsigned int size = *size_used;
- int num_elem = *pages_used;
- int rc = 0;
- int maxpages;
+ ssize_t copied, use;
+ size_t offset;
while (length > 0) {
i = 0;
@@ -298,17 +1382,15 @@
sg_set_page(&to[num_elem],
pages[i], use, offset);
sg_unmark_end(&to[num_elem]);
- if (charge)
- sk_mem_charge(sk, use);
+ /* We do not uncharge memory from this API */
offset = 0;
copied -= use;
- ++i;
- ++num_elem;
+ i++;
+ num_elem++;
}
}
-
/* Mark the end in the last sg entry if newly added */
if (num_elem > *pages_used)
sg_mark_end(&to[num_elem - 1]);
@@ -319,348 +1401,6 @@
*pages_used = num_elem;
return rc;
-}
-
-static int memcopy_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
- int bytes)
-{
- struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
- struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
- struct scatterlist *sg = ctx->sg_plaintext_data;
- int copy, i, rc = 0;
-
- for (i = tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags;
- i < ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem; ++i) {
- copy = sg[i].length;
- if (copy_from_iter(
- page_address(sg_page(&sg[i])) + sg[i].offset,
- copy, from) != copy) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
- bytes -= copy;
-
- ++tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags;
-
- if (!bytes)
- break;
- }
-
-out:
- return rc;
-}
-
-int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
-{
- struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
- struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
- int ret;
- int required_size;
- long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
- bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
- size_t try_to_copy, copied = 0;
- unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
- int record_room;
- bool full_record;
- int orig_size;
- bool is_kvec = msg->msg_iter.type & ITER_KVEC;
-
- if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL))
- return -ENOTSUPP;
-
- lock_sock(sk);
-
- ret = tls_complete_pending_work(sk, tls_ctx, msg->msg_flags, &timeo);
- if (ret)
- goto send_end;
-
- if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
- ret = tls_proccess_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
- if (ret)
- goto send_end;
- }
-
- while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ret = -sk->sk_err;
- goto send_end;
- }
-
- orig_size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
- full_record = false;
- try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg);
- record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
- if (try_to_copy >= record_room) {
- try_to_copy = record_room;
- full_record = true;
- }
-
- required_size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size + try_to_copy +
- tls_ctx->tx.overhead_size;
-
- if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
- goto wait_for_sndbuf;
-alloc_encrypted:
- ret = alloc_encrypted_sg(sk, required_size);
- if (ret) {
- if (ret != -ENOSPC)
- goto wait_for_memory;
-
- /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
- * actually allocated. The difference is due
- * to max sg elements limit
- */
- try_to_copy -= required_size - ctx->sg_encrypted_size;
- full_record = true;
- }
- if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor)) {
- ret = zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
- try_to_copy, &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
- ctx->sg_plaintext_data,
- ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sg_plaintext_data),
- true);
- if (ret)
- goto fallback_to_reg_send;
-
- copied += try_to_copy;
- ret = tls_push_record(sk, msg->msg_flags, record_type);
- if (ret)
- goto send_end;
- continue;
-
-fallback_to_reg_send:
- trim_sg(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_data,
- &ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_plaintext_size,
- orig_size);
- }
-
- required_size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size + try_to_copy;
-alloc_plaintext:
- ret = alloc_plaintext_sg(sk, required_size);
- if (ret) {
- if (ret != -ENOSPC)
- goto wait_for_memory;
-
- /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
- * actually allocated. The difference is due
- * to max sg elements limit
- */
- try_to_copy -= required_size - ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
- full_record = true;
-
- trim_sg(sk, ctx->sg_encrypted_data,
- &ctx->sg_encrypted_num_elem,
- &ctx->sg_encrypted_size,
- ctx->sg_plaintext_size +
- tls_ctx->tx.overhead_size);
- }
-
- ret = memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter, try_to_copy);
- if (ret)
- goto trim_sgl;
-
- copied += try_to_copy;
- if (full_record || eor) {
-push_record:
- ret = tls_push_record(sk, msg->msg_flags, record_type);
- if (ret) {
- if (ret == -ENOMEM)
- goto wait_for_memory;
-
- goto send_end;
- }
- }
-
- continue;
-
-wait_for_sndbuf:
- set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
-wait_for_memory:
- ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
- if (ret) {
-trim_sgl:
- trim_both_sgl(sk, orig_size);
- goto send_end;
- }
-
- if (tls_is_pending_closed_record(tls_ctx))
- goto push_record;
-
- if (ctx->sg_encrypted_size < required_size)
- goto alloc_encrypted;
-
- goto alloc_plaintext;
- }
-
-send_end:
- ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret);
-
- release_sock(sk);
- return copied ? copied : ret;
-}
-
-int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
- int offset, size_t size, int flags)
-{
- struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
- struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
- int ret;
- long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
- bool eor;
- size_t orig_size = size;
- unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- bool full_record;
- int record_room;
-
- if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
- MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST))
- return -ENOTSUPP;
-
- /* No MSG_EOR from splice, only look at MSG_MORE */
- eor = !(flags & (MSG_MORE | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST));
-
- lock_sock(sk);
-
- sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
-
- ret = tls_complete_pending_work(sk, tls_ctx, flags, &timeo);
- if (ret)
- goto sendpage_end;
-
- /* Call the sk_stream functions to manage the sndbuf mem. */
- while (size > 0) {
- size_t copy, required_size;
-
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ret = -sk->sk_err;
- goto sendpage_end;
- }
-
- full_record = false;
- record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
- copy = size;
- if (copy >= record_room) {
- copy = record_room;
- full_record = true;
- }
- required_size = ctx->sg_plaintext_size + copy +
- tls_ctx->tx.overhead_size;
-
- if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
- goto wait_for_sndbuf;
-alloc_payload:
- ret = alloc_encrypted_sg(sk, required_size);
- if (ret) {
- if (ret != -ENOSPC)
- goto wait_for_memory;
-
- /* Adjust copy according to the amount that was
- * actually allocated. The difference is due
- * to max sg elements limit
- */
- copy -= required_size - ctx->sg_plaintext_size;
- full_record = true;
- }
-
- get_page(page);
- sg = ctx->sg_plaintext_data + ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem;
- sg_set_page(sg, page, copy, offset);
- sg_unmark_end(sg);
-
- ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem++;
-
- sk_mem_charge(sk, copy);
- offset += copy;
- size -= copy;
- ctx->sg_plaintext_size += copy;
- tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem;
-
- if (full_record || eor ||
- ctx->sg_plaintext_num_elem ==
- ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sg_plaintext_data)) {
-push_record:
- ret = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (ret) {
- if (ret == -ENOMEM)
- goto wait_for_memory;
-
- goto sendpage_end;
- }
- }
- continue;
-wait_for_sndbuf:
- set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
-wait_for_memory:
- ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
- if (ret) {
- trim_both_sgl(sk, ctx->sg_plaintext_size);
- goto sendpage_end;
- }
-
- if (tls_is_pending_closed_record(tls_ctx))
- goto push_record;
-
- goto alloc_payload;
- }
-
-sendpage_end:
- if (orig_size > size)
- ret = orig_size - size;
- else
- ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret);
-
- release_sock(sk);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static struct sk_buff *tls_wait_data(struct sock *sk, int flags,
- long timeo, int *err)
-{
- struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
- struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
- struct sk_buff *skb;
- DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
-
- while (!(skb = ctx->recv_pkt)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- *err = sock_error(sk);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
- __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
- if (ctx->recv_pkt)
- return ctx->recv_pkt;
- }
-
- if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
- return NULL;
-
- if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
- return NULL;
-
- if ((flags & MSG_DONTWAIT) || !timeo) {
- *err = -EAGAIN;
- return NULL;
- }
-
- add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
- sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
- sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo, ctx->recv_pkt != skb, &wait);
- sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
- remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
-
- /* Handle signals */
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- *err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
-
- return skb;
}
/* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg
@@ -674,10 +1414,11 @@
static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct iov_iter *out_iov,
struct scatterlist *out_sg,
- int *chunk, bool *zc)
+ int *chunk, bool *zc, bool async)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
int n_sgin, n_sgout, nsg, mem_size, aead_size, err, pages = 0;
struct aead_request *aead_req;
@@ -685,19 +1426,23 @@
u8 *aad, *iv, *mem = NULL;
struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL;
struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL;
- const int data_len = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
+ const int data_len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
+ prot->tail_size;
+ int iv_offset = 0;
if (*zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) {
if (out_iov)
n_sgout = iov_iter_npages(out_iov, INT_MAX) + 1;
else
n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg);
+ n_sgin = skb_nsg(skb, rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
+ rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
} else {
n_sgout = 0;
*zc = false;
+ n_sgin = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
}
- n_sgin = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
if (n_sgin < 1)
return -EBADMSG;
@@ -708,7 +1453,7 @@
aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv);
mem_size = aead_size + (nsg * sizeof(struct scatterlist));
- mem_size = mem_size + TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
+ mem_size = mem_size + prot->aad_size;
mem_size = mem_size + crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_recv);
/* Allocate a single block of memory which contains
@@ -724,29 +1469,42 @@
sgin = (struct scatterlist *)(mem + aead_size);
sgout = sgin + n_sgin;
aad = (u8 *)(sgout + n_sgout);
- iv = aad + TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
+ iv = aad + prot->aad_size;
+
+ /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of nonce+iv is always '2' */
+ if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
+ iv[0] = 2;
+ iv_offset = 1;
+ }
/* Prepare IV */
err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
- iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE,
- tls_ctx->rx.iv_size);
+ iv + iv_offset + prot->salt_size,
+ prot->iv_size);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(mem);
return err;
}
- memcpy(iv, tls_ctx->rx.iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
+ if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv,
+ prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
+ else
+ memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size);
+
+ xor_iv_with_seq(prot->version, iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
/* Prepare AAD */
- tls_make_aad(aad, rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size,
- tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq_size,
- ctx->control);
+ tls_make_aad(aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
+ prot->tail_size,
+ tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, prot->rec_seq_size,
+ ctx->control, prot->version);
/* Prepare sgin */
sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin);
- sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], aad, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
+ sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
- rxm->offset + tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size,
- rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size);
+ rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
+ rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
if (err < 0) {
kfree(mem);
return err;
@@ -755,12 +1513,12 @@
if (n_sgout) {
if (out_iov) {
sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout);
- sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], aad, TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE);
+ sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
*chunk = 0;
- err = zerocopy_from_iter(sk, out_iov, data_len, &pages,
- chunk, &sgout[1],
- (n_sgout - 1), false);
+ err = tls_setup_from_iter(sk, out_iov, data_len,
+ &pages, chunk, &sgout[1],
+ (n_sgout - 1));
if (err < 0)
goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
} else if (out_sg) {
@@ -772,12 +1530,15 @@
fallback_to_reg_recv:
sgout = sgin;
pages = 0;
- *chunk = 0;
+ *chunk = data_len;
*zc = false;
}
/* Prepare and submit AEAD request */
- err = tls_do_decryption(sk, sgin, sgout, iv, data_len, aead_req);
+ err = tls_do_decryption(sk, skb, sgin, sgout, iv,
+ data_len, aead_req, async);
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return err;
/* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */
for (; pages > 0; pages--)
@@ -788,31 +1549,52 @@
}
static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct iov_iter *dest, int *chunk, bool *zc)
+ struct iov_iter *dest, int *chunk, bool *zc,
+ bool async)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
- int err = 0;
+ int pad, err = 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
- err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, skb);
- if (err < 0)
- return err;
-#endif
if (!ctx->decrypted) {
- err = decrypt_internal(sk, skb, dest, NULL, chunk, zc);
- if (err < 0)
- return err;
+ if (tls_ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW) {
+ err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx, skb, rxm);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Still not decrypted after tls_device */
+ if (!ctx->decrypted) {
+ err = decrypt_internal(sk, skb, dest, NULL, chunk, zc,
+ async);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot,
+ &tls_ctx->rx);
+ else if (err == -EBADMSG)
+ TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
+ LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
+ return err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *zc = false;
+ }
+
+ pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
+ if (pad < 0)
+ return pad;
+
+ rxm->full_len -= pad;
+ rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
+ rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
+ tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx);
+ ctx->decrypted = 1;
+ ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
} else {
*zc = false;
}
-
- rxm->offset += tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size;
- rxm->full_len -= tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
- tls_advance_record_sn(sk, &tls_ctx->rx);
- ctx->decrypted = true;
- ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
return err;
}
@@ -823,7 +1605,7 @@
bool zc = true;
int chunk;
- return decrypt_internal(sk, skb, NULL, sgout, &chunk, &zc);
+ return decrypt_internal(sk, skb, NULL, sgout, &chunk, &zc, false);
}
static bool tls_sw_advance_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -831,21 +1613,132 @@
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
- struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
- if (len < rxm->full_len) {
- rxm->offset += len;
- rxm->full_len -= len;
+ if (skb) {
+ struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
- return false;
+ if (len < rxm->full_len) {
+ rxm->offset += len;
+ rxm->full_len -= len;
+ return false;
+ }
+ consume_skb(skb);
}
/* Finished with message */
ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
- kfree_skb(skb);
__strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
return true;
+}
+
+/* This function traverses the rx_list in tls receive context to copies the
+ * decrypted records into the buffer provided by caller zero copy is not
+ * true. Further, the records are removed from the rx_list if it is not a peek
+ * case and the record has been consumed completely.
+ */
+static int process_rx_list(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
+ struct msghdr *msg,
+ u8 *control,
+ bool *cmsg,
+ size_t skip,
+ size_t len,
+ bool zc,
+ bool is_peek)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&ctx->rx_list);
+ u8 ctrl = *control;
+ u8 msgc = *cmsg;
+ struct tls_msg *tlm;
+ ssize_t copied = 0;
+
+ /* Set the record type in 'control' if caller didn't pass it */
+ if (!ctrl && skb) {
+ tlm = tls_msg(skb);
+ ctrl = tlm->control;
+ }
+
+ while (skip && skb) {
+ struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ tlm = tls_msg(skb);
+
+ /* Cannot process a record of different type */
+ if (ctrl != tlm->control)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (skip < rxm->full_len)
+ break;
+
+ skip = skip - rxm->full_len;
+ skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
+ }
+
+ while (len && skb) {
+ struct sk_buff *next_skb;
+ struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+ int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len - skip, len);
+
+ tlm = tls_msg(skb);
+
+ /* Cannot process a record of different type */
+ if (ctrl != tlm->control)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Set record type if not already done. For a non-data record,
+ * do not proceed if record type could not be copied.
+ */
+ if (!msgc) {
+ int cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
+ sizeof(ctrl), &ctrl);
+ msgc = true;
+ if (ctrl != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
+ if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ *cmsg = msgc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!zc || (rxm->full_len - skip) > len) {
+ int err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset + skip,
+ msg, chunk);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ len = len - chunk;
+ copied = copied + chunk;
+
+ /* Consume the data from record if it is non-peek case*/
+ if (!is_peek) {
+ rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
+ rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
+
+ /* Return if there is unconsumed data in the record */
+ if (rxm->full_len - skip)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* The remaining skip-bytes must lie in 1st record in rx_list.
+ * So from the 2nd record, 'skip' should be 0.
+ */
+ skip = 0;
+
+ if (msg)
+ msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
+
+ next_skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
+
+ if (!is_peek) {
+ skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
+ consume_skb(skb);
+ }
+
+ skb = next_skb;
+ }
+
+ *control = ctrl;
+ return copied;
}
int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
@@ -857,104 +1750,241 @@
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
- unsigned char control;
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
+ struct sk_psock *psock;
+ unsigned char control = 0;
+ ssize_t decrypted = 0;
struct strp_msg *rxm;
+ struct tls_msg *tlm;
struct sk_buff *skb;
ssize_t copied = 0;
bool cmsg = false;
int target, err = 0;
long timeo;
- bool is_kvec = msg->msg_iter.type & ITER_KVEC;
+ bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
+ bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
+ bool bpf_strp_enabled;
+ int num_async = 0;
+ int pending;
flags |= nonblock;
if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR);
+ psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
lock_sock(sk);
+ bpf_strp_enabled = sk_psock_strp_enabled(psock);
+
+ /* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */
+ err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0, len, false,
+ is_peek);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ tls_err_abort(sk, err);
+ goto end;
+ } else {
+ copied = err;
+ }
+
+ if (len <= copied)
+ goto recv_end;
target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
+ len = len - copied;
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
- do {
- bool zc = false;
- int chunk = 0;
- skb = tls_wait_data(sk, flags, timeo, &err);
- if (!skb)
+ while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || ctx->recv_pkt)) {
+ bool retain_skb = false;
+ bool zc = false;
+ int to_decrypt;
+ int chunk = 0;
+ bool async_capable;
+ bool async = false;
+
+ skb = tls_wait_data(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, timeo, &err);
+ if (!skb) {
+ if (psock) {
+ int ret = __tcp_bpf_recvmsg(sk, psock,
+ msg, len, flags);
+
+ if (ret > 0) {
+ decrypted += ret;
+ len -= ret;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
goto recv_end;
+ } else {
+ tlm = tls_msg(skb);
+ if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ tlm->control = 0;
+ else
+ tlm->control = ctx->control;
+ }
rxm = strp_msg(skb);
+
+ to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
+
+ if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
+ ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA &&
+ prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
+ !bpf_strp_enabled)
+ zc = true;
+
+ /* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
+ if (ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled)
+ async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
+ else
+ async_capable = false;
+
+ err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
+ &chunk, &zc, async_capable);
+ if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
+ goto recv_end;
+ }
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
+ async = true;
+ num_async++;
+ } else if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
+ tlm->control = ctx->control;
+ }
+
+ /* If the type of records being processed is not known yet,
+ * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known,
+ * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end.
+ * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type
+ * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser.
+ * For tls1.3, we disable async.
+ */
+
+ if (!control)
+ control = tlm->control;
+ else if (control != tlm->control)
+ goto recv_end;
+
if (!cmsg) {
int cerr;
cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
- sizeof(ctx->control), &ctx->control);
+ sizeof(control), &control);
cmsg = true;
- control = ctx->control;
- if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
+ if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
err = -EIO;
goto recv_end;
}
}
- } else if (control != ctx->control) {
- goto recv_end;
}
- if (!ctx->decrypted) {
- int to_copy = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
-
- if (!is_kvec && to_copy <= len &&
- likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK)))
- zc = true;
-
- err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
- &chunk, &zc);
- if (err < 0) {
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
- goto recv_end;
- }
- ctx->decrypted = true;
- }
+ if (async)
+ goto pick_next_record;
if (!zc) {
- chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
- err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset, msg,
- chunk);
+ if (bpf_strp_enabled) {
+ err = sk_psock_tls_strp_read(psock, skb);
+ if (err != __SK_PASS) {
+ rxm->offset = rxm->offset + rxm->full_len;
+ rxm->full_len = 0;
+ if (err == __SK_DROP)
+ consume_skb(skb);
+ ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
+ __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rxm->full_len > len) {
+ retain_skb = true;
+ chunk = len;
+ } else {
+ chunk = rxm->full_len;
+ }
+
+ err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
+ msg, chunk);
if (err < 0)
goto recv_end;
- }
- copied += chunk;
- len -= chunk;
- if (likely(!(flags & MSG_PEEK))) {
- u8 control = ctx->control;
-
- if (tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, chunk)) {
- /* Return full control message to
- * userspace before trying to parse
- * another message type
- */
- msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
- if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
- goto recv_end;
+ if (!is_peek) {
+ rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
+ rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
}
- } else {
- /* MSG_PEEK right now cannot look beyond current skb
- * from strparser, meaning we cannot advance skb here
- * and thus unpause strparser since we'd loose original
- * one.
- */
- break;
}
- /* If we have a new message from strparser, continue now. */
- if (copied >= target && !ctx->recv_pkt)
+pick_next_record:
+ if (chunk > len)
+ chunk = len;
+
+ decrypted += chunk;
+ len -= chunk;
+
+ /* For async or peek case, queue the current skb */
+ if (async || is_peek || retain_skb) {
+ skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, skb);
+ skb = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, chunk)) {
+ /* Return full control message to
+ * userspace before trying to parse
+ * another message type
+ */
+ msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
+ if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
+ goto recv_end;
+ } else {
break;
- } while (len);
+ }
+ }
recv_end:
+ if (num_async) {
+ /* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
+ ctx->async_notify = true;
+ pending = atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
+ if (pending) {
+ err = crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
+ if (err) {
+ /* one of async decrypt failed */
+ tls_err_abort(sk, err);
+ copied = 0;
+ decrypted = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
+ }
+
+ /* There can be no concurrent accesses, since we have no
+ * pending decrypt operations
+ */
+ WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
+
+ /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */
+ if (is_peek || is_kvec)
+ err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, copied,
+ decrypted, false, is_peek);
+ else
+ err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0,
+ decrypted, true, is_peek);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ tls_err_abort(sk, err);
+ copied = 0;
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+
+ copied += decrypted;
+
+end:
release_sock(sk);
+ if (psock)
+ sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
return copied ? : err;
}
@@ -975,27 +2005,24 @@
lock_sock(sk);
- timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
- skb = tls_wait_data(sk, flags, timeo, &err);
+ skb = tls_wait_data(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK, timeo, &err);
if (!skb)
goto splice_read_end;
- /* splice does not support reading control messages */
- if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
- err = -ENOTSUPP;
+ err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
goto splice_read_end;
}
- if (!ctx->decrypted) {
- err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc);
-
- if (err < 0) {
- tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
- goto splice_read_end;
- }
- ctx->decrypted = true;
+ /* splice does not support reading control messages */
+ if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto splice_read_end;
}
+
rxm = strp_msg(skb);
chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
@@ -1011,29 +2038,28 @@
return copied ? : err;
}
-unsigned int tls_sw_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
- struct poll_table_struct *wait)
+bool tls_sw_stream_read(const struct sock *sk)
{
- unsigned int ret;
- struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+ bool ingress_empty = true;
+ struct sk_psock *psock;
- /* Grab POLLOUT and POLLHUP from the underlying socket */
- ret = ctx->sk_poll(file, sock, wait);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ psock = sk_psock(sk);
+ if (psock)
+ ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
- /* Clear POLLIN bits, and set based on recv_pkt */
- ret &= ~(POLLIN | POLLRDNORM);
- if (ctx->recv_pkt)
- ret |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM;
-
- return ret;
+ return !ingress_empty || ctx->recv_pkt ||
+ !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
}
static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
size_t cipher_overhead;
@@ -1041,17 +2067,17 @@
int ret;
/* Verify that we have a full TLS header, or wait for more data */
- if (rxm->offset + tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size > skb->len)
+ if (rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size > skb->len)
return 0;
/* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */
- if (WARN_ON(tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size > sizeof(header))) {
+ if (WARN_ON(prot->prepend_size > sizeof(header))) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto read_failure;
}
/* Linearize header to local buffer */
- ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, header, tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size);
+ ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, header, prot->prepend_size);
if (ret < 0)
goto read_failure;
@@ -1060,9 +2086,12 @@
data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8));
- cipher_overhead = tls_ctx->rx.tag_size + tls_ctx->rx.iv_size;
+ cipher_overhead = prot->tag_size;
+ if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ cipher_overhead += prot->iv_size;
- if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead) {
+ if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead +
+ prot->tail_size) {
ret = -EMSGSIZE;
goto read_failure;
}
@@ -1071,16 +2100,15 @@
goto read_failure;
}
- if (header[1] != TLS_VERSION_MINOR(tls_ctx->crypto_recv.info.version) ||
- header[2] != TLS_VERSION_MAJOR(tls_ctx->crypto_recv.info.version)) {
+ /* Note that both TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 use TLS_1_2 version here */
+ if (header[1] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR ||
+ header[2] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto read_failure;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE
- handle_device_resync(strp->sk, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + rxm->offset,
- *(u64*)tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
-#endif
+ tls_device_rx_resync_new_rec(strp->sk, data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + rxm->offset);
return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
read_failure:
@@ -1094,7 +2122,7 @@
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
- ctx->decrypted = false;
+ ctx->decrypted = 0;
ctx->recv_pkt = skb;
strp_pause(strp);
@@ -1106,17 +2134,71 @@
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+ struct sk_psock *psock;
strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp);
+
+ psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
+ if (psock) {
+ if (!list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg))
+ ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
+ sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
+ }
}
-void tls_sw_free_resources_tx(struct sock *sk)
+void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
+{
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+
+ set_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
+ set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
+ cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ctx->tx_work.work);
+}
+
+void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
+ int pending;
+
+ /* Wait for any pending async encryptions to complete */
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
+ ctx->async_notify = true;
+ pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
+
+ if (pending)
+ crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
+
+ tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
+
+ /* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free
+ * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list.
+ */
+ if (tls_ctx->partially_sent_record) {
+ tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx);
+ rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
+ struct tls_rec, list);
+ list_del(&rec->list);
+ sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
+ kfree(rec);
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
+ list_del(&rec->list);
+ sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
+ sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
+ kfree(rec);
+ }
crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send);
- tls_free_both_sg(sk);
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+}
+
+void tls_sw_free_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
+{
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
kfree(ctx);
}
@@ -1132,38 +2214,116 @@
if (ctx->aead_recv) {
kfree_skb(ctx->recv_pkt);
ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
+ skb_queue_purge(&ctx->rx_list);
crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_recv);
strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
- write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready;
- write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- release_sock(sk);
- strp_done(&ctx->strp);
- lock_sock(sk);
+ /* If tls_sw_strparser_arm() was not called (cleanup paths)
+ * we still want to strp_stop(), but sk->sk_data_ready was
+ * never swapped.
+ */
+ if (ctx->saved_data_ready) {
+ write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready;
+ write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ }
}
+}
+
+void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
+{
+ struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+
+ strp_done(&ctx->strp);
+}
+
+void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
+{
+ struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+
+ kfree(ctx);
}
void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
{
struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
- struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk);
+ tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+}
- kfree(ctx);
+/* The work handler to transmitt the encrypted records in tx_list */
+static void tx_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct delayed_work *delayed_work = to_delayed_work(work);
+ struct tx_work *tx_work = container_of(delayed_work,
+ struct tx_work, work);
+ struct sock *sk = tx_work->sk;
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx;
+
+ if (unlikely(!tls_ctx))
+ return;
+
+ ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
+ if (test_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
+ return;
+
+ if (!test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
+ return;
+
+ if (mutex_trylock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock)) {
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
+ release_sock(sk);
+ mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
+ } else if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
+ /* Someone is holding the tx_lock, they will likely run Tx
+ * and cancel the work on their way out of the lock section.
+ * Schedule a long delay just in case.
+ */
+ schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, msecs_to_jiffies(10));
+ }
+}
+
+void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct tls_sw_context_tx *tx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
+
+ /* Schedule the transmission if tx list is ready */
+ if (is_tx_ready(tx_ctx) &&
+ !test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &tx_ctx->tx_bitmask))
+ schedule_delayed_work(&tx_ctx->tx_work.work, 0);
+}
+
+void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
+{
+ struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
+
+ write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+ rx_ctx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready;
+ sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready;
+ write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
+
+ strp_check_rcv(&rx_ctx->strp);
}
int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx)
{
+ struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
+ struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *gcm_128_info;
+ struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
+ struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *ccm_128_info;
struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
struct cipher_context *cctx;
struct crypto_aead **aead;
struct strp_callbacks cb;
- u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size;
- char *iv, *rec_seq;
+ u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size, salt_size;
+ struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt, *cipher_name;
+ size_t keysize;
int rc = 0;
if (!ctx) {
@@ -1199,13 +2359,19 @@
if (tx) {
crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_tx->async_wait);
+ spin_lock_init(&sw_ctx_tx->encrypt_compl_lock);
crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
cctx = &ctx->tx;
aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_list);
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.work, tx_work_handler);
+ sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.sk = sk;
} else {
crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_rx->async_wait);
+ spin_lock_init(&sw_ctx_rx->decrypt_compl_lock);
crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
cctx = &ctx->rx;
+ skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list);
aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
}
@@ -1220,6 +2386,45 @@
((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
gcm_128_info =
(struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info;
+ keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
+ key = gcm_128_info->key;
+ salt = gcm_128_info->salt;
+ salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
+ cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
+ break;
+ }
+ case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256: {
+ nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
+ tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
+ iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
+ iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->iv;
+ rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
+ rec_seq =
+ ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
+ gcm_256_info =
+ (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info;
+ keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE;
+ key = gcm_256_info->key;
+ salt = gcm_256_info->salt;
+ salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE;
+ cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
+ break;
+ }
+ case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: {
+ nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
+ tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
+ iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
+ iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
+ rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
+ rec_seq =
+ ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
+ ccm_128_info =
+ (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info;
+ keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
+ key = ccm_128_info->key;
+ salt = ccm_128_info->salt;
+ salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
+ cipher_name = "ccm(aes)";
break;
}
default:
@@ -1227,53 +2432,47 @@
goto free_priv;
}
- /* Sanity-check the IV size for stack allocations. */
- if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE) {
+ /* Sanity-check the sizes for stack allocations. */
+ if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE ||
+ rec_seq_size > TLS_MAX_REC_SEQ_SIZE) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto free_priv;
}
- cctx->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
- cctx->tag_size = tag_size;
- cctx->overhead_size = cctx->prepend_size + cctx->tag_size;
- cctx->iv_size = iv_size;
- cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE,
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
+ nonce_size = 0;
+ prot->aad_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
+ prot->tail_size = 1;
+ } else {
+ prot->aad_size = TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
+ prot->tail_size = 0;
+ }
+
+ prot->version = crypto_info->version;
+ prot->cipher_type = crypto_info->cipher_type;
+ prot->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
+ prot->tag_size = tag_size;
+ prot->overhead_size = prot->prepend_size +
+ prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size;
+ prot->iv_size = iv_size;
+ prot->salt_size = salt_size;
+ cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cctx->iv) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto free_priv;
}
- memcpy(cctx->iv, gcm_128_info->salt, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
- memcpy(cctx->iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE, iv, iv_size);
- cctx->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
+ /* Note: 128 & 256 bit salt are the same size */
+ prot->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
+ memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, salt_size);
+ memcpy(cctx->iv + salt_size, iv, iv_size);
cctx->rec_seq = kmemdup(rec_seq, rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cctx->rec_seq) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto free_iv;
}
- if (sw_ctx_tx) {
- sg_init_table(sw_ctx_tx->sg_encrypted_data,
- ARRAY_SIZE(sw_ctx_tx->sg_encrypted_data));
- sg_init_table(sw_ctx_tx->sg_plaintext_data,
- ARRAY_SIZE(sw_ctx_tx->sg_plaintext_data));
-
- sg_init_table(sw_ctx_tx->sg_aead_in, 2);
- sg_set_buf(&sw_ctx_tx->sg_aead_in[0], sw_ctx_tx->aad_space,
- sizeof(sw_ctx_tx->aad_space));
- sg_unmark_end(&sw_ctx_tx->sg_aead_in[1]);
- sg_chain(sw_ctx_tx->sg_aead_in, 2,
- sw_ctx_tx->sg_plaintext_data);
- sg_init_table(sw_ctx_tx->sg_aead_out, 2);
- sg_set_buf(&sw_ctx_tx->sg_aead_out[0], sw_ctx_tx->aad_space,
- sizeof(sw_ctx_tx->aad_space));
- sg_unmark_end(&sw_ctx_tx->sg_aead_out[1]);
- sg_chain(sw_ctx_tx->sg_aead_out, 2,
- sw_ctx_tx->sg_encrypted_data);
- }
-
if (!*aead) {
- *aead = crypto_alloc_aead("gcm(aes)", 0, 0);
+ *aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(*aead)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(*aead);
*aead = NULL;
@@ -1283,31 +2482,31 @@
ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
- rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, gcm_128_info->key,
- TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE);
+ rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, keysize);
+
if (rc)
goto free_aead;
- rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, cctx->tag_size);
+ rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
if (rc)
goto free_aead;
if (sw_ctx_rx) {
+ tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv);
+
+ if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ sw_ctx_rx->async_capable = 0;
+ else
+ sw_ctx_rx->async_capable =
+ !!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags &
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+
/* Set up strparser */
memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
cb.rcv_msg = tls_queue;
cb.parse_msg = tls_read_size;
strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk, &cb);
-
- write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
- sw_ctx_rx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready;
- sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready;
- write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
-
- sw_ctx_rx->sk_poll = sk->sk_socket->ops->poll;
-
- strp_check_rcv(&sw_ctx_rx->strp);
}
goto out;
--
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