From 102a0743326a03cd1a1202ceda21e175b7d3575c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: hc <hc@nodka.com>
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 01:20:52 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] add new system file
---
kernel/crypto/testmgr.c | 4630 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 files changed, 3,254 insertions(+), 1,376 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/crypto/testmgr.c b/kernel/crypto/testmgr.c
index 775afc8c..facc167 100644
--- a/kernel/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/kernel/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* Algorithm testing framework and tests.
*
@@ -5,6 +6,7 @@
* Copyright (c) 2002 Jean-Francois Dive <jef@linuxbe.org>
* Copyright (c) 2007 Nokia Siemens Networks
* Copyright (c) 2008 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Updated RFC4106 AES-GCM testing.
* Authors: Aidan O'Mahony (aidan.o.mahony@intel.com)
@@ -12,12 +14,6 @@
* Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@intel.com>
* Tadeusz Struk (tadeusz.struk@intel.com)
* Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
- * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
- * any later version.
- *
*/
#include <crypto/aead.h>
@@ -26,20 +22,43 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/once.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <crypto/rng.h>
#include <crypto/drbg.h>
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/kpp.h>
#include <crypto/acompress.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include "internal.h"
+
+MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL);
static bool notests;
module_param(notests, bool, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(notests, "disable crypto self-tests");
+
+static bool panic_on_fail;
+module_param(panic_on_fail, bool, 0444);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+static bool noextratests;
+module_param(noextratests, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(noextratests, "disable expensive crypto self-tests");
+
+static unsigned int fuzz_iterations = 100;
+module_param(fuzz_iterations, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(fuzz_iterations, "number of fuzz test iterations");
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, crypto_simd_disabled_for_test);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test);
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
@@ -59,28 +78,28 @@
#define XBUFSIZE 8
/*
- * Indexes into the xbuf to simulate cross-page access.
- */
-#define IDX1 32
-#define IDX2 32400
-#define IDX3 1511
-#define IDX4 8193
-#define IDX5 22222
-#define IDX6 17101
-#define IDX7 27333
-#define IDX8 3000
-
-/*
* Used by test_cipher()
*/
#define ENCRYPT 1
#define DECRYPT 0
struct aead_test_suite {
- struct {
- const struct aead_testvec *vecs;
- unsigned int count;
- } enc, dec;
+ const struct aead_testvec *vecs;
+ unsigned int count;
+
+ /*
+ * Set if trying to decrypt an inauthentic ciphertext with this
+ * algorithm might result in EINVAL rather than EBADMSG, due to other
+ * validation the algorithm does on the inputs such as length checks.
+ */
+ unsigned int einval_allowed : 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Set if this algorithm requires that the IV be located at the end of
+ * the AAD buffer, in addition to being given in the normal way. The
+ * behavior when the two IV copies differ is implementation-defined.
+ */
+ unsigned int aad_iv : 1;
};
struct cipher_test_suite {
@@ -122,6 +141,7 @@
struct alg_test_desc {
const char *alg;
+ const char *generic_driver;
int (*test)(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
u32 type, u32 mask);
int fips_allowed; /* set if alg is allowed in fips mode */
@@ -138,9 +158,6 @@
} suite;
};
-static const unsigned int IDX[8] = {
- IDX1, IDX2, IDX3, IDX4, IDX5, IDX6, IDX7, IDX8 };
-
static void hexdump(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
{
print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
@@ -148,12 +165,12 @@
buf, len, false);
}
-static int testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE])
+static int __testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE], int order)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < XBUFSIZE; i++) {
- buf[i] = (void *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ buf[i] = (char *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
if (!buf[i])
goto err_free_buf;
}
@@ -162,856 +179,2436 @@
err_free_buf:
while (i-- > 0)
- free_page((unsigned long)buf[i]);
+ free_pages((unsigned long)buf[i], order);
return -ENOMEM;
}
-static void testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE])
+static int testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+ return __testmgr_alloc_buf(buf, 0);
+}
+
+static void __testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE], int order)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < XBUFSIZE; i++)
- free_page((unsigned long)buf[i]);
+ free_pages((unsigned long)buf[i], order);
}
-static int ahash_guard_result(char *result, char c, int size)
+static void testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+ __testmgr_free_buf(buf, 0);
+}
+
+#define TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE 0xfe
+#define TESTMGR_POISON_LEN 16
+
+static inline void testmgr_poison(void *addr, size_t len)
+{
+ memset(addr, TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE, len);
+}
+
+/* Is the memory region still fully poisoned? */
+static inline bool testmgr_is_poison(const void *addr, size_t len)
+{
+ return memchr_inv(addr, TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE, len) == NULL;
+}
+
+/* flush type for hash algorithms */
+enum flush_type {
+ /* merge with update of previous buffer(s) */
+ FLUSH_TYPE_NONE = 0,
+
+ /* update with previous buffer(s) before doing this one */
+ FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH,
+
+ /* likewise, but also export and re-import the intermediate state */
+ FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+};
+
+/* finalization function for hash algorithms */
+enum finalization_type {
+ FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL, /* use final() */
+ FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP, /* use finup() */
+ FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST, /* use digest() */
+};
+
+#define TEST_SG_TOTAL 10000
+
+/**
+ * struct test_sg_division - description of a scatterlist entry
+ *
+ * This struct describes one entry of a scatterlist being constructed to check a
+ * crypto test vector.
+ *
+ * @proportion_of_total: length of this chunk relative to the total length,
+ * given as a proportion out of TEST_SG_TOTAL so that it
+ * scales to fit any test vector
+ * @offset: byte offset into a 2-page buffer at which this chunk will start
+ * @offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to the
+ * @offset
+ * @flush_type: for hashes, whether an update() should be done now vs.
+ * continuing to accumulate data
+ * @nosimd: if doing the pending update(), do it with SIMD disabled?
+ */
+struct test_sg_division {
+ unsigned int proportion_of_total;
+ unsigned int offset;
+ bool offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+ enum flush_type flush_type;
+ bool nosimd;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct testvec_config - configuration for testing a crypto test vector
+ *
+ * This struct describes the data layout and other parameters with which each
+ * crypto test vector can be tested.
+ *
+ * @name: name of this config, logged for debugging purposes if a test fails
+ * @inplace: operate on the data in-place, if applicable for the algorithm type?
+ * @req_flags: extra request_flags, e.g. CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
+ * @src_divs: description of how to arrange the source scatterlist
+ * @dst_divs: description of how to arrange the dst scatterlist, if applicable
+ * for the algorithm type. Defaults to @src_divs if unset.
+ * @iv_offset: misalignment of the IV in the range [0..MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1],
+ * where 0 is aligned to a 2*(MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1) byte boundary
+ * @iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to
+ * the @iv_offset
+ * @key_offset: misalignment of the key, where 0 is default alignment
+ * @key_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to
+ * the @key_offset
+ * @finalization_type: what finalization function to use for hashes
+ * @nosimd: execute with SIMD disabled? Requires !CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
+ */
+struct testvec_config {
+ const char *name;
+ bool inplace;
+ u32 req_flags;
+ struct test_sg_division src_divs[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct test_sg_division dst_divs[XBUFSIZE];
+ unsigned int iv_offset;
+ unsigned int key_offset;
+ bool iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+ bool key_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+ enum finalization_type finalization_type;
+ bool nosimd;
+};
+
+#define TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN 192
+
+/*
+ * The following are the lists of testvec_configs to test for each algorithm
+ * type when the basic crypto self-tests are enabled, i.e. when
+ * CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS is unset. They aim to provide good test
+ * coverage, while keeping the test time much shorter than the full fuzz tests
+ * so that the basic tests can be enabled in a wider range of circumstances.
+ */
+
+/* Configs for skciphers and aeads */
+static const struct testvec_config default_cipher_testvec_configs[] = {
+ {
+ .name = "in-place",
+ .inplace = true,
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ }, {
+ .name = "out-of-place",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ }, {
+ .name = "unaligned buffer, offset=1",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } },
+ .iv_offset = 1,
+ .key_offset = 1,
+ }, {
+ .name = "buffer aligned only to alignmask",
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 10000,
+ .offset = 1,
+ .offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ },
+ },
+ .iv_offset = 1,
+ .iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ .key_offset = 1,
+ .key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ }, {
+ .name = "two even aligned splits",
+ .src_divs = {
+ { .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+ },
+ }, {
+ .name = "uneven misaligned splits, may sleep",
+ .req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ .src_divs = {
+ { .proportion_of_total = 1900, .offset = 33 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 3300, .offset = 7 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 },
+ },
+ .iv_offset = 3,
+ .key_offset = 3,
+ }, {
+ .name = "misaligned splits crossing pages, inplace",
+ .inplace = true,
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 7500,
+ .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 32
+ }, {
+ .proportion_of_total = 2500,
+ .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 7
+ },
+ },
+ }
+};
+
+static const struct testvec_config default_hash_testvec_configs[] = {
+ {
+ .name = "init+update+final aligned buffer",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+ }, {
+ .name = "init+finup aligned buffer",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP,
+ }, {
+ .name = "digest aligned buffer",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+ }, {
+ .name = "init+update+final misaligned buffer",
+ .src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+ .key_offset = 1,
+ }, {
+ .name = "digest buffer aligned only to alignmask",
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 10000,
+ .offset = 1,
+ .offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+ .key_offset = 1,
+ .key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+ }, {
+ .name = "init+update+update+final two even splits",
+ .src_divs = {
+ { .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 5000,
+ .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH,
+ },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+ }, {
+ .name = "digest uneven misaligned splits, may sleep",
+ .req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ .src_divs = {
+ { .proportion_of_total = 1900, .offset = 33 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 3300, .offset = 7 },
+ { .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+ }, {
+ .name = "digest misaligned splits crossing pages",
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 7500,
+ .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 32,
+ }, {
+ .proportion_of_total = 2500,
+ .offset = PAGE_SIZE - 7,
+ },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+ }, {
+ .name = "import/export",
+ .src_divs = {
+ {
+ .proportion_of_total = 6500,
+ .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+ }, {
+ .proportion_of_total = 3500,
+ .flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+ },
+ },
+ .finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+ }
+};
+
+static unsigned int count_test_sg_divisions(const struct test_sg_division *divs)
+{
+ unsigned int remaining = TEST_SG_TOTAL;
+ unsigned int ndivs = 0;
+
+ do {
+ remaining -= divs[ndivs++].proportion_of_total;
+ } while (remaining);
+
+ return ndivs;
+}
+
+#define SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES BIT(0)
+#define SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD BIT(1)
+
+static bool valid_sg_divisions(const struct test_sg_division *divs,
+ unsigned int count, int *flags_ret)
+{
+ unsigned int total = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count && total != TEST_SG_TOTAL; i++) {
+ if (divs[i].proportion_of_total <= 0 ||
+ divs[i].proportion_of_total > TEST_SG_TOTAL - total)
+ return false;
+ total += divs[i].proportion_of_total;
+ if (divs[i].flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE)
+ *flags_ret |= SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES;
+ if (divs[i].nosimd)
+ *flags_ret |= SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD;
+ }
+ return total == TEST_SG_TOTAL &&
+ memchr_inv(&divs[i], 0, (count - i) * sizeof(divs[0])) == NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the given testvec_config is valid. This isn't strictly needed
+ * since every testvec_config should be valid, but check anyway so that people
+ * don't unknowingly add broken configs that don't do what they wanted.
+ */
+static bool valid_testvec_config(const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+ int flags = 0;
+
+ if (cfg->name == NULL)
+ return false;
+
+ if (!valid_sg_divisions(cfg->src_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs),
+ &flags))
+ return false;
+
+ if (cfg->dst_divs[0].proportion_of_total) {
+ if (!valid_sg_divisions(cfg->dst_divs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), &flags))
+ return false;
+ } else {
+ if (memchr_inv(cfg->dst_divs, 0, sizeof(cfg->dst_divs)))
+ return false;
+ /* defaults to dst_divs=src_divs */
+ }
+
+ if (cfg->iv_offset +
+ (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK : 0) >
+ MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)
+ return false;
+
+ if ((flags & (SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES | SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) &&
+ cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST)
+ return false;
+
+ if ((cfg->nosimd || (flags & SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) &&
+ (cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+struct test_sglist {
+ char *bufs[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct scatterlist sgl[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct scatterlist sgl_saved[XBUFSIZE];
+ struct scatterlist *sgl_ptr;
+ unsigned int nents;
+};
+
+static int init_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+ return __testmgr_alloc_buf(tsgl->bufs, 1 /* two pages per buffer */);
+}
+
+static void destroy_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+ return __testmgr_free_buf(tsgl->bufs, 1 /* two pages per buffer */);
+}
+
+/**
+ * build_test_sglist() - build a scatterlist for a crypto test
+ *
+ * @tsgl: the scatterlist to build. @tsgl->bufs[] contains an array of 2-page
+ * buffers which the scatterlist @tsgl->sgl[] will be made to point into.
+ * @divs: the layout specification on which the scatterlist will be based
+ * @alignmask: the algorithm's alignmask
+ * @total_len: the total length of the scatterlist to build in bytes
+ * @data: if non-NULL, the buffers will be filled with this data until it ends.
+ * Otherwise the buffers will be poisoned. In both cases, some bytes
+ * past the end of each buffer will be poisoned to help detect overruns.
+ * @out_divs: if non-NULL, the test_sg_division to which each scatterlist entry
+ * corresponds will be returned here. This will match @divs except
+ * that divisions resolving to a length of 0 are omitted as they are
+ * not included in the scatterlist.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 or a -errno value
+ */
+static int build_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ const struct test_sg_division *divs,
+ const unsigned int alignmask,
+ const unsigned int total_len,
+ struct iov_iter *data,
+ const struct test_sg_division *out_divs[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+ struct {
+ const struct test_sg_division *div;
+ size_t length;
+ } partitions[XBUFSIZE];
+ const unsigned int ndivs = count_test_sg_divisions(divs);
+ unsigned int len_remaining = total_len;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(partitions) != ARRAY_SIZE(tsgl->sgl));
+ if (WARN_ON(ndivs > ARRAY_SIZE(partitions)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Calculate the (div, length) pairs */
+ tsgl->nents = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ndivs; i++) {
+ unsigned int len_this_sg =
+ min(len_remaining,
+ (total_len * divs[i].proportion_of_total +
+ TEST_SG_TOTAL / 2) / TEST_SG_TOTAL);
+
+ if (len_this_sg != 0) {
+ partitions[tsgl->nents].div = &divs[i];
+ partitions[tsgl->nents].length = len_this_sg;
+ tsgl->nents++;
+ len_remaining -= len_this_sg;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tsgl->nents == 0) {
+ partitions[tsgl->nents].div = &divs[0];
+ partitions[tsgl->nents].length = 0;
+ tsgl->nents++;
+ }
+ partitions[tsgl->nents - 1].length += len_remaining;
+
+ /* Set up the sgl entries and fill the data or poison */
+ sg_init_table(tsgl->sgl, tsgl->nents);
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ unsigned int offset = partitions[i].div->offset;
+ void *addr;
+
+ if (partitions[i].div->offset_relative_to_alignmask)
+ offset += alignmask;
+
+ while (offset + partitions[i].length + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN >
+ 2 * PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (WARN_ON(offset <= 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ offset /= 2;
+ }
+
+ addr = &tsgl->bufs[i][offset];
+ sg_set_buf(&tsgl->sgl[i], addr, partitions[i].length);
+
+ if (out_divs)
+ out_divs[i] = partitions[i].div;
+
+ if (data) {
+ size_t copy_len, copied;
+
+ copy_len = min(partitions[i].length, data->count);
+ copied = copy_from_iter(addr, copy_len, data);
+ if (WARN_ON(copied != copy_len))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ testmgr_poison(addr + copy_len, partitions[i].length +
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN - copy_len);
+ } else {
+ testmgr_poison(addr, partitions[i].length +
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+ }
+ }
+
+ sg_mark_end(&tsgl->sgl[tsgl->nents - 1]);
+ tsgl->sgl_ptr = tsgl->sgl;
+ memcpy(tsgl->sgl_saved, tsgl->sgl, tsgl->nents * sizeof(tsgl->sgl[0]));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that a scatterlist crypto operation produced the correct output.
+ *
+ * @tsgl: scatterlist containing the actual output
+ * @expected_output: buffer containing the expected output
+ * @len_to_check: length of @expected_output in bytes
+ * @unchecked_prefix_len: number of ignored bytes in @tsgl prior to real result
+ * @check_poison: verify that the poison bytes after each chunk are intact?
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if correct, -EINVAL if incorrect, -EOVERFLOW if buffer overrun.
+ */
+static int verify_correct_output(const struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ const char *expected_output,
+ unsigned int len_to_check,
+ unsigned int unchecked_prefix_len,
+ bool check_poison)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ struct scatterlist *sg = &tsgl->sgl_ptr[i];
+ unsigned int len = sg->length;
+ unsigned int offset = sg->offset;
+ const char *actual_output;
+
+ if (unchecked_prefix_len) {
+ if (unchecked_prefix_len >= len) {
+ unchecked_prefix_len -= len;
+ continue;
+ }
+ offset += unchecked_prefix_len;
+ len -= unchecked_prefix_len;
+ unchecked_prefix_len = 0;
+ }
+ len = min(len, len_to_check);
+ actual_output = page_address(sg_page(sg)) + offset;
+ if (memcmp(expected_output, actual_output, len) != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (check_poison &&
+ !testmgr_is_poison(actual_output + len, TESTMGR_POISON_LEN))
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ len_to_check -= len;
+ expected_output += len;
+ }
+ if (WARN_ON(len_to_check != 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_test_sglist_corrupted(const struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ if (tsgl->sgl[i].page_link != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].page_link)
+ return true;
+ if (tsgl->sgl[i].offset != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].offset)
+ return true;
+ if (tsgl->sgl[i].length != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].length)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+struct cipher_test_sglists {
+ struct test_sglist src;
+ struct test_sglist dst;
+};
+
+static struct cipher_test_sglists *alloc_cipher_test_sglists(void)
+{
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls;
+
+ tsgls = kmalloc(sizeof(*tsgls), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tsgls)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (init_test_sglist(&tsgls->src) != 0)
+ goto fail_kfree;
+ if (init_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst) != 0)
+ goto fail_destroy_src;
+
+ return tsgls;
+
+fail_destroy_src:
+ destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->src);
+fail_kfree:
+ kfree(tsgls);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void free_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ if (tsgls) {
+ destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->src);
+ destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst);
+ kfree(tsgls);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Build the src and dst scatterlists for an skcipher or AEAD test */
+static int build_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ unsigned int alignmask,
+ unsigned int src_total_len,
+ unsigned int dst_total_len,
+ const struct kvec *inputs,
+ unsigned int nr_inputs)
+{
+ struct iov_iter input;
+ int err;
+
+ iov_iter_kvec(&input, WRITE, inputs, nr_inputs, src_total_len);
+ err = build_test_sglist(&tsgls->src, cfg->src_divs, alignmask,
+ cfg->inplace ?
+ max(dst_total_len, src_total_len) :
+ src_total_len,
+ &input, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (cfg->inplace) {
+ tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr = tsgls->src.sgl;
+ tsgls->dst.nents = tsgls->src.nents;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return build_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst,
+ cfg->dst_divs[0].proportion_of_total ?
+ cfg->dst_divs : cfg->src_divs,
+ alignmask, dst_total_len, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Support for testing passing a misaligned key to setkey():
+ *
+ * If cfg->key_offset is set, copy the key into a new buffer at that offset,
+ * optionally adding alignmask. Else, just use the key directly.
+ */
+static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ unsigned int alignmask,
+ const u8 **keybuf_ret, const u8 **keyptr_ret)
+{
+ unsigned int key_offset = cfg->key_offset;
+ u8 *keybuf = NULL, *keyptr = (u8 *)key;
+
+ if (key_offset != 0) {
+ if (cfg->key_offset_relative_to_alignmask)
+ key_offset += alignmask;
+ keybuf = kmalloc(key_offset + ksize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!keybuf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ keyptr = keybuf + key_offset;
+ memcpy(keyptr, key, ksize);
+ }
+ *keybuf_ret = keybuf;
+ *keyptr_ret = keyptr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Like setkey_f(tfm, key, ksize), but sometimes misalign the key */
+#define do_setkey(setkey_f, tfm, key, ksize, cfg, alignmask) \
+({ \
+ const u8 *keybuf, *keyptr; \
+ int err; \
+ \
+ err = prepare_keybuf((key), (ksize), (cfg), (alignmask), \
+ &keybuf, &keyptr); \
+ if (err == 0) { \
+ err = setkey_f((tfm), keyptr, (ksize)); \
+ kfree(keybuf); \
+ } \
+ err; \
+})
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+
+/* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */
+static unsigned int generate_random_length(unsigned int max_len)
+{
+ unsigned int len = prandom_u32() % (max_len + 1);
+
+ switch (prandom_u32() % 4) {
+ case 0:
+ return len % 64;
+ case 1:
+ return len % 256;
+ case 2:
+ return len % 1024;
+ default:
+ return len;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void flip_random_bit(u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t bitpos;
+
+ bitpos = prandom_u32() % (size * 8);
+ buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8);
+}
+
+/* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void flip_random_byte(u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ buf[prandom_u32() % size] ^= 0xff;
+}
+
+/* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void mutate_buffer(u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ size_t num_flips;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Sometimes flip some bits */
+ if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) {
+ num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << (prandom_u32() % 8), size * 8);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++)
+ flip_random_bit(buf, size);
+ }
+
+ /* Sometimes flip some bytes */
+ if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0) {
+ num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << (prandom_u32() % 8), size);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++)
+ flip_random_byte(buf, size);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Randomly generate 'count' bytes, but sometimes make them "interesting" */
+static void generate_random_bytes(u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ u8 b;
+ u8 increment;
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (count == 0)
+ return;
+
+ switch (prandom_u32() % 8) { /* Choose a generation strategy */
+ case 0:
+ case 1:
+ /* All the same byte, plus optional mutations */
+ switch (prandom_u32() % 4) {
+ case 0:
+ b = 0x00;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ b = 0xff;
+ break;
+ default:
+ b = (u8)prandom_u32();
+ break;
+ }
+ memset(buf, b, count);
+ mutate_buffer(buf, count);
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ /* Ascending or descending bytes, plus optional mutations */
+ increment = (u8)prandom_u32();
+ b = (u8)prandom_u32();
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++, b += increment)
+ buf[i] = b;
+ mutate_buffer(buf, count);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Fully random bytes */
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ buf[i] = (u8)prandom_u32();
+ }
+}
+
+static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct test_sg_division *divs,
+ size_t max_divs, char *p, char *end,
+ bool gen_flushes, u32 req_flags)
+{
+ struct test_sg_division *div = divs;
+ unsigned int remaining = TEST_SG_TOTAL;
+
+ do {
+ unsigned int this_len;
+ const char *flushtype_str;
+
+ if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_u32() % 2 == 0)
+ this_len = remaining;
+ else
+ this_len = 1 + (prandom_u32() % remaining);
+ div->proportion_of_total = this_len;
+
+ if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0)
+ div->offset = (PAGE_SIZE - 128) + (prandom_u32() % 128);
+ else if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0)
+ div->offset = prandom_u32() % 32;
+ else
+ div->offset = prandom_u32() % PAGE_SIZE;
+ if (prandom_u32() % 8 == 0)
+ div->offset_relative_to_alignmask = true;
+
+ div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_NONE;
+ if (gen_flushes) {
+ switch (prandom_u32() % 4) {
+ case 0:
+ div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (div->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE &&
+ !(req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) &&
+ prandom_u32() % 2 == 0)
+ div->nosimd = true;
+
+ switch (div->flush_type) {
+ case FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH:
+ if (div->nosimd)
+ flushtype_str = "<flush,nosimd>";
+ else
+ flushtype_str = "<flush>";
+ break;
+ case FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT:
+ if (div->nosimd)
+ flushtype_str = "<reimport,nosimd>";
+ else
+ flushtype_str = "<reimport>";
+ break;
+ default:
+ flushtype_str = "";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TEST_SG_TOTAL != 10000); /* for "%u.%u%%" */
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "%s%u.%u%%@%s+%u%s", flushtype_str,
+ this_len / 100, this_len % 100,
+ div->offset_relative_to_alignmask ?
+ "alignmask" : "",
+ div->offset, this_len == remaining ? "" : ", ");
+ remaining -= this_len;
+ div++;
+ } while (remaining);
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+/* Generate a random testvec_config for fuzz testing */
+static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+ char *p = name;
+ char * const end = name + max_namelen;
+
+ memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg));
+
+ cfg->name = name;
+
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "random:");
+
+ if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+ cfg->inplace = true;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " inplace");
+ }
+
+ if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+ cfg->req_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " may_sleep");
+ }
+
+ switch (prandom_u32() % 4) {
+ case 0:
+ cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_final");
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_finup");
+ break;
+ default:
+ cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_digest");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) &&
+ prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+ cfg->nosimd = true;
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd");
+ }
+
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=[");
+ p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->src_divs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), p, end,
+ (cfg->finalization_type !=
+ FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST),
+ cfg->req_flags);
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]");
+
+ if (!cfg->inplace && prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " dst_divs=[");
+ p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(cfg->dst_divs,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs),
+ p, end, false,
+ cfg->req_flags);
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]");
+ }
+
+ if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+ cfg->iv_offset = 1 + (prandom_u32() % MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK);
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset);
+ }
+
+ if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+ cfg->key_offset = 1 + (prandom_u32() % MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK);
+ p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset);
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!valid_testvec_config(cfg));
+}
+
+static void crypto_disable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+ preempt_disable();
+ __this_cpu_write(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, true);
+}
+
+static void crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+ __this_cpu_write(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, false);
+ preempt_enable();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given an algorithm name, build the name of the generic implementation of that
+ * algorithm, assuming the usual naming convention. Specifically, this appends
+ * "-generic" to every part of the name that is not a template name. Examples:
+ *
+ * aes => aes-generic
+ * cbc(aes) => cbc(aes-generic)
+ * cts(cbc(aes)) => cts(cbc(aes-generic))
+ * rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305) => rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic)
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or -ENAMETOOLONG if the generic name would be too long
+ */
+static int build_generic_driver_name(const char *algname,
+ char driver_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME])
+{
+ const char *in = algname;
+ char *out = driver_name;
+ size_t len = strlen(algname);
+
+ if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto too_long;
+ do {
+ const char *in_saved = in;
+
+ while (*in && *in != '(' && *in != ')' && *in != ',')
+ *out++ = *in++;
+ if (*in != '(' && in > in_saved) {
+ len += 8;
+ if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto too_long;
+ memcpy(out, "-generic", 8);
+ out += 8;
+ }
+ } while ((*out++ = *in++) != '\0');
+ return 0;
+
+too_long:
+ pr_err("alg: generic driver name for \"%s\" would be too long\n",
+ algname);
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static void crypto_disable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+}
+
+static void crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int build_hash_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ unsigned int alignmask,
+ const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+ struct kvec kv;
+ struct iov_iter input;
+
+ kv.iov_base = (void *)vec->plaintext;
+ kv.iov_len = vec->psize;
+ iov_iter_kvec(&input, WRITE, &kv, 1, vec->psize);
+ return build_test_sglist(tsgl, cfg->src_divs, alignmask, vec->psize,
+ &input, divs);
+}
+
+static int check_hash_result(const char *type,
+ const u8 *result, unsigned int digestsize,
+ const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const char *driver,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+ if (memcmp(result, vec->digest, digestsize) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ type, driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!testmgr_is_poison(&result[digestsize], TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+ pr_err("alg: %s: %s overran result buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ type, driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int check_shash_op(const char *op, int err,
+ const char *driver, const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+ if (err)
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s %s() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static inline const void *sg_data(struct scatterlist *sg)
+{
+ return page_address(sg_page(sg)) + sg->offset;
+}
+
+/* Test one hash test vector in one configuration, using the shash API */
+static int test_shash_vec_cfg(const char *driver,
+ const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
+ const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
+ const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int statesize = crypto_shash_statesize(tfm);
+ const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE];
+ unsigned int i;
+ u8 result[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Set the key, if specified */
+ if (vec->ksize) {
+ err = do_setkey(crypto_shash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize,
+ cfg, alignmask);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+ crypto_shash_get_flags(tfm));
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Build the scatterlist for the source data */
+ err = build_hash_sglist(tsgl, vec, cfg, alignmask, divs);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s: error preparing scatterlist for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the actual hashing */
+
+ testmgr_poison(desc->__ctx, crypto_shash_descsize(tfm));
+ testmgr_poison(result, digestsize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+
+ if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST ||
+ vec->digest_error) {
+ /* Just using digest() */
+ if (tsgl->nents != 1)
+ return 0;
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, sg_data(&tsgl->sgl[0]),
+ tsgl->sgl[0].length, result);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->digest_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s digest() failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, err,
+ cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->digest_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s digest() unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ goto result_ready;
+ }
+
+ /* Using init(), zero or more update(), then final() or finup() */
+
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = check_shash_op("init", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ if (i + 1 == tsgl->nents &&
+ cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP) {
+ if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sg_data(&tsgl->sgl[i]),
+ tsgl->sgl[i].length, result);
+ if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = check_shash_op("finup", err, driver, vec_name,
+ cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ goto result_ready;
+ }
+ if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_update(desc, sg_data(&tsgl->sgl[i]),
+ tsgl->sgl[i].length);
+ if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = check_shash_op("update", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (divs[i]->flush_type == FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT) {
+ /* Test ->export() and ->import() */
+ testmgr_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+ err = crypto_shash_export(desc, hashstate);
+ err = check_shash_op("export", err, driver, vec_name,
+ cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (!testmgr_is_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+ pr_err("alg: shash: %s export() overran state buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ }
+ testmgr_poison(desc->__ctx, crypto_shash_descsize(tfm));
+ err = crypto_shash_import(desc, hashstate);
+ err = check_shash_op("import", err, driver, vec_name,
+ cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_shash_final(desc, result);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = check_shash_op("final", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+result_ready:
+ return check_hash_result("shash", result, digestsize, vec, vec_name,
+ driver, cfg);
+}
+
+static int do_ahash_op(int (*op)(struct ahash_request *req),
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct crypto_wait *wait, bool nosimd)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+
+ err = op(req);
+
+ if (nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+
+ return crypto_wait_req(err, wait);
+}
+
+static int check_nonfinal_ahash_op(const char *op, int err,
+ u8 *result, unsigned int digestsize,
+ const char *driver, const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s %s() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!testmgr_is_poison(result, digestsize)) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s %s() used result buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Test one hash test vector in one configuration, using the ahash API */
+static int test_ahash_vec_cfg(const char *driver,
+ const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_ahash_alignmask(tfm);
+ const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(tfm);
+ const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+ const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE];
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct scatterlist *pending_sgl;
+ unsigned int pending_len;
+ u8 result[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Set the key, if specified */
+ if (vec->ksize) {
+ err = do_setkey(crypto_ahash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize,
+ cfg, alignmask);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+ crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm));
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Build the scatterlist for the source data */
+ err = build_hash_sglist(tsgl, vec, cfg, alignmask, divs);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s: error preparing scatterlist for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the actual hashing */
+
+ testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm));
+ testmgr_poison(result, digestsize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+
+ if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST ||
+ vec->digest_error) {
+ /* Just using digest() */
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done,
+ &wait);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, tsgl->sgl, result, vec->psize);
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_digest, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->digest_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s digest() failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, err,
+ cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->digest_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s digest() unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ goto result_ready;
+ }
+
+ /* Using init(), zero or more update(), then final() or finup() */
+
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, result, 0);
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_init, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("init", err, result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ pending_sgl = NULL;
+ pending_len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+ if (divs[i]->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE &&
+ pending_sgl != NULL) {
+ /* update() with the pending data */
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags,
+ crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, pending_sgl, result,
+ pending_len);
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_update, req, &wait,
+ divs[i]->nosimd);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("update", err,
+ result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ pending_sgl = NULL;
+ pending_len = 0;
+ }
+ if (divs[i]->flush_type == FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT) {
+ /* Test ->export() and ->import() */
+ testmgr_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+ err = crypto_ahash_export(req, hashstate);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("export", err,
+ result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ if (!testmgr_is_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+ TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s export() overran state buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EOVERFLOW;
+ }
+
+ testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm));
+ err = crypto_ahash_import(req, hashstate);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("import", err,
+ result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (pending_sgl == NULL)
+ pending_sgl = &tsgl->sgl[i];
+ pending_len += tsgl->sgl[i].length;
+ }
+
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, pending_sgl, result, pending_len);
+ if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL) {
+ /* finish with update() and final() */
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_update, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("update", err, result, digestsize,
+ driver, vec_name, cfg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_final, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s final() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* finish with finup() */
+ err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_finup, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: ahash: %s finup() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+result_ready:
+ return check_hash_result("ahash", result, digestsize, vec, vec_name,
+ driver, cfg);
+}
+
+static int test_hash_vec_cfg(const char *driver,
+ const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * For algorithms implemented as "shash", most bugs will be detected by
+ * both the shash and ahash tests. Test the shash API first so that the
+ * failures involve less indirection, so are easier to debug.
+ */
+
+ if (desc) {
+ err = test_shash_vec_cfg(driver, vec, vec_name, cfg, desc, tsgl,
+ hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return test_ahash_vec_cfg(driver, vec, vec_name, cfg, req, tsgl,
+ hashstate);
+}
+
+static int test_hash_vec(const char *driver, const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ unsigned int vec_num, struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct shash_desc *desc, struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ char vec_name[16];
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_hash_testvec_configs); i++) {
+ err = test_hash_vec_cfg(driver, vec, vec_name,
+ &default_hash_testvec_configs[i],
+ req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ if (!noextratests) {
+ struct testvec_config cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname,
+ sizeof(cfgname));
+ err = test_hash_vec_cfg(driver, vec, vec_name, &cfg,
+ req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+/*
+ * Generate a hash test vector from the given implementation.
+ * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated.
+ */
+static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct hash_testvec *vec,
+ unsigned int maxkeysize,
+ unsigned int maxdatasize,
+ char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+ /* Data */
+ vec->psize = generate_random_length(maxdatasize);
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize);
+
+ /*
+ * Key: length in range [1, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize.
+ * If algorithm is unkeyed, then maxkeysize == 0 and set ksize = 0.
+ */
+ vec->setkey_error = 0;
+ vec->ksize = 0;
+ if (maxkeysize) {
+ vec->ksize = maxkeysize;
+ if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0)
+ vec->ksize = 1 + (prandom_u32() % maxkeysize);
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize);
+
+ vec->setkey_error = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, vec->key,
+ vec->ksize);
+ /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to digest. */
+ if (vec->setkey_error)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Digest */
+ vec->digest_error = crypto_shash_digest(desc, vec->plaintext,
+ vec->psize, (u8 *)vec->digest);
+done:
+ snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: psize=%u ksize=%u\"",
+ vec->psize, vec->ksize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the hash algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding generic
+ * implementation, if one is available.
+ */
+static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
+ const char *generic_driver,
+ unsigned int maxkeysize,
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_ahash_blocksize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+ const char *algname = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+ char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_shash *generic_tfm = NULL;
+ struct shash_desc *generic_desc = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct hash_testvec vec = { 0 };
+ char vec_name[64];
+ struct testvec_config *cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+ int err;
+
+ if (noextratests)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ generic_driver = _generic_driver;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+ return 0;
+
+ generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+ if (err == -ENOENT) {
+ pr_warn("alg: hash: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+ driver, generic_driver);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: hash: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+ generic_driver, algname, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cfg) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ generic_desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(generic_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!generic_desc) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ generic_desc->tfm = generic_tfm;
+
+ /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+ if (digestsize != crypto_shash_digestsize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: digestsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, digestsize,
+ crypto_shash_digestsize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (blocksize != crypto_shash_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, blocksize, crypto_shash_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+ * the other implementation against them.
+ */
+
+ vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.plaintext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.digest = kmalloc(digestsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!vec.key || !vec.plaintext || !vec.digest) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+ generate_random_hash_testvec(generic_desc, &vec,
+ maxkeysize, maxdatasize,
+ vec_name, sizeof(vec_name));
+ generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname));
+
+ err = test_hash_vec_cfg(driver, &vec, vec_name, cfg,
+ req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(cfg);
+ kfree(vec.key);
+ kfree(vec.plaintext);
+ kfree(vec.digest);
+ crypto_free_shash(generic_tfm);
+ kfree_sensitive(generic_desc);
+ return err;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
+ const char *generic_driver,
+ unsigned int maxkeysize,
+ struct ahash_request *req,
+ struct shash_desc *desc,
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+ u8 *hashstate)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int alloc_shash(const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask,
+ struct crypto_shash **tfm_ret,
+ struct shash_desc **desc_ret)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct shash_desc *desc;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+ /*
+ * This algorithm is only available through the ahash
+ * API, not the shash API, so skip the shash tests.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate shash transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+
+ desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!desc) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+ *tfm_ret = tfm;
+ *desc_ret = desc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __alg_test_hash(const struct hash_testvec *vecs,
+ unsigned int num_vecs, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask,
+ const char *generic_driver, unsigned int maxkeysize)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *atfm = NULL;
+ struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
+ struct crypto_shash *stfm = NULL;
+ struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
+ struct test_sglist *tsgl = NULL;
+ u8 *hashstate = NULL;
+ unsigned int statesize;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * Always test the ahash API. This works regardless of whether the
+ * algorithm is implemented as ahash or shash.
+ */
+
+ atfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(atfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(atfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(atfm);
+ }
+
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(atfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If available also test the shash API, to cover corner cases that may
+ * be missed by testing the ahash API only.
+ */
+ err = alloc_shash(driver, type, mask, &stfm, &desc);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ tsgl = kmalloc(sizeof(*tsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tsgl || init_test_sglist(tsgl) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ kfree(tsgl);
+ tsgl = NULL;
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(atfm);
+ if (stfm)
+ statesize = max(statesize, crypto_shash_statesize(stfm));
+ hashstate = kmalloc(statesize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hashstate) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate hash state buffer for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_vecs; i++) {
+ err = test_hash_vec(driver, &vecs[i], i, req, desc, tsgl,
+ hashstate);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ err = test_hash_vs_generic_impl(driver, generic_driver, maxkeysize, req,
+ desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+out:
+ kfree(hashstate);
+ if (tsgl) {
+ destroy_test_sglist(tsgl);
+ kfree(tsgl);
+ }
+ kfree(desc);
+ crypto_free_shash(stfm);
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+ crypto_free_ahash(atfm);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_hash(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ const struct hash_testvec *template = desc->suite.hash.vecs;
+ unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.hash.count;
+ unsigned int nr_unkeyed, nr_keyed;
+ unsigned int maxkeysize = 0;
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * For OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, we have to do all the unkeyed tests
+ * first, before setting a key on the tfm. To make this easier, we
+ * require that the unkeyed test vectors (if any) are listed first.
+ */
+
+ for (nr_unkeyed = 0; nr_unkeyed < tcount; nr_unkeyed++) {
+ if (template[nr_unkeyed].ksize)
+ break;
+ }
+ for (nr_keyed = 0; nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed < tcount; nr_keyed++) {
+ if (!template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize) {
+ pr_err("alg: hash: test vectors for %s out of order, "
+ "unkeyed ones must come first\n", desc->alg);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, maxkeysize,
+ template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize);
+ }
+
+ err = 0;
+ if (nr_unkeyed) {
+ err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_unkeyed, driver, type, mask,
+ desc->generic_driver, maxkeysize);
+ template += nr_unkeyed;
+ }
+
+ if (!err && nr_keyed)
+ err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_keyed, driver, type, mask,
+ desc->generic_driver, maxkeysize);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int test_aead_vec_cfg(const char *driver, int enc,
+ const struct aead_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+ const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+ const char *op = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption";
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ u8 _iv[3 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + MAX_IVLEN];
+ u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&_iv[0], 2 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)) +
+ cfg->iv_offset +
+ (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0);
+ struct kvec input[2];
+ int err;
+
+ /* Set the key */
+ if (vec->wk)
+ crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+ else
+ crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+
+ err = do_setkey(crypto_aead_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen,
+ cfg, alignmask);
+ if (err && err != vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+ crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm));
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!err && vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the authentication tag size */
+ err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
+ if (err && err != vec->setauthsize_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s setauthsize failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setauthsize_error, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!err && vec->setauthsize_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s setauthsize unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setauthsize_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (vec->setkey_error || vec->setauthsize_error)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* The IV must be copied to a buffer, as the algorithm may modify it */
+ if (WARN_ON(ivsize > MAX_IVLEN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (vec->iv)
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+ else
+ memset(iv, 0, ivsize);
+
+ /* Build the src/dst scatterlists */
+ input[0].iov_base = (void *)vec->assoc;
+ input[0].iov_len = vec->alen;
+ input[1].iov_base = enc ? (void *)vec->ptext : (void *)vec->ctext;
+ input[1].iov_len = enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen;
+ err = build_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls, cfg, alignmask,
+ vec->alen + (enc ? vec->plen :
+ vec->clen),
+ vec->alen + (enc ? vec->clen :
+ vec->plen),
+ input, 2);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s: error preparing scatterlists for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Do the actual encryption or decryption */
+ testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm));
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, tsgls->src.sgl_ptr, tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr,
+ enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen, iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
+
+ /* Check that the algorithm didn't overwrite things it shouldn't have */
+ if (req->cryptlen != (enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen) ||
+ req->assoclen != vec->alen ||
+ req->iv != iv ||
+ req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr ||
+ req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr ||
+ crypto_aead_reqtfm(req) != tfm ||
+ req->base.complete != crypto_req_done ||
+ req->base.flags != req_flags ||
+ req->base.data != &wait) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted request struct on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ if (req->cryptlen != (enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen))
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->cryptlen'\n");
+ if (req->assoclen != vec->alen)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->assoclen'\n");
+ if (req->iv != iv)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->iv'\n");
+ if (req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->src'\n");
+ if (req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->dst'\n");
+ if (crypto_aead_reqtfm(req) != tfm)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.tfm'\n");
+ if (req->base.complete != crypto_req_done)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.complete'\n");
+ if (req->base.flags != req_flags)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.flags'\n");
+ if (req->base.data != &wait)
+ pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.data'\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->src)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted src sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr != tsgls->src.sgl &&
+ is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->dst)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted dst sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for unexpected success or failure, or wrong error code */
+ if ((err == 0 && vec->novrfy) ||
+ (err != vec->crypt_error && !(err == -EBADMSG && vec->novrfy))) {
+ char expected_error[32];
+
+ if (vec->novrfy &&
+ vec->crypt_error != 0 && vec->crypt_error != -EBADMSG)
+ sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG or %d",
+ vec->crypt_error);
+ else if (vec->novrfy)
+ sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG");
+ else
+ sprintf(expected_error, "%d", vec->crypt_error);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, err,
+ cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (err) /* Expectedly failed. */
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */
+ err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext,
+ enc ? vec->clen : vec->plen,
+ vec->alen, enc || !cfg->inplace);
+ if (err == -EOVERFLOW) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s overran dst buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_aead_vec(const char *driver, int enc,
+ const struct aead_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ char vec_name[16];
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ if (enc && vec->novrfy)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) {
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, enc, vec, vec_name,
+ &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i],
+ req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ if (!noextratests) {
+ struct testvec_config cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname,
+ sizeof(cfgname));
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, enc, vec, vec_name,
+ &cfg, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+
+struct aead_extra_tests_ctx {
+ struct aead_request *req;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ const char *driver;
+ const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc;
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls;
+ unsigned int maxdatasize;
+ unsigned int maxkeysize;
+
+ struct aead_testvec vec;
+ char vec_name[64];
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+ struct testvec_config cfg;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Make at least one random change to a (ciphertext, AAD) pair. "Ciphertext"
+ * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag. The
+ * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty.
+ */
+static void mutate_aead_message(struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv,
+ unsigned int ivsize)
+{
+ const unsigned int aad_tail_size = aad_iv ? ivsize : 0;
+ const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+
+ if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0 && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) {
+ /* Mutate the AAD */
+ flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen - aad_tail_size);
+ if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0)
+ return;
+ }
+ if (prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+ /* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */
+ flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize);
+ } else {
+ /* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */
+ flip_random_bit((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Minimum authentication tag size in bytes at which we assume that we can
+ * reliably generate inauthentic messages, i.e. not generate an authentic
+ * message by chance.
+ */
+#define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8
+
+static void generate_aead_message(struct aead_request *req,
+ const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+ struct aead_testvec *vec,
+ bool prefer_inauthentic)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+ const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) &&
+ (prefer_inauthentic || prandom_u32() % 4 == 0);
+
+ /* Generate the AAD. */
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen);
+ if (suite->aad_iv && vec->alen >= ivsize)
+ /* Avoid implementation-defined behavior. */
+ memcpy((u8 *)vec->assoc + vec->alen - ivsize, vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+ if (inauthentic && prandom_u32() % 2 == 0) {
+ /* Generate a random ciphertext. */
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen);
+ } else {
+ int i = 0;
+ struct scatterlist src[2], dst;
+ u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+
+ /* Generate a random plaintext and encrypt it. */
+ sg_init_table(src, 2);
+ if (vec->alen)
+ sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen);
+ if (vec->plen) {
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen);
+ sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen);
+ }
+ sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen);
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+ aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, &dst, vec->plen, iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen);
+ vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(req),
+ &wait);
+ /* If encryption failed, we're done. */
+ if (vec->crypt_error != 0)
+ return;
+ memmove((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->ctext + vec->alen, vec->clen);
+ if (!inauthentic)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an
+ * inauthentic one.
+ */
+ mutate_aead_message(vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize);
+ }
+ vec->novrfy = 1;
+ if (suite->einval_allowed)
+ vec->crypt_error = -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate an AEAD test vector 'vec' using the implementation specified by
+ * 'req'. The buffers in 'vec' must already be allocated.
+ *
+ * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic
+ * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often.
+ */
+static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct aead_request *req,
+ struct aead_testvec *vec,
+ const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+ unsigned int maxkeysize,
+ unsigned int maxdatasize,
+ char *name, size_t max_namelen,
+ bool prefer_inauthentic)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int maxauthsize = crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm);
+ unsigned int authsize;
+ unsigned int total_len;
+
+ /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */
+ vec->klen = maxkeysize;
+ if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0)
+ vec->klen = prandom_u32() % (maxkeysize + 1);
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen);
+ vec->setkey_error = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen);
+
+ /* IV */
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+ /* Tag length: in [0, maxauthsize], but usually choose maxauthsize */
+ authsize = maxauthsize;
+ if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0)
+ authsize = prandom_u32() % (maxauthsize + 1);
+ if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE)
+ authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE;
+ if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize))
+ authsize = maxdatasize;
+ maxdatasize -= authsize;
+ vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
+
+ /* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */
+ total_len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize);
+ if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0)
+ vec->alen = 0;
+ else
+ vec->alen = generate_random_length(total_len);
+ vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen;
+ vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize;
+
+ /*
+ * Generate the AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext. Not applicable if the
+ * key or the authentication tag size couldn't be set.
+ */
+ vec->novrfy = 0;
+ vec->crypt_error = 0;
+ if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0)
+ generate_aead_message(req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic);
+ snprintf(name, max_namelen,
+ "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"",
+ vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy);
+}
+
+static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(
+ struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
{
int i;
- for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
- if (result[i] != c)
- return -EINVAL;
+ for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+ generate_random_aead_testvec(ctx->req, &ctx->vec,
+ &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead,
+ ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize,
+ ctx->vec_name,
+ sizeof(ctx->vec_name), true);
+ if (ctx->vec.novrfy)
+ return;
}
+}
+/*
+ * Generate inauthentic test vectors (i.e. ciphertext, AAD pairs that aren't the
+ * result of an encryption with the key) and verify that decryption fails.
+ */
+static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+ /*
+ * Since this part of the tests isn't comparing the
+ * implementation to another, there's no point in testing any
+ * test vectors other than inauthentic ones (vec.novrfy=1) here.
+ *
+ * If we're having trouble generating such a test vector, e.g.
+ * if the algorithm keeps rejecting the generated keys, don't
+ * retry forever; just continue on.
+ */
+ try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx);
+ if (ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname,
+ sizeof(ctx->cfgname));
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ctx->driver, DECRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+ ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+ ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ cond_resched();
+ }
return 0;
}
-static int ahash_partial_update(struct ahash_request **preq,
- struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const struct hash_testvec *template,
- void *hash_buff, int k, int temp, struct scatterlist *sg,
- const char *algo, char *result, struct crypto_wait *wait)
+/*
+ * Test the AEAD algorithm against the corresponding generic implementation, if
+ * one is available.
+ */
+static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
{
- char *state;
- struct ahash_request *req;
- int statesize, ret = -EINVAL;
- static const unsigned char guard[] = { 0x00, 0xba, 0xad, 0x00 };
- int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm = ctx->tfm;
+ const char *algname = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+ const char *driver = ctx->driver;
+ const char *generic_driver = ctx->test_desc->generic_driver;
+ char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_aead *generic_tfm = NULL;
+ struct aead_request *generic_req = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
- req = *preq;
- statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(
- crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req));
- state = kmalloc(statesize + sizeof(guard), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!state) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: Failed to alloc state for %s\n", algo);
- goto out_nostate;
+ if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ generic_driver = _generic_driver;
}
- memcpy(state + statesize, guard, sizeof(guard));
- memset(result, 1, digestsize);
- ret = crypto_ahash_export(req, state);
- WARN_ON(memcmp(state + statesize, guard, sizeof(guard)));
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: Failed to export() for %s\n", algo);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = ahash_guard_result(result, 1, digestsize);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: Failed, export used req->result for %s\n",
- algo);
- goto out;
- }
- ahash_request_free(req);
- req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: Failed to alloc request for %s\n", algo);
- goto out_noreq;
- }
- ahash_request_set_callback(req,
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- crypto_req_done, wait);
- memcpy(hash_buff, template->plaintext + temp,
- template->tap[k]);
- sg_init_one(&sg[0], hash_buff, template->tap[k]);
- ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, result, template->tap[k]);
- ret = crypto_ahash_import(req, state);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: Failed to import() for %s\n", algo);
+ if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+ return 0;
+
+ generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+ if (err == -ENOENT) {
+ pr_warn("alg: aead: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+ driver, generic_driver);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: aead: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+ generic_driver, algname, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ generic_req = aead_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!generic_req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- ret = ahash_guard_result(result, 1, digestsize);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: Failed, import used req->result for %s\n",
- algo);
+
+ /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+ if (crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm) !=
+ crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: maxauthsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm),
+ crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), wait);
- if (ret)
+
+ if (crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) != crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
- *preq = req;
- ret = 0;
- goto out_noreq;
+ }
+
+ if (crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm) != crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm),
+ crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+ * the other implementation against them.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+ generate_random_aead_testvec(generic_req, &ctx->vec,
+ &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead,
+ ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize,
+ ctx->vec_name,
+ sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false);
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->cfg, ctx->cfgname,
+ sizeof(ctx->cfgname));
+ if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+ ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+ ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ctx->vec.crypt_error == 0 || ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+ err = test_aead_vec_cfg(driver, DECRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+ ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+ ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ err = 0;
out:
- ahash_request_free(req);
-out_noreq:
- kfree(state);
-out_nostate:
- return ret;
+ crypto_free_aead(generic_tfm);
+ aead_request_free(generic_req);
+ return err;
}
-enum hash_test {
- HASH_TEST_DIGEST,
- HASH_TEST_FINAL,
- HASH_TEST_FINUP
-};
-
-static int __test_hash(struct crypto_ahash *tfm,
- const struct hash_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount,
- enum hash_test test_type, const int align_offset)
+static int test_aead_extra(const char *driver,
+ const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
{
- const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
- size_t digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
- unsigned int i, j, k, temp;
- struct scatterlist sg[8];
- char *result;
- char *key;
- struct ahash_request *req;
- struct crypto_wait wait;
- void *hash_buff;
- char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
- result = kmalloc(digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!result)
- return ret;
- key = kmalloc(MAX_KEYLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto out_nobuf;
- if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
- goto out_nobuf;
+ if (noextratests)
+ return 0;
- crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ctx->req = req;
+ ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ ctx->driver = driver;
+ ctx->test_desc = test_desc;
+ ctx->tsgls = tsgls;
+ ctx->maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+ ctx->maxkeysize = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < test_desc->suite.aead.count; i++)
+ ctx->maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, ctx->maxkeysize,
+ test_desc->suite.aead.vecs[i].klen);
- req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: hash: Failed to allocate request for "
- "%s\n", algo);
- goto out_noreq;
- }
- ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- crypto_req_done, &wait);
-
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
- if (template[i].np)
- continue;
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (WARN_ON(align_offset + template[i].psize > PAGE_SIZE))
- goto out;
-
- j++;
- memset(result, 0, digest_size);
-
- hash_buff = xbuf[0];
- hash_buff += align_offset;
-
- memcpy(hash_buff, template[i].plaintext, template[i].psize);
- sg_init_one(&sg[0], hash_buff, template[i].psize);
-
- if (template[i].ksize) {
- crypto_ahash_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
- if (template[i].ksize > MAX_KEYLEN) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: setkey failed on test %d for %s: key size %d > %d\n",
- j, algo, template[i].ksize, MAX_KEYLEN);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(key, template[i].key, template[i].ksize);
- ret = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, key, template[i].ksize);
- if (ret) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: hash: setkey failed on "
- "test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", j, algo,
- -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, result, template[i].psize);
- switch (test_type) {
- case HASH_TEST_DIGEST:
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: digest failed on test %d "
- "for %s: ret=%d\n", j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- break;
-
- case HASH_TEST_FINAL:
- memset(result, 1, digest_size);
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: init failed on test %d "
- "for %s: ret=%d\n", j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = ahash_guard_result(result, 1, digest_size);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: init failed on test %d "
- "for %s: used req->result\n", j, algo);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: update failed on test %d "
- "for %s: ret=%d\n", j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = ahash_guard_result(result, 1, digest_size);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: update failed on test %d "
- "for %s: used req->result\n", j, algo);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: final failed on test %d "
- "for %s: ret=%d\n", j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- break;
-
- case HASH_TEST_FINUP:
- memset(result, 1, digest_size);
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: init failed on test %d "
- "for %s: ret=%d\n", j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = ahash_guard_result(result, 1, digest_size);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: init failed on test %d "
- "for %s: used req->result\n", j, algo);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_finup(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: final failed on test %d "
- "for %s: ret=%d\n", j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- break;
- }
-
- if (memcmp(result, template[i].digest,
- crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm))) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: hash: Test %d failed for %s\n",
- j, algo);
- hexdump(result, crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm));
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ ctx->vec.key = kmalloc(ctx->maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->vec.iv = kmalloc(crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->vec.assoc = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->vec.ptext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ ctx->vec.ctext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx->vec.key || !ctx->vec.iv || !ctx->vec.assoc ||
+ !ctx->vec.ptext || !ctx->vec.ctext) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
- if (test_type)
+ err = test_aead_vs_generic_impl(ctx);
+ if (err)
goto out;
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
- /* alignment tests are only done with continuous buffers */
- if (align_offset != 0)
- break;
-
- if (!template[i].np)
- continue;
-
- j++;
- memset(result, 0, digest_size);
-
- temp = 0;
- sg_init_table(sg, template[i].np);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- for (k = 0; k < template[i].np; k++) {
- if (WARN_ON(offset_in_page(IDX[k]) +
- template[i].tap[k] > PAGE_SIZE))
- goto out;
- sg_set_buf(&sg[k],
- memcpy(xbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]),
- template[i].plaintext + temp,
- template[i].tap[k]),
- template[i].tap[k]);
- temp += template[i].tap[k];
- }
-
- if (template[i].ksize) {
- if (template[i].ksize > MAX_KEYLEN) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: setkey failed on test %d for %s: key size %d > %d\n",
- j, algo, template[i].ksize, MAX_KEYLEN);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- crypto_ahash_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
- memcpy(key, template[i].key, template[i].ksize);
- ret = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, key, template[i].ksize);
-
- if (ret) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: hash: setkey "
- "failed on chunking test %d "
- "for %s: ret=%d\n", j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, result, template[i].psize);
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: digest failed on chunking test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (memcmp(result, template[i].digest,
- crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm))) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: hash: Chunking test %d "
- "failed for %s\n", j, algo);
- hexdump(result, crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm));
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- /* partial update exercise */
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
- /* alignment tests are only done with continuous buffers */
- if (align_offset != 0)
- break;
-
- if (template[i].np < 2)
- continue;
-
- j++;
- memset(result, 0, digest_size);
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- hash_buff = xbuf[0];
- memcpy(hash_buff, template[i].plaintext,
- template[i].tap[0]);
- sg_init_one(&sg[0], hash_buff, template[i].tap[0]);
-
- if (template[i].ksize) {
- crypto_ahash_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
- if (template[i].ksize > MAX_KEYLEN) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: setkey failed on test %d for %s: key size %d > %d\n",
- j, algo, template[i].ksize, MAX_KEYLEN);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(key, template[i].key, template[i].ksize);
- ret = crypto_ahash_setkey(tfm, key, template[i].ksize);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: setkey failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, result, template[i].tap[0]);
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: init failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: update failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
-
- temp = template[i].tap[0];
- for (k = 1; k < template[i].np; k++) {
- ret = ahash_partial_update(&req, tfm, &template[i],
- hash_buff, k, temp, &sg[0], algo, result,
- &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: partial update failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- j, algo, -ret);
- goto out_noreq;
- }
- temp += template[i].tap[k];
- }
- ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(req), &wait);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: final failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
- if (memcmp(result, template[i].digest,
- crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm))) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: Partial Test %d failed for %s\n",
- j, algo);
- hexdump(result, crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm));
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 0;
-
+ err = test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(ctx);
out:
- ahash_request_free(req);
-out_noreq:
- testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
-out_nobuf:
- kfree(key);
- kfree(result);
- return ret;
+ kfree(ctx->vec.key);
+ kfree(ctx->vec.iv);
+ kfree(ctx->vec.assoc);
+ kfree(ctx->vec.ptext);
+ kfree(ctx->vec.ctext);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ return err;
}
-
-static int test_hash(struct crypto_ahash *tfm,
- const struct hash_testvec *template,
- unsigned int tcount, enum hash_test test_type)
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_aead_extra(const char *driver,
+ const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
{
- unsigned int alignmask;
- int ret;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
- ret = __test_hash(tfm, template, tcount, test_type, 0);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+static int test_aead(const char *driver, int enc,
+ const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+ struct aead_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
- /* test unaligned buffers, check with one byte offset */
- ret = __test_hash(tfm, template, tcount, test_type, 1);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- alignmask = crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(&tfm->base);
- if (alignmask) {
- /* Check if alignment mask for tfm is correctly set. */
- ret = __test_hash(tfm, template, tcount, test_type,
- alignmask + 1);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ for (i = 0; i < suite->count; i++) {
+ err = test_aead_vec(driver, enc, &suite->vecs[i], i, req,
+ tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
}
-
return 0;
}
-static int __test_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc,
- const struct aead_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount,
- const bool diff_dst, const int align_offset)
+static int alg_test_aead(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
{
- const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm));
- unsigned int i, j, k, n, temp;
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
- char *q;
- char *key;
- struct aead_request *req;
- struct scatterlist *sg;
- struct scatterlist *sgout;
- const char *e, *d;
- struct crypto_wait wait;
- unsigned int authsize, iv_len;
- void *input;
- void *output;
- void *assoc;
- char *iv;
- char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
- char *xoutbuf[XBUFSIZE];
- char *axbuf[XBUFSIZE];
+ const struct aead_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.aead;
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ struct aead_request *req = NULL;
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls = NULL;
+ int err;
- iv = kzalloc(MAX_IVLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!iv)
- return ret;
- key = kmalloc(MAX_KEYLEN, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key)
- goto out_noxbuf;
- if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
- goto out_noxbuf;
- if (testmgr_alloc_buf(axbuf))
- goto out_noaxbuf;
- if (diff_dst && testmgr_alloc_buf(xoutbuf))
- goto out_nooutbuf;
+ if (suite->count <= 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: empty test suite for %s\n", driver);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- /* avoid "the frame size is larger than 1024 bytes" compiler warning */
- sg = kmalloc(array3_size(sizeof(*sg), 8, (diff_dst ? 4 : 2)),
- GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!sg)
- goto out_nosg;
- sgout = &sg[16];
-
- if (diff_dst)
- d = "-ddst";
- else
- d = "";
-
- if (enc == ENCRYPT)
- e = "encryption";
- else
- e = "decryption";
-
- crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
req = aead_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: Failed to allocate request for %s\n",
- d, algo);
+ pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
- aead_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- crypto_req_done, &wait);
-
- iv_len = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
-
- for (i = 0, j = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
- if (template[i].np)
- continue;
-
- j++;
-
- /* some templates have no input data but they will
- * touch input
- */
- input = xbuf[0];
- input += align_offset;
- assoc = axbuf[0];
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (WARN_ON(align_offset + template[i].ilen >
- PAGE_SIZE || template[i].alen > PAGE_SIZE))
- goto out;
-
- memcpy(input, template[i].input, template[i].ilen);
- memcpy(assoc, template[i].assoc, template[i].alen);
- if (template[i].iv)
- memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, iv_len);
- else
- memset(iv, 0, iv_len);
-
- crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
- if (template[i].wk)
- crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
-
- if (template[i].klen > MAX_KEYLEN) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: setkey failed on test %d for %s: key size %d > %d\n",
- d, j, algo, template[i].klen,
- MAX_KEYLEN);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(key, template[i].key, template[i].klen);
-
- ret = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, template[i].klen);
- if (template[i].fail == !ret) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: setkey failed on test %d for %s: flags=%x\n",
- d, j, algo, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm));
- goto out;
- } else if (ret)
- continue;
-
- authsize = abs(template[i].rlen - template[i].ilen);
- ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: Failed to set authsize to %u on test %d for %s\n",
- d, authsize, j, algo);
- goto out;
- }
-
- k = !!template[i].alen;
- sg_init_table(sg, k + 1);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[0], assoc, template[i].alen);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[k], input,
- template[i].ilen + (enc ? authsize : 0));
- output = input;
-
- if (diff_dst) {
- sg_init_table(sgout, k + 1);
- sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], assoc, template[i].alen);
-
- output = xoutbuf[0];
- output += align_offset;
- sg_set_buf(&sgout[k], output,
- template[i].rlen + (enc ? 0 : authsize));
- }
-
- aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, (diff_dst) ? sgout : sg,
- template[i].ilen, iv);
-
- aead_request_set_ad(req, template[i].alen);
-
- ret = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
- : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
-
- switch (ret) {
- case 0:
- if (template[i].novrfy) {
- /* verification was supposed to fail */
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: %s failed on test %d for %s: ret was 0, expected -EBADMSG\n",
- d, e, j, algo);
- /* so really, we got a bad message */
- ret = -EBADMSG;
- goto out;
- }
- break;
- case -EBADMSG:
- if (template[i].novrfy)
- /* verification failure was expected */
- continue;
- /* fall through */
- default:
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: %s failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- d, e, j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
-
- q = output;
- if (memcmp(q, template[i].result, template[i].rlen)) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: Test %d failed on %s for %s\n",
- d, j, e, algo);
- hexdump(q, template[i].rlen);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ tsgls = alloc_cipher_test_sglists();
+ if (!tsgls) {
+ pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
}
- for (i = 0, j = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
- /* alignment tests are only done with continuous buffers */
- if (align_offset != 0)
- break;
+ err = test_aead(driver, ENCRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
- if (!template[i].np)
- continue;
+ err = test_aead(driver, DECRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
- j++;
-
- if (template[i].iv)
- memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, iv_len);
- else
- memset(iv, 0, MAX_IVLEN);
-
- crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
- if (template[i].wk)
- crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
- if (template[i].klen > MAX_KEYLEN) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: setkey failed on test %d for %s: key size %d > %d\n",
- d, j, algo, template[i].klen, MAX_KEYLEN);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- memcpy(key, template[i].key, template[i].klen);
-
- ret = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, template[i].klen);
- if (template[i].fail == !ret) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: setkey failed on chunk test %d for %s: flags=%x\n",
- d, j, algo, crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm));
- goto out;
- } else if (ret)
- continue;
-
- authsize = abs(template[i].rlen - template[i].ilen);
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- sg_init_table(sg, template[i].anp + template[i].np);
- if (diff_dst)
- sg_init_table(sgout, template[i].anp + template[i].np);
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- for (k = 0, temp = 0; k < template[i].anp; k++) {
- if (WARN_ON(offset_in_page(IDX[k]) +
- template[i].atap[k] > PAGE_SIZE))
- goto out;
- sg_set_buf(&sg[k],
- memcpy(axbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]),
- template[i].assoc + temp,
- template[i].atap[k]),
- template[i].atap[k]);
- if (diff_dst)
- sg_set_buf(&sgout[k],
- axbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]),
- template[i].atap[k]);
- temp += template[i].atap[k];
- }
-
- for (k = 0, temp = 0; k < template[i].np; k++) {
- if (WARN_ON(offset_in_page(IDX[k]) +
- template[i].tap[k] > PAGE_SIZE))
- goto out;
-
- q = xbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] + offset_in_page(IDX[k]);
- memcpy(q, template[i].input + temp, template[i].tap[k]);
- sg_set_buf(&sg[template[i].anp + k],
- q, template[i].tap[k]);
-
- if (diff_dst) {
- q = xoutbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]);
-
- memset(q, 0, template[i].tap[k]);
-
- sg_set_buf(&sgout[template[i].anp + k],
- q, template[i].tap[k]);
- }
-
- n = template[i].tap[k];
- if (k == template[i].np - 1 && enc)
- n += authsize;
- if (offset_in_page(q) + n < PAGE_SIZE)
- q[n] = 0;
-
- temp += template[i].tap[k];
- }
-
- ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: Failed to set authsize to %u on chunk test %d for %s\n",
- d, authsize, j, algo);
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (enc) {
- if (WARN_ON(sg[template[i].anp + k - 1].offset +
- sg[template[i].anp + k - 1].length +
- authsize > PAGE_SIZE)) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (diff_dst)
- sgout[template[i].anp + k - 1].length +=
- authsize;
- sg[template[i].anp + k - 1].length += authsize;
- }
-
- aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, (diff_dst) ? sgout : sg,
- template[i].ilen,
- iv);
-
- aead_request_set_ad(req, template[i].alen);
-
- ret = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req)
- : crypto_aead_decrypt(req), &wait);
-
- switch (ret) {
- case 0:
- if (template[i].novrfy) {
- /* verification was supposed to fail */
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: %s failed on chunk test %d for %s: ret was 0, expected -EBADMSG\n",
- d, e, j, algo);
- /* so really, we got a bad message */
- ret = -EBADMSG;
- goto out;
- }
- break;
- case -EBADMSG:
- if (template[i].novrfy)
- /* verification failure was expected */
- continue;
- /* fall through */
- default:
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: %s failed on chunk test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- d, e, j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- for (k = 0, temp = 0; k < template[i].np; k++) {
- if (diff_dst)
- q = xoutbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]);
- else
- q = xbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]);
-
- n = template[i].tap[k];
- if (k == template[i].np - 1)
- n += enc ? authsize : -authsize;
-
- if (memcmp(q, template[i].result + temp, n)) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: Chunk test %d failed on %s at page %u for %s\n",
- d, j, e, k, algo);
- hexdump(q, n);
- goto out;
- }
-
- q += n;
- if (k == template[i].np - 1 && !enc) {
- if (!diff_dst &&
- memcmp(q, template[i].input +
- temp + n, authsize))
- n = authsize;
- else
- n = 0;
- } else {
- for (n = 0; offset_in_page(q + n) && q[n]; n++)
- ;
- }
- if (n) {
- pr_err("alg: aead%s: Result buffer corruption in chunk test %d on %s at page %u for %s: %u bytes:\n",
- d, j, e, k, algo, n);
- hexdump(q, n);
- goto out;
- }
-
- temp += template[i].tap[k];
- }
- }
-
- ret = 0;
-
+ err = test_aead_extra(driver, desc, req, tsgls);
out:
+ free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls);
aead_request_free(req);
- kfree(sg);
-out_nosg:
- if (diff_dst)
- testmgr_free_buf(xoutbuf);
-out_nooutbuf:
- testmgr_free_buf(axbuf);
-out_noaxbuf:
- testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
-out_noxbuf:
- kfree(key);
- kfree(iv);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int test_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, int enc,
- const struct aead_testvec *template, unsigned int tcount)
-{
- unsigned int alignmask;
- int ret;
-
- /* test 'dst == src' case */
- ret = __test_aead(tfm, enc, template, tcount, false, 0);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- /* test 'dst != src' case */
- ret = __test_aead(tfm, enc, template, tcount, true, 0);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- /* test unaligned buffers, check with one byte offset */
- ret = __test_aead(tfm, enc, template, tcount, true, 1);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- alignmask = crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(&tfm->base);
- if (alignmask) {
- /* Check if alignment mask for tfm is correctly set. */
- ret = __test_aead(tfm, enc, template, tcount, true,
- alignmask + 1);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- }
-
- return 0;
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ return err;
}
static int test_cipher(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, int enc,
@@ -1037,8 +2634,6 @@
j = 0;
for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
- if (template[i].np)
- continue;
if (fips_enabled && template[i].fips_skip)
continue;
@@ -1056,17 +2651,24 @@
crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
if (template[i].wk)
- crypto_cipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
+ crypto_cipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, template[i].key,
template[i].klen);
- if (template[i].fail == !ret) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: setkey failed "
- "on test %d for %s: flags=%x\n", j,
- algo, crypto_cipher_get_flags(tfm));
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == template[i].setkey_error)
+ continue;
+ pr_err("alg: cipher: %s setkey failed on test vector %u; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ algo, j, template[i].setkey_error, ret,
+ crypto_cipher_get_flags(tfm));
goto out;
- } else if (ret)
- continue;
+ }
+ if (template[i].setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: cipher: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %u; expected_error=%d\n",
+ algo, j, template[i].setkey_error);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
for (k = 0; k < template[i].len;
k += crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm)) {
@@ -1096,284 +2698,489 @@
return ret;
}
-static int __test_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, int enc,
- const struct cipher_testvec *template,
- unsigned int tcount,
- const bool diff_dst, const int align_offset)
+static int test_skcipher_vec_cfg(const char *driver, int enc,
+ const struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+ const char *vec_name,
+ const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
{
- const char *algo =
- crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_skcipher_tfm(tfm));
- unsigned int i, j, k, n, temp;
- char *q;
- struct skcipher_request *req;
- struct scatterlist sg[8];
- struct scatterlist sgout[8];
- const char *e, *d;
- struct crypto_wait wait;
- const char *input, *result;
- void *data;
- char iv[MAX_IVLEN];
- char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
- char *xoutbuf[XBUFSIZE];
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
- unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(tfm);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+ const char *op = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption";
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+ u8 _iv[3 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + MAX_IVLEN];
+ u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&_iv[0], 2 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)) +
+ cfg->iv_offset +
+ (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0);
+ struct kvec input;
+ int err;
- if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
- goto out_nobuf;
-
- if (diff_dst && testmgr_alloc_buf(xoutbuf))
- goto out_nooutbuf;
-
- if (diff_dst)
- d = "-ddst";
+ /* Set the key */
+ if (vec->wk)
+ crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
else
- d = "";
-
- if (enc == ENCRYPT)
- e = "encryption";
- else
- e = "decryption";
-
- crypto_init_wait(&wait);
-
- req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: Failed to allocate request for %s\n",
- d, algo);
- goto out;
+ crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tfm,
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+ err = do_setkey(crypto_skcipher_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen,
+ cfg, alignmask);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+ crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm));
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->setkey_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+ driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
- crypto_req_done, &wait);
-
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
- if (template[i].np && !template[i].also_non_np)
- continue;
-
- if (fips_enabled && template[i].fips_skip)
- continue;
-
- if (template[i].iv && !(template[i].generates_iv && enc))
- memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, ivsize);
+ /* The IV must be copied to a buffer, as the algorithm may modify it */
+ if (ivsize) {
+ if (WARN_ON(ivsize > MAX_IVLEN))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (vec->generates_iv && !enc)
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv_out, ivsize);
+ else if (vec->iv)
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
else
- memset(iv, 0, MAX_IVLEN);
-
- input = enc ? template[i].ptext : template[i].ctext;
- result = enc ? template[i].ctext : template[i].ptext;
- j++;
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (WARN_ON(align_offset + template[i].len > PAGE_SIZE))
- goto out;
-
- data = xbuf[0];
- data += align_offset;
- memcpy(data, input, template[i].len);
-
- crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
- if (template[i].wk)
- crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
-
- ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, template[i].key,
- template[i].klen);
- if (template[i].fail == !ret) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: setkey failed on test %d for %s: flags=%x\n",
- d, j, algo, crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm));
- goto out;
- } else if (ret)
- continue;
-
- sg_init_one(&sg[0], data, template[i].len);
- if (diff_dst) {
- data = xoutbuf[0];
- data += align_offset;
- sg_init_one(&sgout[0], data, template[i].len);
+ memset(iv, 0, ivsize);
+ } else {
+ if (vec->generates_iv) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s has ivsize=0 but test vector %s generates IV!\n",
+ driver, vec_name);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
-
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, (diff_dst) ? sgout : sg,
- template[i].len, iv);
- ret = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req) :
- crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
-
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: %s failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- d, e, j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
-
- q = data;
- if (memcmp(q, result, template[i].len)) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: Test %d failed (invalid result) on %s for %s\n",
- d, j, e, algo);
- hexdump(q, template[i].len);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (template[i].generates_iv && enc &&
- memcmp(iv, template[i].iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm))) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: Test %d failed (invalid output IV) on %s for %s\n",
- d, j, e, algo);
- hexdump(iv, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm));
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
+ iv = NULL;
}
- j = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
- /* alignment tests are only done with continuous buffers */
- if (align_offset != 0)
- break;
-
- if (!template[i].np)
- continue;
-
- if (fips_enabled && template[i].fips_skip)
- continue;
-
- if (template[i].iv && !(template[i].generates_iv && enc))
- memcpy(iv, template[i].iv, ivsize);
- else
- memset(iv, 0, MAX_IVLEN);
-
- input = enc ? template[i].ptext : template[i].ctext;
- result = enc ? template[i].ctext : template[i].ptext;
- j++;
- crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
- if (template[i].wk)
- crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm,
- CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY);
-
- ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, template[i].key,
- template[i].klen);
- if (template[i].fail == !ret) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: setkey failed on chunk test %d for %s: flags=%x\n",
- d, j, algo, crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm));
- goto out;
- } else if (ret)
- continue;
-
- temp = 0;
- ret = -EINVAL;
- sg_init_table(sg, template[i].np);
- if (diff_dst)
- sg_init_table(sgout, template[i].np);
- for (k = 0; k < template[i].np; k++) {
- if (WARN_ON(offset_in_page(IDX[k]) +
- template[i].tap[k] > PAGE_SIZE))
- goto out;
-
- q = xbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] + offset_in_page(IDX[k]);
-
- memcpy(q, input + temp, template[i].tap[k]);
-
- if (offset_in_page(q) + template[i].tap[k] < PAGE_SIZE)
- q[template[i].tap[k]] = 0;
-
- sg_set_buf(&sg[k], q, template[i].tap[k]);
- if (diff_dst) {
- q = xoutbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]);
-
- sg_set_buf(&sgout[k], q, template[i].tap[k]);
-
- memset(q, 0, template[i].tap[k]);
- if (offset_in_page(q) +
- template[i].tap[k] < PAGE_SIZE)
- q[template[i].tap[k]] = 0;
- }
-
- temp += template[i].tap[k];
- }
-
- skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, (diff_dst) ? sgout : sg,
- template[i].len, iv);
-
- ret = crypto_wait_req(enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req) :
- crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
-
- if (ret) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: %s failed on chunk test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
- d, e, j, algo, -ret);
- goto out;
- }
-
- temp = 0;
- ret = -EINVAL;
- for (k = 0; k < template[i].np; k++) {
- if (diff_dst)
- q = xoutbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]);
- else
- q = xbuf[IDX[k] >> PAGE_SHIFT] +
- offset_in_page(IDX[k]);
-
- if (memcmp(q, result + temp, template[i].tap[k])) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: Chunk test %d failed on %s at page %u for %s\n",
- d, j, e, k, algo);
- hexdump(q, template[i].tap[k]);
- goto out;
- }
-
- q += template[i].tap[k];
- for (n = 0; offset_in_page(q + n) && q[n]; n++)
- ;
- if (n) {
- pr_err("alg: skcipher%s: Result buffer corruption in chunk test %d on %s at page %u for %s: %u bytes:\n",
- d, j, e, k, algo, n);
- hexdump(q, n);
- goto out;
- }
- temp += template[i].tap[k];
- }
+ /* Build the src/dst scatterlists */
+ input.iov_base = enc ? (void *)vec->ptext : (void *)vec->ctext;
+ input.iov_len = vec->len;
+ err = build_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls, cfg, alignmask,
+ vec->len, vec->len, &input, 1);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s: error preparing scatterlists for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
}
- ret = 0;
+ /* Do the actual encryption or decryption */
+ testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm));
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, tsgls->src.sgl_ptr, tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr,
+ vec->len, iv);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+ err = enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req) : crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ if (cfg->nosimd)
+ crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+ err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
-out:
- skcipher_request_free(req);
- if (diff_dst)
- testmgr_free_buf(xoutbuf);
-out_nooutbuf:
- testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
-out_nobuf:
- return ret;
-}
+ /* Check that the algorithm didn't overwrite things it shouldn't have */
+ if (req->cryptlen != vec->len ||
+ req->iv != iv ||
+ req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr ||
+ req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr ||
+ crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req) != tfm ||
+ req->base.complete != crypto_req_done ||
+ req->base.flags != req_flags ||
+ req->base.data != &wait) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted request struct on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ if (req->cryptlen != vec->len)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->cryptlen'\n");
+ if (req->iv != iv)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->iv'\n");
+ if (req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->src'\n");
+ if (req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->dst'\n");
+ if (crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req) != tfm)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.tfm'\n");
+ if (req->base.complete != crypto_req_done)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.complete'\n");
+ if (req->base.flags != req_flags)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.flags'\n");
+ if (req->base.data != &wait)
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.data'\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->src)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted src sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr != tsgls->src.sgl &&
+ is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->dst)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted dst sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
-static int test_skcipher(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, int enc,
- const struct cipher_testvec *template,
- unsigned int tcount)
-{
- unsigned int alignmask;
- int ret;
+ /* Check for success or failure */
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == vec->crypt_error)
+ return 0;
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, vec->crypt_error, err, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (vec->crypt_error) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, vec->crypt_error, cfg->name);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
- /* test 'dst == src' case */
- ret = __test_skcipher(tfm, enc, template, tcount, false, 0);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ /* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */
+ err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext,
+ vec->len, 0, true);
+ if (err == -EOVERFLOW) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s overran dst buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ return err;
+ }
- /* test 'dst != src' case */
- ret = __test_skcipher(tfm, enc, template, tcount, true, 0);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- /* test unaligned buffers, check with one byte offset */
- ret = __test_skcipher(tfm, enc, template, tcount, true, 1);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- alignmask = crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(&tfm->base);
- if (alignmask) {
- /* Check if alignment mask for tfm is correctly set. */
- ret = __test_skcipher(tfm, enc, template, tcount, true,
- alignmask + 1);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ /* If applicable, check that the algorithm generated the correct IV */
+ if (vec->iv_out && memcmp(iv, vec->iv_out, ivsize) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s test failed (wrong output IV) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+ driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+ hexdump(iv, ivsize);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_skcipher_vec(const char *driver, int enc,
+ const struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+ unsigned int vec_num,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ char vec_name[16];
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ if (fips_enabled && vec->fips_skip)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) {
+ err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(driver, enc, vec, vec_name,
+ &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i],
+ req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ if (!noextratests) {
+ struct testvec_config cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+ generate_random_testvec_config(&cfg, cfgname,
+ sizeof(cfgname));
+ err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(driver, enc, vec, vec_name,
+ &cfg, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+/*
+ * Generate a symmetric cipher test vector from the given implementation.
+ * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated.
+ */
+static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+ unsigned int maxdatasize,
+ char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ struct scatterlist src, dst;
+ u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
+ DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+
+ /* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */
+ vec->klen = maxkeysize;
+ if (prandom_u32() % 4 == 0)
+ vec->klen = prandom_u32() % (maxkeysize + 1);
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen);
+ vec->setkey_error = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen);
+
+ /* IV */
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+ /* Plaintext */
+ vec->len = generate_random_length(maxdatasize);
+ generate_random_bytes((u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len);
+
+ /* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to encrypt. */
+ if (vec->setkey_error)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Ciphertext */
+ sg_init_one(&src, vec->ptext, vec->len);
+ sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->len);
+ memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+ skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+ skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, vec->len, iv);
+ vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+ if (vec->crypt_error != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The only acceptable error here is for an invalid length, so
+ * skcipher decryption should fail with the same error too.
+ * We'll test for this. But to keep the API usage well-defined,
+ * explicitly initialize the ciphertext buffer too.
+ */
+ memset((u8 *)vec->ctext, 0, vec->len);
+ }
+done:
+ snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: len=%u klen=%u\"",
+ vec->len, vec->klen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the skcipher algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding
+ * generic implementation, if one is available.
+ */
+static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
+ const char *generic_driver,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+ const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+ const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+ const char *algname = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+ char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+ struct crypto_skcipher *generic_tfm = NULL;
+ struct skcipher_request *generic_req = NULL;
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct cipher_testvec vec = { 0 };
+ char vec_name[64];
+ struct testvec_config *cfg;
+ char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+ int err;
+
+ if (noextratests)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Keywrap isn't supported here yet as it handles its IV differently. */
+ if (strncmp(algname, "kw(", 3) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+ err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ generic_driver = _generic_driver;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+ return 0;
+
+ generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+ if (err == -ENOENT) {
+ pr_warn("alg: skcipher: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+ driver, generic_driver);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+ generic_driver, algname, err);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cfg) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ generic_req = skcipher_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!generic_req) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+ if (crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm) !=
+ crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: min keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm),
+ crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (maxkeysize != crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: max keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, maxkeysize,
+ crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (ivsize != crypto_skcipher_ivsize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, ivsize, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (blocksize != crypto_skcipher_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+ driver, blocksize,
+ crypto_skcipher_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+ * the other implementation against them.
+ */
+
+ vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.iv = kmalloc(ivsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.ptext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ vec.ctext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!vec.key || !vec.iv || !vec.ptext || !vec.ctext) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+ generate_random_cipher_testvec(generic_req, &vec, maxdatasize,
+ vec_name, sizeof(vec_name));
+ generate_random_testvec_config(cfg, cfgname, sizeof(cfgname));
+
+ err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(driver, ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name,
+ cfg, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(driver, DECRYPT, &vec, vec_name,
+ cfg, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(cfg);
+ kfree(vec.key);
+ kfree(vec.iv);
+ kfree(vec.ptext);
+ kfree(vec.ctext);
+ crypto_free_skcipher(generic_tfm);
+ skcipher_request_free(generic_req);
+ return err;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *driver,
+ const char *generic_driver,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int test_skcipher(const char *driver, int enc,
+ const struct cipher_test_suite *suite,
+ struct skcipher_request *req,
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < suite->count; i++) {
+ err = test_skcipher_vec(driver, enc, &suite->vecs[i], i, req,
+ tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_skcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+ const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ const struct cipher_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.cipher;
+ struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+ struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
+ struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls = NULL;
+ int err;
+
+ if (suite->count <= 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: empty test suite for %s\n", driver);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(driver, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+ driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ }
+
+ req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tsgls = alloc_cipher_test_sglists();
+ if (!tsgls) {
+ pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+ driver);
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ err = test_skcipher(driver, ENCRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = test_skcipher(driver, DECRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(driver, desc->generic_driver, req,
+ tsgls);
+out:
+ free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls);
+ skcipher_request_free(req);
+ crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+ return err;
}
static int test_comp(struct crypto_comp *tfm,
@@ -1713,35 +3520,6 @@
return err;
}
-static int alg_test_aead(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
- u32 type, u32 mask)
-{
- struct crypto_aead *tfm;
- int err = 0;
-
- tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(driver, type, mask);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: aead: Failed to load transform for %s: "
- "%ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
- return PTR_ERR(tfm);
- }
-
- if (desc->suite.aead.enc.vecs) {
- err = test_aead(tfm, ENCRYPT, desc->suite.aead.enc.vecs,
- desc->suite.aead.enc.count);
- if (err)
- goto out;
- }
-
- if (!err && desc->suite.aead.dec.vecs)
- err = test_aead(tfm, DECRYPT, desc->suite.aead.dec.vecs,
- desc->suite.aead.dec.count);
-
-out:
- crypto_free_aead(tfm);
- return err;
-}
-
static int alg_test_cipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
@@ -1761,28 +3539,6 @@
err = test_cipher(tfm, DECRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count);
crypto_free_cipher(tfm);
- return err;
-}
-
-static int alg_test_skcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
- const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
-{
- const struct cipher_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.cipher;
- struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
- int err;
-
- tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(driver, type, mask);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: skcipher: Failed to load transform for "
- "%s: %ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
- return PTR_ERR(tfm);
- }
-
- err = test_skcipher(tfm, ENCRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count);
- if (!err)
- err = test_skcipher(tfm, DECRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count);
-
- crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
return err;
}
@@ -1824,72 +3580,11 @@
return err;
}
-static int __alg_test_hash(const struct hash_testvec *template,
- unsigned int tcount, const char *driver,
- u32 type, u32 mask)
-{
- struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
- int err;
-
- tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(driver, type, mask);
- if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: hash: Failed to load transform for %s: "
- "%ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
- return PTR_ERR(tfm);
- }
-
- err = test_hash(tfm, template, tcount, HASH_TEST_DIGEST);
- if (!err)
- err = test_hash(tfm, template, tcount, HASH_TEST_FINAL);
- if (!err)
- err = test_hash(tfm, template, tcount, HASH_TEST_FINUP);
- crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
- return err;
-}
-
-static int alg_test_hash(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
- u32 type, u32 mask)
-{
- const struct hash_testvec *template = desc->suite.hash.vecs;
- unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.hash.count;
- unsigned int nr_unkeyed, nr_keyed;
- int err;
-
- /*
- * For OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, we have to do all the unkeyed tests
- * first, before setting a key on the tfm. To make this easier, we
- * require that the unkeyed test vectors (if any) are listed first.
- */
-
- for (nr_unkeyed = 0; nr_unkeyed < tcount; nr_unkeyed++) {
- if (template[nr_unkeyed].ksize)
- break;
- }
- for (nr_keyed = 0; nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed < tcount; nr_keyed++) {
- if (!template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize) {
- pr_err("alg: hash: test vectors for %s out of order, "
- "unkeyed ones must come first\n", desc->alg);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- }
-
- err = 0;
- if (nr_unkeyed) {
- err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_unkeyed, driver, type, mask);
- template += nr_unkeyed;
- }
-
- if (!err && nr_keyed)
- err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_keyed, driver, type, mask);
-
- return err;
-}
-
static int alg_test_crc32c(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
- u32 val;
+ __le32 val;
int err;
err = alg_test_hash(desc, driver, type, mask);
@@ -1916,9 +3611,8 @@
u32 *ctx = (u32 *)shash_desc_ctx(shash);
shash->tfm = tfm;
- shash->flags = 0;
- *ctx = le32_to_cpu(420553207);
+ *ctx = 420553207;
err = crypto_shash_final(shash, (u8 *)&val);
if (err) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Operation failed for "
@@ -1926,9 +3620,9 @@
break;
}
- if (val != ~420553207) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Test failed for %s: "
- "%d\n", driver, val);
+ if (val != cpu_to_le32(~420553207)) {
+ pr_err("alg: crc32c: Test failed for %s: %u\n",
+ driver, le32_to_cpu(val));
err = -EINVAL;
}
} while (0);
@@ -1975,7 +3669,7 @@
if (IS_ERR(drng)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for "
"%s\n", driver);
- kzfree(buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
return -ENOMEM;
}
@@ -2022,7 +3716,7 @@
outbuf:
crypto_free_rng(drng);
- kzfree(buf);
+ kfree_sensitive(buf);
return ret;
}
@@ -2100,12 +3794,11 @@
if (vec->genkey) {
/* Save party A's public key */
- a_public = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+ a_public = kmemdup(sg_virt(req->dst), out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!a_public) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_output;
}
- memcpy(a_public, sg_virt(req->dst), out_len_max);
} else {
/* Verify calculated public key */
if (memcmp(vec->expected_a_public, sg_virt(req->dst),
@@ -2118,13 +3811,12 @@
}
/* Calculate shared secret key by using counter part (b) public key. */
- input_buf = kzalloc(vec->b_public_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ input_buf = kmemdup(vec->b_public, vec->b_public_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!input_buf) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_output;
}
- memcpy(input_buf, vec->b_public, vec->b_public_size);
sg_init_one(&src, input_buf, vec->b_public_size);
sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max);
kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, vec->b_public_size);
@@ -2140,12 +3832,11 @@
if (vec->genkey) {
/* Save the shared secret obtained by party A */
- a_ss = kzalloc(vec->expected_ss_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ a_ss = kmemdup(sg_virt(req->dst), vec->expected_ss_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!a_ss) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto free_all;
}
- memcpy(a_ss, sg_virt(req->dst), vec->expected_ss_size);
/*
* Calculate party B's shared secret by using party A's
@@ -2233,6 +3924,12 @@
return err;
}
+static u8 *test_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
+{
+ memcpy(dst, &val, sizeof(val));
+ return dst + sizeof(val);
+}
+
static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs)
{
@@ -2243,7 +3940,11 @@
struct crypto_wait wait;
unsigned int out_len_max, out_len = 0;
int err = -ENOMEM;
- struct scatterlist src, dst, src_tab[2];
+ struct scatterlist src, dst, src_tab[3];
+ const char *m, *c;
+ unsigned int m_size, c_size;
+ const char *op;
+ u8 *key, *ptr;
if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
return err;
@@ -2254,57 +3955,102 @@
crypto_init_wait(&wait);
- if (vecs->public_key_vec)
- err = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, vecs->key,
- vecs->key_len);
- else
- err = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, vecs->key,
- vecs->key_len);
- if (err)
+ key = kmalloc(vecs->key_len + sizeof(u32) * 2 + vecs->param_len,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
goto free_req;
+ memcpy(key, vecs->key, vecs->key_len);
+ ptr = key + vecs->key_len;
+ ptr = test_pack_u32(ptr, vecs->algo);
+ ptr = test_pack_u32(ptr, vecs->param_len);
+ memcpy(ptr, vecs->params, vecs->param_len);
+ if (vecs->public_key_vec)
+ err = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, vecs->key_len);
+ else
+ err = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, vecs->key_len);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_key;
+
+ /*
+ * First run test which do not require a private key, such as
+ * encrypt or verify.
+ */
err = -ENOMEM;
out_len_max = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
outbuf_enc = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!outbuf_enc)
- goto free_req;
+ goto free_key;
- if (WARN_ON(vecs->m_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+ if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test) {
+ m = vecs->m;
+ m_size = vecs->m_size;
+ c = vecs->c;
+ c_size = vecs->c_size;
+ op = "encrypt";
+ } else {
+ /* Swap args so we could keep plaintext (digest)
+ * in vecs->m, and cooked signature in vecs->c.
+ */
+ m = vecs->c; /* signature */
+ m_size = vecs->c_size;
+ c = vecs->m; /* digest */
+ c_size = vecs->m_size;
+ op = "verify";
+ }
+
+ err = -E2BIG;
+ if (WARN_ON(m_size > PAGE_SIZE))
goto free_all;
+ memcpy(xbuf[0], m, m_size);
- memcpy(xbuf[0], vecs->m, vecs->m_size);
-
- sg_init_table(src_tab, 2);
+ sg_init_table(src_tab, 3);
sg_set_buf(&src_tab[0], xbuf[0], 8);
- sg_set_buf(&src_tab[1], xbuf[0] + 8, vecs->m_size - 8);
- sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max);
- akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, &dst, vecs->m_size,
- out_len_max);
+ sg_set_buf(&src_tab[1], xbuf[0] + 8, m_size - 8);
+ if (vecs->siggen_sigver_test) {
+ if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+ goto free_all;
+ memcpy(xbuf[1], c, c_size);
+ sg_set_buf(&src_tab[2], xbuf[1], c_size);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, NULL, m_size, c_size);
+ } else {
+ sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, &dst, m_size,
+ out_len_max);
+ }
akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
crypto_req_done, &wait);
err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ?
- /* Run asymmetric signature generation */
- crypto_akcipher_sign(req) :
+ /* Run asymmetric signature verification */
+ crypto_akcipher_verify(req) :
/* Run asymmetric encrypt */
crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
if (err) {
- pr_err("alg: akcipher: encrypt test failed. err %d\n", err);
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err);
goto free_all;
}
- if (req->dst_len != vecs->c_size) {
- pr_err("alg: akcipher: encrypt test failed. Invalid output len\n");
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto free_all;
+ if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test && c) {
+ if (req->dst_len != c_size) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len\n",
+ op);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_all;
+ }
+ /* verify that encrypted message is equal to expected */
+ if (memcmp(c, outbuf_enc, c_size) != 0) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n",
+ op);
+ hexdump(outbuf_enc, c_size);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_all;
+ }
}
- /* verify that encrypted message is equal to expected */
- if (memcmp(vecs->c, outbuf_enc, vecs->c_size)) {
- pr_err("alg: akcipher: encrypt test failed. Invalid output\n");
- hexdump(outbuf_enc, vecs->c_size);
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto free_all;
- }
- /* Don't invoke decrypt for vectors with public key */
+
+ /*
+ * Don't invoke (decrypt or sign) test which require a private key
+ * for vectors with only a public key.
+ */
if (vecs->public_key_vec) {
err = 0;
goto free_all;
@@ -2315,43 +4061,50 @@
goto free_all;
}
- if (WARN_ON(vecs->c_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+ if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test && !c) {
+ c = outbuf_enc;
+ c_size = req->dst_len;
+ }
+
+ err = -E2BIG;
+ op = vecs->siggen_sigver_test ? "sign" : "decrypt";
+ if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE))
goto free_all;
+ memcpy(xbuf[0], c, c_size);
- memcpy(xbuf[0], vecs->c, vecs->c_size);
-
- sg_init_one(&src, xbuf[0], vecs->c_size);
+ sg_init_one(&src, xbuf[0], c_size);
sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_dec, out_len_max);
crypto_init_wait(&wait);
- akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, vecs->c_size, out_len_max);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, c_size, out_len_max);
err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ?
- /* Run asymmetric signature verification */
- crypto_akcipher_verify(req) :
+ /* Run asymmetric signature generation */
+ crypto_akcipher_sign(req) :
/* Run asymmetric decrypt */
crypto_akcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
if (err) {
- pr_err("alg: akcipher: decrypt test failed. err %d\n", err);
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err);
goto free_all;
}
out_len = req->dst_len;
- if (out_len < vecs->m_size) {
- pr_err("alg: akcipher: decrypt test failed. "
- "Invalid output len %u\n", out_len);
+ if (out_len < m_size) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len %u\n",
+ op, out_len);
err = -EINVAL;
goto free_all;
}
/* verify that decrypted message is equal to the original msg */
- if (memchr_inv(outbuf_dec, 0, out_len - vecs->m_size) ||
- memcmp(vecs->m, outbuf_dec + out_len - vecs->m_size,
- vecs->m_size)) {
- pr_err("alg: akcipher: decrypt test failed. Invalid output\n");
+ if (memchr_inv(outbuf_dec, 0, out_len - m_size) ||
+ memcmp(m, outbuf_dec + out_len - m_size, m_size)) {
+ pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n", op);
hexdump(outbuf_dec, out_len);
err = -EINVAL;
}
free_all:
kfree(outbuf_dec);
kfree(outbuf_enc);
+free_key:
+ kfree(key);
free_req:
akcipher_request_free(req);
free_xbuf:
@@ -2405,18 +4158,21 @@
return 0;
}
-#define __VECS(tv) { .vecs = tv, .count = ARRAY_SIZE(tv) }
+#define ____VECS(tv) .vecs = tv, .count = ARRAY_SIZE(tv)
+#define __VECS(tv) { ____VECS(tv) }
/* Please keep this list sorted by algorithm name. */
static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
{
.alg = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "adiantum(xchacha12-generic,aes-generic,nhpoly1305-generic)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha12_aes_tv_template)
},
}, {
.alg = "adiantum(xchacha20,aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "adiantum(xchacha20-generic,aes-generic,nhpoly1305-generic)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha20_aes_tv_template)
@@ -2425,28 +4181,7 @@
.alg = "aegis128",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(aegis128_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(aegis128_dec_tv_template),
- }
- }
- }, {
- .alg = "aegis128l",
- .test = alg_test_aead,
- .suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(aegis128l_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(aegis128l_dec_tv_template),
- }
- }
- }, {
- .alg = "aegis256",
- .test = alg_test_aead,
- .suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(aegis256_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(aegis256_dec_tv_template),
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(aegis128_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "ansi_cprng",
@@ -2458,36 +4193,27 @@
.alg = "authenc(hmac(md5),ecb(cipher_null))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_md5_ecb_cipher_null_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(hmac_md5_ecb_cipher_null_dec_tv_template)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_md5_ecb_cipher_null_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha1_aes_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des3_ede_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),ctr(aes))",
@@ -2497,10 +4223,7 @@
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),ecb(cipher_null))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha1_ecb_cipher_null_enc_tv_temp),
- .dec = __VECS(hmac_sha1_ecb_cipher_null_dec_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_ecb_cipher_null_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
@@ -2510,44 +4233,34 @@
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des3_ede))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des3_ede_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des3_ede_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),ctr(aes))",
@@ -2561,18 +4274,14 @@
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des3_ede))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des3_ede_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),ctr(aes))",
@@ -2587,26 +4296,20 @@
.fips_allowed = 1,
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha512_aes_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des3_ede))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des3_ede_cbc_enc_tv_temp)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
}
}, {
.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),ctr(aes))",
@@ -2726,11 +4429,23 @@
.test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1,
}, {
+ /* Same as cbc(sm4) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "cbc(psm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
.alg = "cbc(serpent)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(serpent_cbc_tv_template)
},
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cbc(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_cbc_tv_template)
+ }
}, {
.alg = "cbc(twofish)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
@@ -2738,6 +4453,15 @@
.cipher = __VECS(tf_cbc_tv_template)
},
}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+ .alg = "cbc-paes-s390",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_cbc_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif
.alg = "cbcmac(aes)",
.fips_allowed = 1,
.test = alg_test_hash,
@@ -2746,12 +4470,13 @@
}
}, {
.alg = "ccm(aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
.aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(aes_ccm_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(aes_ccm_dec_tv_template)
+ ____VECS(aes_ccm_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
}
}
}, {
@@ -2761,6 +4486,12 @@
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(aes_cfb_tv_template)
},
+ }, {
+ .alg = "cfb(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_cfb_tv_template)
+ }
}, {
.alg = "chacha20",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
@@ -2787,6 +4518,7 @@
}, {
.alg = "crc32",
.test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
.hash = __VECS(crc32_tv_template)
}
@@ -2856,10 +4588,23 @@
.test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1,
}, {
+
+ /* Same as ctr(sm4) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "ctr(psm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
.alg = "ctr(serpent)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(serpent_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ctr(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ctr_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "ctr(twofish)",
@@ -2868,11 +4613,28 @@
.cipher = __VECS(tf_ctr_tv_template)
}
}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+ .alg = "ctr-paes-s390",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif
.alg = "cts(cbc(aes))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(cts_mode_tv_template)
}
+ }, {
+ /* Same as cts(cbc((aes)) except the key is stored in
+ * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+ */
+ .alg = "cts(cbc(paes))",
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
}, {
.alg = "curve25519",
.test = alg_test_kpp,
@@ -3035,6 +4797,7 @@
}
}, {
.alg = "ecb(arc4)",
+ .generic_driver = "ecb(arc4)-generic",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(arc4_tv_template)
@@ -3151,6 +4914,15 @@
.cipher = __VECS(xtea_tv_template)
}
}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+ .alg = "ecb-paes-s390",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif
.alg = "ecdh",
.test = alg_test_kpp,
.fips_allowed = 1,
@@ -3158,14 +4930,32 @@
.kpp = __VECS(ecdh_tv_template)
}
}, {
- .alg = "gcm(aes)",
+ .alg = "ecrdsa",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(aes_gcm_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(aes_gcm_dec_tv_template)
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "gcm(aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
+ .test = alg_test_aead,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .aead = __VECS(aes_gcm_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "ghash",
@@ -3256,6 +5046,24 @@
.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha512_tv_template)
}
}, {
+ .alg = "hmac(sm3)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_sm3_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(streebog256)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_streebog256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "hmac(streebog512)",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(hmac_streebog512_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
.alg = "jitterentropy_rng",
.fips_allowed = 1,
.test = alg_test_null,
@@ -3268,30 +5076,35 @@
}
}, {
.alg = "lrw(aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(aes-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(aes_lrw_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "lrw(camellia)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(camellia-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(camellia_lrw_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "lrw(cast6)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(cast6-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(cast6_lrw_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "lrw(serpent)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(serpent-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(serpent_lrw_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "lrw(twofish)",
+ .generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(twofish-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(tf_lrw_tv_template)
@@ -3327,6 +5140,16 @@
}
}
}, {
+ .alg = "lzo-rle",
+ .test = alg_test_comp,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .comp = {
+ .comp = __VECS(lzorle_comp_tv_template),
+ .decomp = __VECS(lzorle_decomp_tv_template)
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
.alg = "md4",
.test = alg_test_hash,
.suite = {
@@ -3343,24 +5166,6 @@
.test = alg_test_hash,
.suite = {
.hash = __VECS(michael_mic_tv_template)
- }
- }, {
- .alg = "morus1280",
- .test = alg_test_aead,
- .suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(morus1280_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(morus1280_dec_tv_template),
- }
- }
- }, {
- .alg = "morus640",
- .test = alg_test_aead,
- .suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(morus640_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(morus640_dec_tv_template),
- }
}
}, {
.alg = "nhpoly1305",
@@ -3382,6 +5187,12 @@
.alg = "ofb(paes)",
.test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "ofb(sm4)",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ofb_tv_template)
+ }
}, {
.alg = "pcbc(fcrypt)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
@@ -3421,50 +5232,60 @@
.cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_rfc3686_tv_template)
}
}, {
+ .alg = "rfc3686(ctr(sm4))",
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(sm4_ctr_rfc3686_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
.alg = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
+ .generic_driver = "rfc4106(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
.aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4106_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4106_dec_tv_template)
+ ____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4106_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ .aad_iv = 1,
}
}
}, {
.alg = "rfc4309(ccm(aes))",
+ .generic_driver = "rfc4309(ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic)))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
.aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(aes_ccm_rfc4309_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(aes_ccm_rfc4309_dec_tv_template)
+ ____VECS(aes_ccm_rfc4309_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ .aad_iv = 1,
}
}
}, {
.alg = "rfc4543(gcm(aes))",
+ .generic_driver = "rfc4543(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
.aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4543_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4543_dec_tv_template),
+ ____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4543_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ .aad_iv = 1,
}
}
}, {
.alg = "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
- .aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(rfc7539_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(rfc7539_dec_tv_template),
- }
+ .aead = __VECS(rfc7539_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "rfc7539esp(chacha20,poly1305)",
.test = alg_test_aead,
.suite = {
.aead = {
- .enc = __VECS(rfc7539esp_enc_tv_template),
- .dec = __VECS(rfc7539esp_dec_tv_template),
+ ____VECS(rfc7539esp_tv_template),
+ .einval_allowed = 1,
+ .aad_iv = 1,
}
}
}, {
@@ -3568,10 +5389,28 @@
.hash = __VECS(sha512_tv_template)
}
}, {
+ .alg = "sm2",
+ .test = alg_test_akcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .akcipher = __VECS(sm2_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
.alg = "sm3",
.test = alg_test_hash,
.suite = {
.hash = __VECS(sm3_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "streebog256",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(streebog256_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+ .alg = "streebog512",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(streebog512_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "tgr128",
@@ -3635,6 +5474,7 @@
},
}, {
.alg = "xts(aes)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(aes-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.fips_allowed = 1,
.suite = {
@@ -3642,12 +5482,14 @@
}
}, {
.alg = "xts(camellia)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(camellia-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(camellia_xts_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "xts(cast6)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(cast6-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(cast6_xts_tv_template)
@@ -3661,17 +5503,28 @@
.fips_allowed = 1,
}, {
.alg = "xts(serpent)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(serpent-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(serpent_xts_tv_template)
}
}, {
.alg = "xts(twofish)",
+ .generic_driver = "xts(ecb(twofish-generic))",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
.cipher = __VECS(tf_xts_tv_template)
}
}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+ .alg = "xts-paes-s390",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_skcipher,
+ .suite = {
+ .cipher = __VECS(aes_xts_tv_template)
+ }
+ }, {
+#endif
.alg = "xts4096(paes)",
.test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1,
@@ -3679,6 +5532,13 @@
.alg = "xts512(paes)",
.test = alg_test_null,
.fips_allowed = 1,
+ }, {
+ .alg = "xxhash64",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = __VECS(xxhash64_tv_template)
+ }
}, {
.alg = "zlib-deflate",
.test = alg_test_comp,
@@ -3702,17 +5562,9 @@
}
};
-static bool alg_test_descs_checked;
-
-static void alg_test_descs_check_order(void)
+static void alg_check_test_descs_order(void)
{
int i;
-
- /* only check once */
- if (alg_test_descs_checked)
- return;
-
- alg_test_descs_checked = true;
for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(alg_test_descs); i++) {
int diff = strcmp(alg_test_descs[i - 1].alg,
@@ -3729,6 +5581,29 @@
alg_test_descs[i].alg);
}
}
+}
+
+static void alg_check_testvec_configs(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++)
+ WARN_ON(!valid_testvec_config(
+ &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i]));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_hash_testvec_configs); i++)
+ WARN_ON(!valid_testvec_config(
+ &default_hash_testvec_configs[i]));
+}
+
+static void testmgr_onetime_init(void)
+{
+ alg_check_test_descs_order();
+ alg_check_testvec_configs();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+ pr_warn("alg: extra crypto tests enabled. This is intended for developer use only.\n");
+#endif
}
static int alg_find_test(const char *alg)
@@ -3767,7 +5642,7 @@
return 0;
}
- alg_test_descs_check_order();
+ DO_ONCE(testmgr_onetime_init);
if ((type & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER) {
char nalg[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
@@ -3805,8 +5680,11 @@
type, mask);
test_done:
- if (fips_enabled && rc)
- panic("%s: %s alg self test failed in fips mode!\n", driver, alg);
+ if (rc && (fips_enabled || panic_on_fail)) {
+ fips_fail_notify();
+ panic("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) failed in %s mode!\n",
+ driver, alg, fips_enabled ? "fips" : "panic_on_fail");
+ }
if (fips_enabled && !rc)
pr_info("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n", driver, alg);
--
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