hc
2024-10-12 a5969cabbb4660eab42b6ef0412cbbd1200cf14d
kernel/fs/proc/root.c
....@@ -19,150 +19,270 @@
1919 #include <linux/module.h>
2020 #include <linux/bitops.h>
2121 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
22
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
2223 #include <linux/mount.h>
2324 #include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
24
-#include <linux/parser.h>
25
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
2526 #include <linux/cred.h>
27
+#include <linux/magic.h>
28
+#include <linux/slab.h>
2629
2730 #include "internal.h"
2831
29
-static int proc_test_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
32
+struct proc_fs_context {
33
+ struct pid_namespace *pid_ns;
34
+ unsigned int mask;
35
+ enum proc_hidepid hidepid;
36
+ int gid;
37
+ enum proc_pidonly pidonly;
38
+};
39
+
40
+enum proc_param {
41
+ Opt_gid,
42
+ Opt_hidepid,
43
+ Opt_subset,
44
+};
45
+
46
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec proc_fs_parameters[] = {
47
+ fsparam_u32("gid", Opt_gid),
48
+ fsparam_string("hidepid", Opt_hidepid),
49
+ fsparam_string("subset", Opt_subset),
50
+ {}
51
+};
52
+
53
+static inline int valid_hidepid(unsigned int value)
3054 {
31
- return sb->s_fs_info == data;
55
+ return (value == HIDEPID_OFF ||
56
+ value == HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS ||
57
+ value == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE ||
58
+ value == HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE);
3259 }
3360
34
-static int proc_set_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
61
+static int proc_parse_hidepid_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
3562 {
36
- int err = set_anon_super(sb, NULL);
37
- if (!err) {
38
- struct pid_namespace *ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data;
39
- sb->s_fs_info = get_pid_ns(ns);
63
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
64
+ struct fs_parameter_spec hidepid_u32_spec = fsparam_u32("hidepid", Opt_hidepid);
65
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
66
+ int base = (unsigned long)hidepid_u32_spec.data;
67
+
68
+ if (param->type != fs_value_is_string)
69
+ return invalf(fc, "proc: unexpected type of hidepid value\n");
70
+
71
+ if (!kstrtouint(param->string, base, &result.uint_32)) {
72
+ if (!valid_hidepid(result.uint_32))
73
+ return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid - %s\n", param->string);
74
+ ctx->hidepid = result.uint_32;
75
+ return 0;
4076 }
41
- return err;
77
+
78
+ if (!strcmp(param->string, "off"))
79
+ ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_OFF;
80
+ else if (!strcmp(param->string, "noaccess"))
81
+ ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS;
82
+ else if (!strcmp(param->string, "invisible"))
83
+ ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_INVISIBLE;
84
+ else if (!strcmp(param->string, "ptraceable"))
85
+ ctx->hidepid = HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACEABLE;
86
+ else
87
+ return invalf(fc, "proc: unknown value of hidepid - %s\n", param->string);
88
+
89
+ return 0;
4290 }
4391
44
-enum {
45
- Opt_gid, Opt_hidepid, Opt_err,
46
-};
47
-
48
-static const match_table_t tokens = {
49
- {Opt_hidepid, "hidepid=%u"},
50
- {Opt_gid, "gid=%u"},
51
- {Opt_err, NULL},
52
-};
53
-
54
-static int proc_parse_options(char *options, struct pid_namespace *pid)
92
+static int proc_parse_subset_param(struct fs_context *fc, char *value)
5593 {
56
- char *p;
57
- substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
58
- int option;
94
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
5995
60
- if (!options)
61
- return 1;
96
+ while (value) {
97
+ char *ptr = strchr(value, ',');
6298
63
- while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
64
- int token;
65
- if (!*p)
66
- continue;
99
+ if (ptr != NULL)
100
+ *ptr++ = '\0';
67101
68
- args[0].to = args[0].from = NULL;
69
- token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
70
- switch (token) {
71
- case Opt_gid:
72
- if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
73
- return 0;
74
- pid->pid_gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), option);
75
- break;
76
- case Opt_hidepid:
77
- if (match_int(&args[0], &option))
78
- return 0;
79
- if (option < HIDEPID_OFF ||
80
- option > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
81
- pr_err("proc: hidepid value must be between 0 and 2.\n");
82
- return 0;
102
+ if (*value != '\0') {
103
+ if (!strcmp(value, "pid")) {
104
+ ctx->pidonly = PROC_PIDONLY_ON;
105
+ } else {
106
+ return invalf(fc, "proc: unsupported subset option - %s\n", value);
83107 }
84
- pid->hide_pid = option;
85
- break;
86
- default:
87
- pr_err("proc: unrecognized mount option \"%s\" "
88
- "or missing value\n", p);
89
- return 0;
90108 }
109
+ value = ptr;
91110 }
92111
93
- return 1;
112
+ return 0;
94113 }
95114
96
-int proc_remount(struct super_block *sb, int *flags, char *data)
115
+static int proc_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
97116 {
98
- struct pid_namespace *pid = sb->s_fs_info;
117
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
118
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
119
+ int opt;
120
+
121
+ opt = fs_parse(fc, proc_fs_parameters, param, &result);
122
+ if (opt < 0)
123
+ return opt;
124
+
125
+ switch (opt) {
126
+ case Opt_gid:
127
+ ctx->gid = result.uint_32;
128
+ break;
129
+
130
+ case Opt_hidepid:
131
+ if (proc_parse_hidepid_param(fc, param))
132
+ return -EINVAL;
133
+ break;
134
+
135
+ case Opt_subset:
136
+ if (proc_parse_subset_param(fc, param->string) < 0)
137
+ return -EINVAL;
138
+ break;
139
+
140
+ default:
141
+ return -EINVAL;
142
+ }
143
+
144
+ ctx->mask |= 1 << opt;
145
+ return 0;
146
+}
147
+
148
+static void proc_apply_options(struct proc_fs_info *fs_info,
149
+ struct fs_context *fc,
150
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns)
151
+{
152
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
153
+
154
+ if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_gid))
155
+ fs_info->pid_gid = make_kgid(user_ns, ctx->gid);
156
+ if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_hidepid))
157
+ fs_info->hide_pid = ctx->hidepid;
158
+ if (ctx->mask & (1 << Opt_subset))
159
+ fs_info->pidonly = ctx->pidonly;
160
+}
161
+
162
+static int proc_fill_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
163
+{
164
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
165
+ struct inode *root_inode;
166
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info;
167
+ int ret;
168
+
169
+ fs_info = kzalloc(sizeof(*fs_info), GFP_KERNEL);
170
+ if (!fs_info)
171
+ return -ENOMEM;
172
+
173
+ fs_info->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
174
+ proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns());
175
+
176
+ /* User space would break if executables or devices appear on proc */
177
+ s->s_iflags |= SB_I_USERNS_VISIBLE | SB_I_NOEXEC | SB_I_NODEV;
178
+ s->s_flags |= SB_NODIRATIME | SB_NOSUID | SB_NOEXEC;
179
+ s->s_blocksize = 1024;
180
+ s->s_blocksize_bits = 10;
181
+ s->s_magic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC;
182
+ s->s_op = &proc_sops;
183
+ s->s_time_gran = 1;
184
+ s->s_fs_info = fs_info;
185
+
186
+ /*
187
+ * procfs isn't actually a stacking filesystem; however, there is
188
+ * too much magic going on inside it to permit stacking things on
189
+ * top of it
190
+ */
191
+ s->s_stack_depth = FILESYSTEM_MAX_STACK_DEPTH;
192
+
193
+ /* procfs dentries and inodes don't require IO to create */
194
+ s->s_shrink.seeks = 0;
195
+
196
+ pde_get(&proc_root);
197
+ root_inode = proc_get_inode(s, &proc_root);
198
+ if (!root_inode) {
199
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: get root inode failed\n");
200
+ return -ENOMEM;
201
+ }
202
+
203
+ s->s_root = d_make_root(root_inode);
204
+ if (!s->s_root) {
205
+ pr_err("proc_fill_super: allocate dentry failed\n");
206
+ return -ENOMEM;
207
+ }
208
+
209
+ ret = proc_setup_self(s);
210
+ if (ret) {
211
+ return ret;
212
+ }
213
+ return proc_setup_thread_self(s);
214
+}
215
+
216
+static int proc_reconfigure(struct fs_context *fc)
217
+{
218
+ struct super_block *sb = fc->root->d_sb;
219
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
99220
100221 sync_filesystem(sb);
101
- return !proc_parse_options(data, pid);
222
+
223
+ proc_apply_options(fs_info, fc, current_user_ns());
224
+ return 0;
102225 }
103226
104
-static struct dentry *proc_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
105
- int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
227
+static int proc_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
106228 {
107
- int err;
108
- struct super_block *sb;
109
- struct pid_namespace *ns;
110
- char *options;
229
+ return get_tree_nodev(fc, proc_fill_super);
230
+}
111231
112
- if (flags & SB_KERNMOUNT) {
113
- ns = (struct pid_namespace *)data;
114
- options = NULL;
115
- } else {
116
- ns = task_active_pid_ns(current);
117
- options = data;
232
+static void proc_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
233
+{
234
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx = fc->fs_private;
118235
119
- /* Does the mounter have privilege over the pid namespace? */
120
- if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
121
- return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
122
- }
236
+ put_pid_ns(ctx->pid_ns);
237
+ kfree(ctx);
238
+}
123239
124
- sb = sget(fs_type, proc_test_super, proc_set_super, flags, ns);
125
- if (IS_ERR(sb))
126
- return ERR_CAST(sb);
240
+static const struct fs_context_operations proc_fs_context_ops = {
241
+ .free = proc_fs_context_free,
242
+ .parse_param = proc_parse_param,
243
+ .get_tree = proc_get_tree,
244
+ .reconfigure = proc_reconfigure,
245
+};
127246
128
- if (!proc_parse_options(options, ns)) {
129
- deactivate_locked_super(sb);
130
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
131
- }
247
+static int proc_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
248
+{
249
+ struct proc_fs_context *ctx;
132250
133
- if (!sb->s_root) {
134
- err = proc_fill_super(sb);
135
- if (err) {
136
- deactivate_locked_super(sb);
137
- return ERR_PTR(err);
138
- }
251
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct proc_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
252
+ if (!ctx)
253
+ return -ENOMEM;
139254
140
- sb->s_flags |= MS_ACTIVE;
141
- /* User space would break if executables appear on proc */
142
- sb->s_iflags |= SB_I_NOEXEC;
143
- }
144
-
145
- return dget(sb->s_root);
255
+ ctx->pid_ns = get_pid_ns(task_active_pid_ns(current));
256
+ put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
257
+ fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(ctx->pid_ns->user_ns);
258
+ fc->fs_private = ctx;
259
+ fc->ops = &proc_fs_context_ops;
260
+ return 0;
146261 }
147262
148263 static void proc_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
149264 {
150
- struct pid_namespace *ns;
265
+ struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(sb);
151266
152
- ns = (struct pid_namespace *)sb->s_fs_info;
153
- if (ns->proc_self)
154
- dput(ns->proc_self);
155
- if (ns->proc_thread_self)
156
- dput(ns->proc_thread_self);
267
+ if (!fs_info) {
268
+ kill_anon_super(sb);
269
+ return;
270
+ }
271
+
272
+ dput(fs_info->proc_self);
273
+ dput(fs_info->proc_thread_self);
274
+
157275 kill_anon_super(sb);
158
- put_pid_ns(ns);
276
+ put_pid_ns(fs_info->pid_ns);
277
+ kfree(fs_info);
159278 }
160279
161280 static struct file_system_type proc_fs_type = {
162
- .name = "proc",
163
- .mount = proc_mount,
164
- .kill_sb = proc_kill_sb,
165
- .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
281
+ .name = "proc",
282
+ .init_fs_context = proc_init_fs_context,
283
+ .parameters = proc_fs_parameters,
284
+ .kill_sb = proc_kill_sb,
285
+ .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT | FS_DISALLOW_NOTIFY_PERM,
166286 };
167287
168288 void __init proc_root_init(void)
....@@ -174,7 +294,6 @@
174294 proc_symlink("mounts", NULL, "self/mounts");
175295
176296 proc_net_init();
177
- proc_uid_init();
178297 proc_mkdir("fs", NULL);
179298 proc_mkdir("driver", NULL);
180299 proc_create_mount_point("fs/nfsd"); /* somewhere for the nfsd filesystem to be mounted */
....@@ -199,9 +318,9 @@
199318
200319 static struct dentry *proc_root_lookup(struct inode * dir, struct dentry * dentry, unsigned int flags)
201320 {
202
- if (!proc_pid_lookup(dir, dentry, flags))
321
+ if (!proc_pid_lookup(dentry, flags))
203322 return NULL;
204
-
323
+
205324 return proc_lookup(dir, dentry, flags);
206325 }
207326
....@@ -246,25 +365,8 @@
246365 .nlink = 2,
247366 .refcnt = REFCOUNT_INIT(1),
248367 .proc_iops = &proc_root_inode_operations,
249
- .proc_fops = &proc_root_operations,
368
+ .proc_dir_ops = &proc_root_operations,
250369 .parent = &proc_root,
251370 .subdir = RB_ROOT,
252371 .name = "/proc",
253372 };
254
-
255
-int pid_ns_prepare_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
256
-{
257
- struct vfsmount *mnt;
258
-
259
- mnt = kern_mount_data(&proc_fs_type, ns);
260
- if (IS_ERR(mnt))
261
- return PTR_ERR(mnt);
262
-
263
- ns->proc_mnt = mnt;
264
- return 0;
265
-}
266
-
267
-void pid_ns_release_proc(struct pid_namespace *ns)
268
-{
269
- kern_unmount(ns->proc_mnt);
270
-}