~hc/RK356X_SDK_RELEASE.git

..	..	@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
60	60	select ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T if X86_32
61	61	select ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_INIT
62	62	select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI
	63	+ select ARCH_HAS_CPU_FINALIZE_INIT
63	64	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL
64	65	select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE if !X86_PAE
65	66	select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED
..	..	@@ -1336,17 +1337,16 @@
1336	1337	If you select this option, microcode patch loading support for AMD
1337	1338	processors will be enabled.
1338	1339
1339		-config MICROCODE_OLD_INTERFACE
1340		- bool "Ancient loading interface (DEPRECATED)"
	1340	+config MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
	1341	+ bool "Late microcode loading (DANGEROUS)"
1341	1342	default n
1342	1343	depends on MICROCODE
1343	1344	help
1344		- DO NOT USE THIS! This is the ancient /dev/cpu/microcode interface
1345		- which was used by userspace tools like iucode_tool and microcode.ctl.
1346		- It is inadequate because it runs too late to be able to properly
1347		- load microcode on a machine and it needs special tools. Instead, you
1348		- should've switched to the early loading method with the initrd or
1349		- builtin microcode by now: Documentation/x86/microcode.rst
	1345	+ Loading microcode late, when the system is up and executing instructions
	1346	+ is a tricky business and should be avoided if possible. Just the sequence
	1347	+ of synchronizing all cores and SMT threads is one fragile dance which does
	1348	+ not guarantee that cores might not softlock after the loading. Therefore,
	1349	+ use this at your own risk. Late loading taints the kernel too.
1350	1350
1351	1351	config X86_MSR
1352	1352	tristate "/dev/cpu/*/msr - Model-specific register support"
..	..	@@ -2483,6 +2483,13 @@
2483	2483	This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
2484	2484	performance.
2485	2485
	2486	+config CPU_SRSO
	2487	+ bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
	2488	+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
	2489	+ default y
	2490	+ help
	2491	+ Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
	2492	+
2486	2493	config SLS
2487	2494	bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
2488	2495	depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
..	..	@@ -2492,6 +2499,25 @@
2492	2499	against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
2493	2500	larger.
2494	2501
	2502	+config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
	2503	+ bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
	2504	+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
	2505	+ default n
	2506	+ help
	2507	+ Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
	2508	+ unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
	2509	+ vector registers.
	2510	+
	2511	+ This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
	2512	+ command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
	2513	+ AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
	2514	+ the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will
	2515	+ break with this option set.
	2516	+
	2517	+ Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect.
	2518	+
	2519	+ If in doubt, say N.
	2520	+
2495	2521	endif
2496	2522
2497	2523	config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES