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2024-05-10 10ebd8556b7990499c896a550e3d416b444211e6

 kernel/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
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@@ -15,11 +15,14 @@
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 #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT		0
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 #define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER		1
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 #define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL	2
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+#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES		3
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 /* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
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-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC	(1UL << 0)
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-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG		(1UL << 1)
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-#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW	(1UL << 2)
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+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC		(1UL << 0)
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+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG			(1UL << 1)
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+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW		(1UL << 2)
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+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER	(1UL << 3)
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+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH		(1UL << 4)
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26
 
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 /*
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  * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
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@@ -35,6 +38,7 @@
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 #define SECCOMP_RET_KILL	 SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD
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 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP	 0x00030000U /* disallow and force a SIGSYS */
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 #define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO	 0x00050000U /* returns an errno */
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+#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF	 0x7fc00000U /* notifies userspace */
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 #define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE	 0x7ff00000U /* pass to a tracer or disallow */
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 #define SECCOMP_RET_LOG		 0x7ffc0000U /* allow after logging */
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 #define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	 0x7fff0000U /* allow */
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@@ -60,4 +64,87 @@
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 	__u64 args[6];
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 };
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+struct seccomp_notif_sizes {
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+	__u16 seccomp_notif;
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+	__u16 seccomp_notif_resp;
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+	__u16 seccomp_data;
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+};
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+
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+struct seccomp_notif {
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+	__u64 id;
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+	__u32 pid;
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+	__u32 flags;
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+	struct seccomp_data data;
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+};
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+
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+/*
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+ * Valid flags for struct seccomp_notif_resp
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+ *
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+ * Note, the SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE flag must be used with caution!
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+ * If set by the process supervising the syscalls of another process the
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+ * syscall will continue. This is problematic because of an inherent TOCTOU.
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+ * An attacker can exploit the time while the supervised process is waiting on
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+ * a response from the supervising process to rewrite syscall arguments which
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+ * are passed as pointers of the intercepted syscall.
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+ * It should be absolutely clear that this means that the seccomp notifier
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+ * _cannot_ be used to implement a security policy! It should only ever be used
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+ * in scenarios where a more privileged process supervises the syscalls of a
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+ * lesser privileged process to get around kernel-enforced security
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+ * restrictions when the privileged process deems this safe. In other words,
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+ * in order to continue a syscall the supervising process should be sure that
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+ * another security mechanism or the kernel itself will sufficiently block
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+ * syscalls if arguments are rewritten to something unsafe.
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+ *
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+ * Similar precautions should be applied when stacking SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
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+ * or SECCOMP_RET_TRACE. For SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filters acting on the
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+ * same syscall, the most recently added filter takes precedence. This means
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+ * that the new SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF filter can override any
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+ * SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND from earlier filters, essentially allowing all
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+ * such filtered syscalls to be executed by sending the response
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+ * SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE. Note that SECCOMP_RET_TRACE can equally
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+ * be overriden by SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE.
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+ */
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+#define SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE (1UL << 0)
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+
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+struct seccomp_notif_resp {
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+	__u64 id;
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+	__s64 val;
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+	__s32 error;
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+	__u32 flags;
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+};
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+
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+/* valid flags for seccomp_notif_addfd */
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+#define SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD	(1UL << 0) /* Specify remote fd */
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+
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+/**
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+ * struct seccomp_notif_addfd
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+ * @id: The ID of the seccomp notification
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+ * @flags: SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_*
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+ * @srcfd: The local fd number
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+ * @newfd: Optional remote FD number if SETFD option is set, otherwise 0.
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+ * @newfd_flags: The O_* flags the remote FD should have applied
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+ */
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+struct seccomp_notif_addfd {
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+	__u64 id;
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+	__u32 flags;
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+	__u32 srcfd;
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+	__u32 newfd;
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+	__u32 newfd_flags;
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+};
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+
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+#define SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC		'!'
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+#define SECCOMP_IO(nr)			_IO(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr)
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+#define SECCOMP_IOR(nr, type)		_IOR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
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+#define SECCOMP_IOW(nr, type)		_IOW(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
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+#define SECCOMP_IOWR(nr, type)		_IOWR(SECCOMP_IOC_MAGIC, nr, type)
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+
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+/* Flags for seccomp notification fd ioctl. */
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+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV	SECCOMP_IOWR(0, struct seccomp_notif)
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+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND	SECCOMP_IOWR(1,	\
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+						struct seccomp_notif_resp)
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+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID	SECCOMP_IOW(2, __u64)
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+/* On success, the return value is the remote process's added fd number */
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+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD	SECCOMP_IOW(3, \
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+						struct seccomp_notif_addfd)
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+
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 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_SECCOMP_H */