forked from ~ljy/RK356X_SDK_RELEASE

blame | history | patch | commit | commitdiff
hc
2024-02-20 102a0743326a03cd1a1202ceda21e175b7d3575c 
 kernel/block/blk-crypto.c
....@@ -9,11 +9,12 @@
99 
1010 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "blk-crypto: " fmt
1111 
12
-#include <linux/blk-crypto.h>
12
+#include <linux/bio.h>
1313 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
1414 #include <linux/keyslot-manager.h>
15
-#include <linux/random.h>
16
-#include <linux/siphash.h>
15
+#include <linux/module.h>
16
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
17
+#include <linux/slab.h>
1718 
1819 #include "blk-crypto-internal.h"
1920 
....@@ -35,139 +36,273 @@
3536 	},
3637 };
3738 
38
-/* Check that all I/O segments are data unit aligned */
39
-static int bio_crypt_check_alignment(struct bio *bio)
39
+/*
40
+ * This number needs to be at least (the number of threads doing IO
41
+ * concurrently) * (maximum recursive depth of a bio), so that we don't
42
+ * deadlock on crypt_ctx allocations. The default is chosen to be the same
43
+ * as the default number of post read contexts in both EXT4 and F2FS.
44
+ */
45
+static int num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs = 128;
46
+
47
+module_param(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs, int, 0444);
48
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
49
+		"Number of bio crypto contexts to preallocate");
50
+
51
+static struct kmem_cache *bio_crypt_ctx_cache;
52
+static mempool_t *bio_crypt_ctx_pool;
53
+
54
+static int __init bio_crypt_ctx_init(void)
55
+{
56
+	size_t i;
57
+
58
+	bio_crypt_ctx_cache = KMEM_CACHE(bio_crypt_ctx, 0);
59
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_cache)
60
+		goto out_no_mem;
61
+
62
+	bio_crypt_ctx_pool = mempool_create_slab_pool(num_prealloc_crypt_ctxs,
63
+						      bio_crypt_ctx_cache);
64
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_pool)
65
+		goto out_no_mem;
66
+
67
+	/* This is assumed in various places. */
68
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_INVALID != 0);
69
+
70
+	/* Sanity check that no algorithm exceeds the defined limits. */
71
+	for (i = 0; i < BLK_ENCRYPTION_MODE_MAX; i++) {
72
+		BUG_ON(blk_crypto_modes[i].keysize > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_KEY_SIZE);
73
+		BUG_ON(blk_crypto_modes[i].ivsize > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE);
74
+	}
75
+
76
+	return 0;
77
+out_no_mem:
78
+	panic("Failed to allocate mem for bio crypt ctxs\n");
79
+}
80
+subsys_initcall(bio_crypt_ctx_init);
81
+
82
+void bio_crypt_set_ctx(struct bio *bio, const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
83
+		       const u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE], gfp_t gfp_mask)
84
+{
85
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc;
86
+
87
+	/*
88
+	 * The caller must use a gfp_mask that contains __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM so
89
+	 * that the mempool_alloc() can't fail.
90
+	 */
91
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!(gfp_mask & __GFP_DIRECT_RECLAIM));
92
+
93
+	bc = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
94
+
95
+	bc->bc_key = key;
96
+	memcpy(bc->bc_dun, dun, sizeof(bc->bc_dun));
97
+
98
+	bio->bi_crypt_context = bc;
99
+}
100
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(bio_crypt_set_ctx);
101
+
102
+void __bio_crypt_free_ctx(struct bio *bio)
103
+{
104
+	mempool_free(bio->bi_crypt_context, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
105
+	bio->bi_crypt_context = NULL;
106
+}
107
+
108
+int __bio_crypt_clone(struct bio *dst, struct bio *src, gfp_t gfp_mask)
109
+{
110
+	dst->bi_crypt_context = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
111
+	if (!dst->bi_crypt_context)
112
+		return -ENOMEM;
113
+	*dst->bi_crypt_context = *src->bi_crypt_context;
114
+	return 0;
115
+}
116
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__bio_crypt_clone);
117
+
118
+/* Increments @dun by @inc, treating @dun as a multi-limb integer. */
119
+void bio_crypt_dun_increment(u64 dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE],
120
+			     unsigned int inc)
121
+{
122
+	int i;
123
+
124
+	for (i = 0; inc && i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) {
125
+		dun[i] += inc;
126
+		/*
127
+		 * If the addition in this limb overflowed, then we need to
128
+		 * carry 1 into the next limb. Else the carry is 0.
129
+		 */
130
+		if (dun[i] < inc)
131
+			inc = 1;
132
+		else
133
+			inc = 0;
134
+	}
135
+}
136
+
137
+void __bio_crypt_advance(struct bio *bio, unsigned int bytes)
138
+{
139
+	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
140
+
141
+	bio_crypt_dun_increment(bc->bc_dun,
142
+				bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits);
143
+}
144
+
145
+/*
146
+ * Returns true if @bc->bc_dun plus @bytes converted to data units is equal to
147
+ * @next_dun, treating the DUNs as multi-limb integers.
148
+ */
149
+bool bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(const struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc,
150
+				 unsigned int bytes,
151
+				 const u64 next_dun[BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE])
152
+{
153
+	int i;
154
+	unsigned int carry = bytes >> bc->bc_key->data_unit_size_bits;
155
+
156
+	for (i = 0; i < BLK_CRYPTO_DUN_ARRAY_SIZE; i++) {
157
+		if (bc->bc_dun[i] + carry != next_dun[i])
158
+			return false;
159
+		/*
160
+		 * If the addition in this limb overflowed, then we need to
161
+		 * carry 1 into the next limb. Else the carry is 0.
162
+		 */
163
+		if ((bc->bc_dun[i] + carry) < carry)
164
+			carry = 1;
165
+		else
166
+			carry = 0;
167
+	}
168
+
169
+	/* If the DUN wrapped through 0, don't treat it as contiguous. */
170
+	return carry == 0;
171
+}
172
+
173
+/*
174
+ * Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible - i.e. that
175
+ * they are mergeable except for data_unit_num continuity.
176
+ */
177
+static bool bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1,
178
+				     struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2)
179
+{
180
+	if (!bc1)
181
+		return !bc2;
182
+
183
+	return bc2 && bc1->bc_key == bc2->bc_key;
184
+}
185
+
186
+bool bio_crypt_rq_ctx_compatible(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio)
187
+{
188
+	return bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(rq->crypt_ctx, bio->bi_crypt_context);
189
+}
190
+
191
+/*
192
+ * Checks that two bio crypt contexts are compatible, and also
193
+ * that their data_unit_nums are continuous (and can hence be merged)
194
+ * in the order @bc1 followed by @bc2.
195
+ */
196
+bool bio_crypt_ctx_mergeable(struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc1, unsigned int bc1_bytes,
197
+			     struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc2)
198
+{
199
+	if (!bio_crypt_ctx_compatible(bc1, bc2))
200
+		return false;
201
+
202
+	return !bc1 || bio_crypt_dun_is_contiguous(bc1, bc1_bytes, bc2->bc_dun);
203
+}
204
+
205
+/* Check that all I/O segments are data unit aligned. */
206
+static bool bio_crypt_check_alignment(struct bio *bio)
40207 {
41208 	const unsigned int data_unit_size =
42
-				bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_key->data_unit_size;
209
+		bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size;
43210 	struct bvec_iter iter;
44211 	struct bio_vec bv;
45212 
46213 	bio_for_each_segment(bv, bio, iter) {
47214 		if (!IS_ALIGNED(bv.bv_len | bv.bv_offset, data_unit_size))
48
-			return -EIO;
215
+			return false;
49216 	}
50
-	return 0;
217
+
218
+	return true;
219
+}
220
+
221
+blk_status_t __blk_crypto_rq_get_keyslot(struct request *rq)
222
+{
223
+	return blk_ksm_get_slot_for_key(rq->q->ksm, rq->crypt_ctx->bc_key,
224
+					&rq->crypt_keyslot);
225
+}
226
+
227
+void __blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(struct request *rq)
228
+{
229
+	blk_ksm_put_slot(rq->crypt_keyslot);
230
+	rq->crypt_keyslot = NULL;
231
+}
232
+
233
+void __blk_crypto_free_request(struct request *rq)
234
+{
235
+	/* The keyslot, if one was needed, should have been released earlier. */
236
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(rq->crypt_keyslot))
237
+		__blk_crypto_rq_put_keyslot(rq);
238
+
239
+	mempool_free(rq->crypt_ctx, bio_crypt_ctx_pool);
240
+	rq->crypt_ctx = NULL;
51241 }
52242 
53243 /**
54
- * blk_crypto_submit_bio - handle submitting bio for inline encryption
244
+ * __blk_crypto_bio_prep - Prepare bio for inline encryption
55245  *
56246  * @bio_ptr: pointer to original bio pointer
57247  *
58
- * If the bio doesn't have inline encryption enabled or the submitter already
59
- * specified a keyslot for the target device, do nothing.  Else, a raw key must
60
- * have been provided, so acquire a device keyslot for it if supported.  Else,
61
- * use the crypto API fallback.
248
+ * If the bio crypt context provided for the bio is supported by the underlying
249
+ * device's inline encryption hardware, do nothing.
62250  *
63
- * When the crypto API fallback is used for encryption, blk-crypto may choose to
64
- * split the bio into 2 - the first one that will continue to be processed and
65
- * the second one that will be resubmitted via generic_make_request.
66
- * A bounce bio will be allocated to encrypt the contents of the aforementioned
67
- * "first one", and *bio_ptr will be updated to this bounce bio.
251
+ * Otherwise, try to perform en/decryption for this bio by falling back to the
252
+ * kernel crypto API. When the crypto API fallback is used for encryption,
253
+ * blk-crypto may choose to split the bio into 2 - the first one that will
254
+ * continue to be processed and the second one that will be resubmitted via
255
+ * submit_bio_noacct. A bounce bio will be allocated to encrypt the contents
256
+ * of the aforementioned "first one", and *bio_ptr will be updated to this
257
+ * bounce bio.
68258  *
69
- * Return: 0 if bio submission should continue; nonzero if bio_endio() was
70
- *	   already called so bio submission should abort.
259
+ * Caller must ensure bio has bio_crypt_ctx.
260
+ *
261
+ * Return: true on success; false on error (and bio->bi_status will be set
262
+ *	   appropriately, and bio_endio() will have been called so bio
263
+ *	   submission should abort).
71264  */
72
-int blk_crypto_submit_bio(struct bio **bio_ptr)
265
+bool __blk_crypto_bio_prep(struct bio **bio_ptr)
73266 {
74267 	struct bio *bio = *bio_ptr;
75
-	struct request_queue *q;
76
-	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
77
-	int err;
268
+	const struct blk_crypto_key *bc_key = bio->bi_crypt_context->bc_key;
78269 
79
-	if (!bc || !bio_has_data(bio))
80
-		return 0;
270
+	/* Error if bio has no data. */
271
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!bio_has_data(bio))) {
272
+		bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
273
+		goto fail;
274
+	}
275
+
276
+	if (!bio_crypt_check_alignment(bio)) {
277
+		bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
278
+		goto fail;
279
+	}
81280 
82281 	/*
83
-	 * When a read bio is marked for fallback decryption, its bi_iter is
84
-	 * saved so that when we decrypt the bio later, we know what part of it
85
-	 * was marked for fallback decryption (when the bio is passed down after
86
-	 * blk_crypto_submit bio, it may be split or advanced so we cannot rely
87
-	 * on the bi_iter while decrypting in blk_crypto_endio)
282
+	 * Success if device supports the encryption context, or if we succeeded
283
+	 * in falling back to the crypto API.
88284 	 */
89
-	if (bio_crypt_fallback_crypted(bc))
90
-		return 0;
91
-
92
-	err = bio_crypt_check_alignment(bio);
93
-	if (err) {
94
-		bio->bi_status = BLK_STS_IOERR;
95
-		goto out;
96
-	}
97
-
98
-	q = bio->bi_disk->queue;
99
-
100
-	if (bc->bc_ksm) {
101
-		/* Key already programmed into device? */
102
-		if (q->ksm == bc->bc_ksm)
103
-			return 0;
104
-
105
-		/* Nope, release the existing keyslot. */
106
-		bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(bc);
107
-	}
108
-
109
-	/* Get device keyslot if supported */
110
-	if (keyslot_manager_crypto_mode_supported(q->ksm,
111
-				bc->bc_key->crypto_mode,
112
-				blk_crypto_key_dun_bytes(bc->bc_key),
113
-				bc->bc_key->data_unit_size,
114
-				bc->bc_key->is_hw_wrapped)) {
115
-		err = bio_crypt_ctx_acquire_keyslot(bc, q->ksm);
116
-		if (!err)
117
-			return 0;
118
-
119
-		pr_warn_once("Failed to acquire keyslot for %s (err=%d).  Falling back to crypto API.\n",
120
-			     bio->bi_disk->disk_name, err);
121
-	}
122
-
123
-	/* Fallback to crypto API */
124
-	err = blk_crypto_fallback_submit_bio(bio_ptr);
125
-	if (err)
126
-		goto out;
127
-
128
-	return 0;
129
-out:
130
-	bio_endio(*bio_ptr);
131
-	return err;
132
-}
133
-
134
-/**
135
- * blk_crypto_endio - clean up bio w.r.t inline encryption during bio_endio
136
- *
137
- * @bio: the bio to clean up
138
- *
139
- * If blk_crypto_submit_bio decided to fallback to crypto API for this bio,
140
- * we queue the bio for decryption into a workqueue and return false,
141
- * and call bio_endio(bio) at a later time (after the bio has been decrypted).
142
- *
143
- * If the bio is not to be decrypted by the crypto API, this function releases
144
- * the reference to the keyslot that blk_crypto_submit_bio got.
145
- *
146
- * Return: true if bio_endio should continue; false otherwise (bio_endio will
147
- * be called again when bio has been decrypted).
148
- */
149
-bool blk_crypto_endio(struct bio *bio)
150
-{
151
-	struct bio_crypt_ctx *bc = bio->bi_crypt_context;
152
-
153
-	if (!bc)
285
+	if (blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(bio->bi_disk->queue->ksm,
286
+					 &bc_key->crypto_cfg))
154287 		return true;
155288 
156
-	if (bio_crypt_fallback_crypted(bc)) {
157
-		/*
158
-		 * The only bios who's crypto is handled by the blk-crypto
159
-		 * fallback when they reach here are those with
160
-		 * bio_data_dir(bio) == READ, since WRITE bios that are
161
-		 * encrypted by the crypto API fallback are handled by
162
-		 * blk_crypto_encrypt_endio().
163
-		 */
164
-		return !blk_crypto_queue_decrypt_bio(bio);
289
+	if (blk_crypto_fallback_bio_prep(bio_ptr))
290
+		return true;
291
+fail:
292
+	bio_endio(*bio_ptr);
293
+	return false;
294
+}
295
+
296
+int __blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep(struct request *rq, struct bio *bio,
297
+			     gfp_t gfp_mask)
298
+{
299
+	if (!rq->crypt_ctx) {
300
+		rq->crypt_ctx = mempool_alloc(bio_crypt_ctx_pool, gfp_mask);
301
+		if (!rq->crypt_ctx)
302
+			return -ENOMEM;
165303 	}
166
-
167
-	if (bc->bc_keyslot >= 0)
168
-		bio_crypt_ctx_release_keyslot(bc);
169
-
170
-	return true;
304
+	*rq->crypt_ctx = *bio->bi_crypt_context;
305
+	return 0;
171306 }
172307 
173308 /**
....@@ -185,8 +320,8 @@
185320  *	       key is used
186321  * @data_unit_size: the data unit size to use for en/decryption
187322  *
188
- * Return: The blk_crypto_key that was prepared, or an ERR_PTR() on error.  When
189
- *	   done using the key, it must be freed with blk_crypto_free_key().
323
+ * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure.  The caller is responsible for
324
+ *	   zeroizing both blk_key and raw_key when done with them.
190325  */
191326 int blk_crypto_init_key(struct blk_crypto_key *blk_key,
192327 			const u8 *raw_key, unsigned int raw_key_size,
....@@ -196,8 +331,6 @@
196331 			unsigned int data_unit_size)
197332 {
198333 	const struct blk_crypto_mode *mode;
199
-	static siphash_key_t hash_key;
200
-	u32 hash;
201334 
202335 	memset(blk_key, 0, sizeof(*blk_key));
203336 
....@@ -216,91 +349,100 @@
216349 			return -EINVAL;
217350 	}
218351 
219
-	if (dun_bytes <= 0 || dun_bytes > BLK_CRYPTO_MAX_IV_SIZE)
352
+	if (dun_bytes == 0 || dun_bytes > mode->ivsize)
220353 		return -EINVAL;
221354 
222355 	if (!is_power_of_2(data_unit_size))
223356 		return -EINVAL;
224357 
225
-	blk_key->crypto_mode = crypto_mode;
226
-	blk_key->data_unit_size = data_unit_size;
358
+	blk_key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode = crypto_mode;
359
+	blk_key->crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = dun_bytes;
360
+	blk_key->crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = data_unit_size;
361
+	blk_key->crypto_cfg.is_hw_wrapped = is_hw_wrapped;
227362 	blk_key->data_unit_size_bits = ilog2(data_unit_size);
228363 	blk_key->size = raw_key_size;
229
-	blk_key->is_hw_wrapped = is_hw_wrapped;
230364 	memcpy(blk_key->raw, raw_key, raw_key_size);
231
-
232
-	/*
233
-	 * The keyslot manager uses the SipHash of the key to implement O(1) key
234
-	 * lookups while avoiding leaking information about the keys.  It's
235
-	 * precomputed here so that it only needs to be computed once per key.
236
-	 */
237
-	get_random_once(&hash_key, sizeof(hash_key));
238
-	hash = (u32)siphash(raw_key, raw_key_size, &hash_key);
239
-	blk_crypto_key_set_hash_and_dun_bytes(blk_key, hash, dun_bytes);
240365 
241366 	return 0;
242367 }
243368 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_init_key);
244369 
370
+/*
371
+ * Check if bios with @cfg can be en/decrypted by blk-crypto (i.e. either the
372
+ * request queue it's submitted to supports inline crypto, or the
373
+ * blk-crypto-fallback is enabled and supports the cfg).
374
+ */
375
+bool blk_crypto_config_supported(struct request_queue *q,
376
+				 const struct blk_crypto_config *cfg)
377
+{
378
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BLK_INLINE_ENCRYPTION_FALLBACK) &&
379
+	    !cfg->is_hw_wrapped)
380
+		return true;
381
+	return blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(q->ksm, cfg);
382
+}
383
+
245384 /**
246
- * blk_crypto_start_using_mode() - Start using blk-crypto on a device
247
- * @crypto_mode: the crypto mode that will be used
248
- * @dun_bytes: number of bytes that will be used to specify the DUN
249
- * @data_unit_size: the data unit size that will be used
250
- * @is_hw_wrapped_key: whether the key will be hardware-wrapped
385
+ * blk_crypto_start_using_key() - Start using a blk_crypto_key on a device
386
+ * @key: A key to use on the device
251387  * @q: the request queue for the device
252388  *
253389  * Upper layers must call this function to ensure that either the hardware
254
- * supports the needed crypto settings, or the crypto API fallback has
255
- * transforms for the needed mode allocated and ready to go.
390
+ * supports the key's crypto settings, or the crypto API fallback has transforms
391
+ * for the needed mode allocated and ready to go. This function may allocate
392
+ * an skcipher, and *should not* be called from the data path, since that might
393
+ * cause a deadlock
256394  *
257
- * Return: 0 on success; -ENOPKG if the hardware doesn't support the crypto
258
- *	   settings and blk-crypto-fallback is either disabled or the needed
259
- *	   algorithm is disabled in the crypto API; or another -errno code.
395
+ * Return: 0 on success; -ENOPKG if the hardware doesn't support the key and
396
+ *	   blk-crypto-fallback is either disabled or the needed algorithm
397
+ *	   is disabled in the crypto API; or another -errno code.
260398  */
261
-int blk_crypto_start_using_mode(enum blk_crypto_mode_num crypto_mode,
262
-				unsigned int dun_bytes,
263
-				unsigned int data_unit_size,
264
-				bool is_hw_wrapped_key,
265
-				struct request_queue *q)
399
+int blk_crypto_start_using_key(const struct blk_crypto_key *key,
400
+			       struct request_queue *q)
266401 {
267
-	if (keyslot_manager_crypto_mode_supported(q->ksm, crypto_mode,
268
-						  dun_bytes, data_unit_size,
269
-						  is_hw_wrapped_key))
402
+	if (blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(q->ksm, &key->crypto_cfg))
270403 		return 0;
271
-	if (is_hw_wrapped_key) {
404
+	if (key->crypto_cfg.is_hw_wrapped) {
272405 		pr_warn_once("hardware doesn't support wrapped keys\n");
273406 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
274407 	}
275
-	return blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(crypto_mode);
408
+	return blk_crypto_fallback_start_using_mode(key->crypto_cfg.crypto_mode);
276409 }
277
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_start_using_mode);
410
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_start_using_key);
278411 
279412 /**
280
- * blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a key from any inline encryption hardware
281
- *			    it may have been programmed into
282
- * @q: The request queue who's keyslot manager this key might have been
283
- *     programmed into
284
- * @key: The key to evict
413
+ * blk_crypto_evict_key() - Evict a blk_crypto_key from a request_queue
414
+ * @q: a request_queue on which I/O using the key may have been done
415
+ * @key: the key to evict
285416  *
286
- * Upper layers (filesystems) should call this function to ensure that a key
287
- * is evicted from hardware that it might have been programmed into. This
288
- * will call keyslot_manager_evict_key on the queue's keyslot manager, if one
289
- * exists, and supports the crypto algorithm with the specified data unit size.
290
- * Otherwise, it will evict the key from the blk-crypto-fallback's ksm.
417
+ * For a given request_queue, this function removes the given blk_crypto_key
418
+ * from the keyslot management structures and evicts it from any underlying
419
+ * hardware keyslot(s) or blk-crypto-fallback keyslot it may have been
420
+ * programmed into.
291421  *
292
- * Return: 0 on success, -err on error.
422
+ * Upper layers must call this before freeing the blk_crypto_key.  It must be
423
+ * called for every request_queue the key may have been used on.  The key must
424
+ * no longer be in use by any I/O when this function is called.
425
+ *
426
+ * Context: May sleep.
293427  */
294
-int blk_crypto_evict_key(struct request_queue *q,
295
-			 const struct blk_crypto_key *key)
428
+void blk_crypto_evict_key(struct request_queue *q,
429
+			  const struct blk_crypto_key *key)
296430 {
297
-	if (q->ksm &&
298
-	    keyslot_manager_crypto_mode_supported(q->ksm, key->crypto_mode,
299
-						  blk_crypto_key_dun_bytes(key),
300
-						  key->data_unit_size,
301
-						  key->is_hw_wrapped))
302
-		return keyslot_manager_evict_key(q->ksm, key);
431
+	int err;
303432 
304
-	return blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(key);
433
+	if (blk_ksm_crypto_cfg_supported(q->ksm, &key->crypto_cfg))
434
+		err = blk_ksm_evict_key(q->ksm, key);
435
+	else
436
+		err = blk_crypto_fallback_evict_key(key);
437
+	/*
438
+	 * An error can only occur here if the key failed to be evicted from a
439
+	 * keyslot (due to a hardware or driver issue) or is allegedly still in
440
+	 * use by I/O (due to a kernel bug).  Even in these cases, the key is
441
+	 * still unlinked from the keyslot management structures, and the caller
442
+	 * is allowed and expected to free it right away.  There's nothing
443
+	 * callers can do to handle errors, so just log them and return void.
444
+	 */
445
+	if (err)
446
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("error %d evicting key\n", err);
305447 }
306448 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_crypto_evict_key);