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2024-01-05 071106ecf68c401173c58808b1cf5f68cc50d390 
 kernel/security/keys/big_key.c
....@@ -1,13 +1,9 @@
1
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
12 /* Large capacity key type
23  *
3
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
4
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2020 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
45  * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
56  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
6
- *
7
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
8
- * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
9
- * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
10
- * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
117  */
128 
139 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "big_key: "fmt
....@@ -16,20 +12,10 @@
1612 #include <linux/file.h>
1713 #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
1814 #include <linux/err.h>
19
-#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
2015 #include <linux/random.h>
21
-#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
2216 #include <keys/user-type.h>
2317 #include <keys/big_key-type.h>
24
-#include <crypto/aead.h>
25
-#include <crypto/gcm.h>
26
-
27
-struct big_key_buf {
28
-	unsigned int		nr_pages;
29
-	void			*virt;
30
-	struct scatterlist	*sg;
31
-	struct page		*pages[];
32
-};
18
+#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
3319 
3420 /*
3521  * Layout of key payload words.
....@@ -42,29 +28,11 @@
4228 };
4329 
4430 /*
45
- * Crypto operation with big_key data
46
- */
47
-enum big_key_op {
48
-	BIG_KEY_ENC,
49
-	BIG_KEY_DEC,
50
-};
51
-
52
-/*
5331  * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
5432  * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
5533  * least as large as the data.
5634  */
5735 #define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
58
-
59
-/*
60
- * Key size for big_key data encryption
61
- */
62
-#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 32
63
-
64
-/*
65
- * Authentication tag length
66
- */
67
-#define ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE 16
6836 
6937 /*
7038  * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
....@@ -79,136 +47,20 @@
7947 	.destroy		= big_key_destroy,
8048 	.describe		= big_key_describe,
8149 	.read			= big_key_read,
82
-	/* no ->update(); don't add it without changing big_key_crypt() nonce */
50
+	.update			= big_key_update,
8351 };
84
-
85
-/*
86
- * Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption
87
- */
88
-static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)";
89
-#define BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE		GCM_AES_IV_SIZE
90
-
91
-/*
92
- * Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption
93
- */
94
-static struct crypto_aead *big_key_aead;
95
-
96
-/*
97
- * Since changing the key affects the entire object, we need a mutex.
98
- */
99
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(big_key_aead_lock);
100
-
101
-/*
102
- * Encrypt/decrypt big_key data
103
- */
104
-static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, struct big_key_buf *buf, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
105
-{
106
-	int ret;
107
-	struct aead_request *aead_req;
108
-	/* We always use a zero nonce. The reason we can get away with this is
109
-	 * because we're using a different randomly generated key for every
110
-	 * different encryption. Notably, too, key_type_big_key doesn't define
111
-	 * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the
112
-	 * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption.
113
-	 */
114
-	u8 zero_nonce[BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE];
115
-
116
-	aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL);
117
-	if (!aead_req)
118
-		return -ENOMEM;
119
-
120
-	memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce));
121
-	aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, buf->sg, buf->sg, datalen, zero_nonce);
122
-	aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
123
-	aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0);
124
-
125
-	mutex_lock(&big_key_aead_lock);
126
-	if (crypto_aead_setkey(big_key_aead, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) {
127
-		ret = -EAGAIN;
128
-		goto error;
129
-	}
130
-	if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
131
-		ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
132
-	else
133
-		ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
134
-error:
135
-	mutex_unlock(&big_key_aead_lock);
136
-	aead_request_free(aead_req);
137
-	return ret;
138
-}
139
-
140
-/*
141
- * Free up the buffer.
142
- */
143
-static void big_key_free_buffer(struct big_key_buf *buf)
144
-{
145
-	unsigned int i;
146
-
147
-	if (buf->virt) {
148
-		memset(buf->virt, 0, buf->nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE);
149
-		vunmap(buf->virt);
150
-	}
151
-
152
-	for (i = 0; i < buf->nr_pages; i++)
153
-		if (buf->pages[i])
154
-			__free_page(buf->pages[i]);
155
-
156
-	kfree(buf);
157
-}
158
-
159
-/*
160
- * Allocate a buffer consisting of a set of pages with a virtual mapping
161
- * applied over them.
162
- */
163
-static void *big_key_alloc_buffer(size_t len)
164
-{
165
-	struct big_key_buf *buf;
166
-	unsigned int npg = (len + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
167
-	unsigned int i, l;
168
-
169
-	buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct big_key_buf) +
170
-		      sizeof(struct page) * npg +
171
-		      sizeof(struct scatterlist) * npg,
172
-		      GFP_KERNEL);
173
-	if (!buf)
174
-		return NULL;
175
-
176
-	buf->nr_pages = npg;
177
-	buf->sg = (void *)(buf->pages + npg);
178
-	sg_init_table(buf->sg, npg);
179
-
180
-	for (i = 0; i < buf->nr_pages; i++) {
181
-		buf->pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
182
-		if (!buf->pages[i])
183
-			goto nomem;
184
-
185
-		l = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE);
186
-		sg_set_page(&buf->sg[i], buf->pages[i], l, 0);
187
-		len -= l;
188
-	}
189
-
190
-	buf->virt = vmap(buf->pages, buf->nr_pages, VM_MAP, PAGE_KERNEL);
191
-	if (!buf->virt)
192
-		goto nomem;
193
-
194
-	return buf;
195
-
196
-nomem:
197
-	big_key_free_buffer(buf);
198
-	return NULL;
199
-}
20052 
20153 /*
20254  * Preparse a big key
20355  */
20456 int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
20557 {
206
-	struct big_key_buf *buf;
20758 	struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
20859 	struct file *file;
209
-	u8 *enckey;
60
+	u8 *buf, *enckey;
21061 	ssize_t written;
211
-	size_t datalen = prep->datalen, enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
62
+	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
63
+	size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
21264 	int ret;
21365 
21466 	if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
....@@ -224,28 +76,28 @@
22476 		 * to be swapped out if needed.
22577 		 *
22678 		 * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
79
+		 * Since the key is random for each file, we can set the nonce
80
+		 * to zero, provided we never define a ->update() call.
22781 		 */
22882 		loff_t pos = 0;
22983 
230
-		buf = big_key_alloc_buffer(enclen);
84
+		buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
23185 		if (!buf)
23286 			return -ENOMEM;
233
-		memcpy(buf->virt, prep->data, datalen);
23487 
23588 		/* generate random key */
236
-		enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
89
+		enckey = kmalloc(CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
23790 		if (!enckey) {
23891 			ret = -ENOMEM;
23992 			goto error;
24093 		}
241
-		ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, ENC_KEY_SIZE);
94
+		ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE);
24295 		if (unlikely(ret))
24396 			goto err_enckey;
24497 
245
-		/* encrypt aligned data */
246
-		ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, buf, datalen, enckey);
247
-		if (ret)
248
-			goto err_enckey;
98
+		/* encrypt data */
99
+		chacha20poly1305_encrypt(buf, prep->data, datalen, NULL, 0,
100
+					 0, enckey);
249101 
250102 		/* save aligned data to file */
251103 		file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
....@@ -254,11 +106,11 @@
254106 			goto err_enckey;
255107 		}
256108 
257
-		written = kernel_write(file, buf->virt, enclen, &pos);
109
+		written = kernel_write(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
258110 		if (written != enclen) {
259111 			ret = written;
260112 			if (written >= 0)
261
-				ret = -ENOMEM;
113
+				ret = -EIO;
262114 			goto err_fput;
263115 		}
264116 
....@@ -269,7 +121,8 @@
269121 		*path = file->f_path;
270122 		path_get(path);
271123 		fput(file);
272
-		big_key_free_buffer(buf);
124
+		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
125
+		kvfree(buf);
273126 	} else {
274127 		/* Just store the data in a buffer */
275128 		void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
....@@ -285,9 +138,10 @@
285138 err_fput:
286139 	fput(file);
287140 err_enckey:
288
-	kzfree(enckey);
141
+	kfree_sensitive(enckey);
289142 error:
290
-	big_key_free_buffer(buf);
143
+	memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
144
+	kvfree(buf);
291145 	return ret;
292146 }
293147 
....@@ -301,7 +155,7 @@
301155 
302156 		path_put(path);
303157 	}
304
-	kzfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
158
+	kfree_sensitive(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
305159 }
306160 
307161 /*
....@@ -333,8 +187,25 @@
333187 		path->mnt = NULL;
334188 		path->dentry = NULL;
335189 	}
336
-	kzfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
190
+	kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
337191 	key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
192
+}
193
+
194
+/*
195
+ * Update a big key
196
+ */
197
+int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
198
+{
199
+	int ret;
200
+
201
+	ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
202
+	if (ret < 0)
203
+		return ret;
204
+
205
+	if (key_is_positive(key))
206
+		big_key_destroy(key);
207
+
208
+	return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
338209 }
339210 
340211 /*
....@@ -365,14 +236,13 @@
365236 		return datalen;
366237 
367238 	if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
368
-		struct big_key_buf *buf;
369239 		struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
370240 		struct file *file;
371
-		u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
372
-		size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
241
+		u8 *buf, *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
242
+		size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
373243 		loff_t pos = 0;
374244 
375
-		buf = big_key_alloc_buffer(enclen);
245
+		buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
376246 		if (!buf)
377247 			return -ENOMEM;
378248 
....@@ -383,25 +253,28 @@
383253 		}
384254 
385255 		/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
386
-		ret = kernel_read(file, buf->virt, enclen, &pos);
387
-		if (ret >= 0 && ret != enclen) {
388
-			ret = -EIO;
256
+		ret = kernel_read(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
257
+		if (ret != enclen) {
258
+			if (ret >= 0)
259
+				ret = -EIO;
389260 			goto err_fput;
390261 		}
391262 
392
-		ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, buf, enclen, enckey);
393
-		if (ret)
263
+		ret = chacha20poly1305_decrypt(buf, buf, enclen, NULL, 0, 0,
264
+					       enckey) ? 0 : -EBADMSG;
265
+		if (unlikely(ret))
394266 			goto err_fput;
395267 
396268 		ret = datalen;
397269 
398270 		/* copy out decrypted data */
399
-		memcpy(buffer, buf->virt, datalen);
271
+		memcpy(buffer, buf, datalen);
400272 
401273 err_fput:
402274 		fput(file);
403275 error:
404
-		big_key_free_buffer(buf);
276
+		memzero_explicit(buf, enclen);
277
+		kvfree(buf);
405278 	} else {
406279 		ret = datalen;
407280 		memcpy(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], datalen);
....@@ -415,39 +288,7 @@
415288  */
416289 static int __init big_key_init(void)
417290 {
418
-	int ret;
419
-
420
-	/* init block cipher */
421
-	big_key_aead = crypto_alloc_aead(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
422
-	if (IS_ERR(big_key_aead)) {
423
-		ret = PTR_ERR(big_key_aead);
424
-		pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret);
425
-		return ret;
426
-	}
427
-
428
-	if (unlikely(crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead) != BIG_KEY_IV_SIZE)) {
429
-		WARN(1, "big key algorithm changed?");
430
-		ret = -EINVAL;
431
-		goto free_aead;
432
-	}
433
-
434
-	ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE);
435
-	if (ret < 0) {
436
-		pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret);
437
-		goto free_aead;
438
-	}
439
-
440
-	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
441
-	if (ret < 0) {
442
-		pr_err("Can't register type: %d\n", ret);
443
-		goto free_aead;
444
-	}
445
-
446
-	return 0;
447
-
448
-free_aead:
449
-	crypto_free_aead(big_key_aead);
450
-	return ret;
291
+	return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
451292 }
452293 
453294 late_initcall(big_key_init);