| .. | .. | 
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| 65 | 65 |   */ | 
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| 66 | 66 |  static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) | 
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| 67 | 67 |  { | 
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| 68 |  | -	u64 canary = 0;  | 
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 | 68 | +	u64 canary;  | 
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| 69 | 69 |  	u64 tsc; | 
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| 70 | 70 |   | 
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| 71 | 71 |  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 | 
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| .. | .. | 
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| 76 | 76 |  	 * of randomness. The TSC only matters for very early init, | 
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| 77 | 77 |  	 * there it already has some randomness on most systems. Later | 
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| 78 | 78 |  	 * on during the bootup the random pool has true entropy too. | 
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| 79 |  | -	 * For preempt-rt we need to weaken the randomness a bit, as  | 
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| 80 |  | -	 * we can't call into the random generator from atomic context  | 
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| 81 |  | -	 * due to locking constraints. We just leave canary  | 
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| 82 |  | -	 * uninitialized and use the TSC based randomness on top of it.  | 
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| 83 | 79 |  	 */ | 
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| 84 |  | -#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT  | 
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| 85 | 80 |  	get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); | 
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| 86 |  | -#endif  | 
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| 87 | 81 |  	tsc = rdtsc(); | 
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| 88 | 82 |  	canary += tsc + (tsc << 32UL); | 
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| 89 | 83 |  	canary &= CANARY_MASK; | 
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