移去rt

hc

2023-12-08 01573e231f18eb2d99162747186f59511f56b64d

 kernel/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/Yama.rst
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 etc) to extract additional credentials and continue to expand the scope
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 of their attack without resorting to user-assisted phishing.
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-This is not a theoretical problem. SSH session hijacking
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-(http://www.storm.net.nz/projects/7) and arbitrary code injection
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-(http://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html) attacks already
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+This is not a theoretical problem. `SSH session hijacking
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+<https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-05/bh-us-05-boileau.pdf>`_
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+and `arbitrary code injection
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+<https://c-skills.blogspot.com/2007/05/injectso.html>`_ attacks already
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 exist and remain possible if ptrace is allowed to operate as before.
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 Since ptrace is not commonly used by non-developers and non-admins, system
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 builders should be allowed the option to disable this debugging system.
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     Using ``PTRACE_TRACEME`` is unchanged.
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 2 - admin-only attach:
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-    only processes with ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` may use ptrace
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-    with ``PTRACE_ATTACH``, or through children calling ``PTRACE_TRACEME``.
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+    only processes with ``CAP_SYS_PTRACE`` may use ptrace, either with
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+    ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` or through children calling ``PTRACE_TRACEME``.
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 3 - no attach:
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     no processes may use ptrace with ``PTRACE_ATTACH`` nor via