# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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menu "Kernel hardening options"
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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bool
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help
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While the kernel is built with warnings enabled for any missed
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stack variable initializations, this warning is silenced for
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anything passed by reference to another function, under the
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occasionally misguided assumption that the function will do
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the initialization. As this regularly leads to exploitable
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flaws, this plugin is available to identify and zero-initialize
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such variables, depending on the chosen level of coverage.
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This plugin was originally ported from grsecurity/PaX. More
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information at:
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* https://grsecurity.net/
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* https://pax.grsecurity.net/
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menu "Memory initialization"
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config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
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def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=pattern)
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config CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
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def_bool $(cc-option,-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero -enable-trivial-auto-var-init-zero-knowing-it-will-be-removed-from-clang)
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choice
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prompt "Initialize kernel stack variables at function entry"
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default GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL if COMPILE_TEST && GCC_PLUGINS
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default INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN if COMPILE_TEST && CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
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default INIT_STACK_NONE
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help
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This option enables initialization of stack variables at
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function entry time. This has the possibility to have the
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greatest coverage (since all functions can have their
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variables initialized), but the performance impact depends
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on the function calling complexity of a given workload's
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syscalls.
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This chooses the level of coverage over classes of potentially
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uninitialized variables. The selected class will be
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initialized before use in a function.
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config INIT_STACK_NONE
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bool "no automatic initialization (weakest)"
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help
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Disable automatic stack variable initialization.
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This leaves the kernel vulnerable to the standard
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classes of uninitialized stack variable exploits
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and information exposures.
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_BYREF_ALL
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bool "zero-init anything passed by reference (very strong)"
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depends on GCC_PLUGINS
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select GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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help
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Zero-initialize any stack variables that may be passed
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by reference and had not already been explicitly
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initialized. This is intended to eliminate all classes
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of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures.
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config INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN
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bool "0xAA-init everything on the stack (strongest)"
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depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_PATTERN
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help
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Initializes everything on the stack with a 0xAA
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pattern. This is intended to eliminate all classes
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of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
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left uninitialized.
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Pattern initialization is known to provoke many existing bugs
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related to uninitialized locals, e.g. pointers receive
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non-NULL values, buffer sizes and indices are very big.
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config INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
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bool "zero-init everything on the stack (strongest and safest)"
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depends on CC_HAS_AUTO_VAR_INIT_ZERO
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help
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Initializes everything on the stack with a zero
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value. This is intended to eliminate all classes
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of uninitialized stack variable exploits and information
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exposures, even variables that were warned to have been
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left uninitialized.
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Zero initialization provides safe defaults for strings,
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pointers, indices and sizes, and is therefore
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more suitable as a security mitigation measure.
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endchoice
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config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
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bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
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depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
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depends on !COMPILE_TEST # too noisy
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help
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This option will cause a warning to be printed each time the
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structleak plugin finds a variable it thinks needs to be
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initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected
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by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings.
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config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
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bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
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help
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This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
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command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
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When "init_on_alloc" is enabled, all page allocator and slab
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allocator memory will be zeroed when allocated, eliminating
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many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory" flaws, especially
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heap content exposures. The performance impact varies by
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workload, but most cases see <1% impact. Some synthetic
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workloads have measured as high as 7%.
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config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
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bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
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help
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This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
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command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
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Similar to "init_on_alloc", when "init_on_free" is enabled,
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all page allocator and slab allocator memory will be zeroed
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when freed, eliminating many kinds of "uninitialized heap memory"
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flaws, especially heap content exposures. The primary difference
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with "init_on_free" is that data lifetime in memory is reduced,
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as anything freed is wiped immediately, making live forensics or
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cold boot memory attacks unable to recover freed memory contents.
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The performance impact varies by workload, but is more expensive
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than "init_on_alloc" due to the negative cache effects of
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touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
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synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.
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endmenu
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endmenu
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